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
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BRITISH IMPERIALISM
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY



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BRITISH IMPERIALISM

IN THE

EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

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CHAPTER I

BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

THE imperialism of to-day rests principally upon the desire for union with fellow-subjects over sea, and upon the belief that without Greater Britain the mother-country would become (in Lord Curzon's words) merely 'the inglorious playground of the world.' Its motives are thus the gratification of national sentiment, and the strengthening of national influence.

A wide gulf separates this creed from that which guided England while she built her empire. Hardly a flicker of racial feeling brightens the worldly wisdom which led to her triumphs in the eighteenth century. Even Chatham failed to realise that in commercial relations the Briton across the Atlantic should not be treated as an alien by the Briton at home. The conception of an Anglo-Saxon brotherhood, though it dawned on Benjamin Franklin, was unknown in England. Similarly

no one then held the opinion that the prime value of colonisation was the increase of British power. Men appreciated its indirect services to the advancement of naval supremacy, but they did not dream that the diffusion of their compatriots over the globe conduced to make the country the arbiter of Christendom. Although the period that witnessed Clive pacing the mango grove at Plassey, and Wolfe climbing the Heights of Abraham, must be called heroic, surely no imperialism was ever less military. A standing army was the stock abomination of the political stage. Defoe wrote complacently in 1728, 'What poor man in his sense, that could get twelve shillings a week at his loom, and live at home, warm, easy and safe, would go abroad and starve in a camp, or be knocked on the head on the counterscarp, at the rate of three and six a week?'¹ Upon such excessive prudence the long history of English unreadiness for conflict, and of English mismanagement in war, is the best comment.

The keynote to the enthusiasm which sustained the people during their wars with France and Spain for maritime and colonial ascendancy was simply trade. Commercial interests led them to venture into every market under the sun, and the flag followed in their wake. We

¹ Defoe's *Plan of the English Commerce* (1728), p. 94.

must not allow ourselves to be deluded by the sounding catchwords that accompanied their victorious course. 'The Protestant religion' was no more the source of their inspiration than 'Saint George for Merrie England' had been in the Middle Ages. When the state was asked to found Anglican bishoprics in North America, or to give its promised money grant to Berkeley's plan for educating and converting Red Indians in Bermuda, it deprecated at once the folly of religious visionaries. Nor was the defence of human liberty a direct motive for British expansion. That noble cause helped indeed to consolidate the empire, but it was adopted as a means, not as an end.

During the long period of *laissez-faire* principles that stretches from the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781 to the triumph of Disraeli at the polls in 1874, this absorption of eighteenth-century empire-builders in commercial concerns was deemed to be the undying condemnation of the old colonial system. Its fundamental canon that a great empire should aim at self-sufficiency, and its elementary idea that a nation cannot prosper unless it carves out markets for itself in a world of fierce competition, were alike laughed to scorn by generations of economists and doctrinaires. They rightly pointed out that the reckless

concentration of imperial policy upon these two objects had led to the loss of the American colonies.

Such critics forgot, however, that the economic disabilities which had been placed upon the colonies, and which were the real cause of the Revolution, had not been essential to the theory of empire that prompted them. They did not see that if the former system had brought on its own punishment in America, it had also brought on its own rewards. It gave to England not only sea-power and the possessions that still remained to her, but also the vast wealth, the world-wide influence and the great traditions that enabled her to stand far in advance of all other nations after the strain and waste of the Napoleonic wars.

English colonial policy under the first three Georges had no doubt grave faults. It was saturated by the narrow commercialism which tormented Burke, and which brought in its train a baneful spirit of monopoly and an unholy devotion to the slave-trade. Yet it endowed Britain none the less with sanity and tolerance. Under its sway the colonies enjoyed a full measure of self-government, and with a liberality which was then amazing it provided civil and religious liberty both for foreign settlers who came within the borders of the

empire, and for foreign settlements that fell beneath the English rule. No other state has ever surpassed the wise British policy of conciliation that made the Germans in Pennsylvania averse to throw in their lot with the rebels of 1775, and that secured the loyalty of the French Canadians in that year and in 1812 by permitting the maintenance of their institutions and religion.

A second and no less valuable lesson was the national unwillingness to embark upon fruitless wars. The Kings of France were led by selfish ambitions to fritter away the strength of their country in flattering a taste for military glory, in losing Canada upon the plains of Germany. The typical English politician of the same era would not allow his government to indulge in so sterile a career, and public opinion approved his course. The people fought well and gladly, but only when they felt that the cause they championed harmonised with their material interests. The eighteenth century, in spite of all its wars, was the seed-time of the Pax Britannica. Even the want of imagination and ideals, which renders so large a portion of English annals during that time dull if not sordid, helped to make for peace.

Freedom for all creeds and races within the realm, and the utility of peace, are surely no

unworthy principles for which modern England is indebted to the empire-builders of the eighteenth century. Without such lasting legacies to British political theory, the empire could hardly have survived the paralysing indifference of the Manchester school.

For these reasons the later-day reader ought not to feel out of touch with the four outbursts of popular emotion which are treated in the succeeding chapters. They illustrate how strenuous and how uniform were the forces in English society which made the rise of Greater Britain one of the dominating features in the story of a great epoch. Weighty issues may be raised by small episodes, and he who investigates these mere incidents in the evolution of British politics finds himself faced by problems that are still with us. The historian will always delight to amplify if possible by fresh research the existing version of a past event, but he has also the larger task of providing the materials upon which all sound public policy is based. Statesmanship rarely comes by instinct, and political knowledge is not mere intuition.

CHAPTER II

THE WAR FEVER OF 1739

THE merits of the agitation which forced Walpole into war with Spain in 1739 will always be open to question. To one school of thought it represents for all time the sacrifice of England's true interests at the altar of ignorance and greed. It is only memorable as the cause of Walpole's departure from the peace policy which was the dictate of his convictions and the keystone of his fame. To another school, however, the war fever of 1739 is an essential step in the march of the British empire, linking in an ambiguous age the patriotism which won Gibraltar and Blenheim to that which triumphed at Plassey and Quebec. To orthodox Whigs the story of Jenkins's ear has always been fabulous or claptrap; to later-day believers in 'expansion' it ranks among the most pathetic in history.

To describe the actual polemics of the movement towards the war in dispute is to tread less debatable ground. In spite of its frequent lapses into the personalities which are the dross

of political literature, the controversial writings of the day are both interesting and suggestive. Their ideas embrace important and permanent elements in English thought as well as mere distaste for the autocracy and for the diplomatic immobility of the minister against whom they are aimed. It is, however, necessary first to examine the facts which gave birth to the nation's grievance, in order to give it some of that historical sympathy to which all deep popular emotions are entitled. The primary fact was the vice inherent to the Spanish colonial system.

Two principles, slavery and excessive fiscal restraint, were then the commonplaces of political science, and the evils which they involved found easy victims in the indolent inhabitants of Spanish America. They became absolutely dependent upon Europe for both their commercial needs and also for the negroes required to work the mines which were their only source of wealth. In sharp contrast with England under her analogous 'old colonial system,' Spain herself was too idle and negligent to avail herself of her monopoly. Alone among the nations possessing transatlantic dependencies, she made no attempt to draw slaves from the African coasts.¹ Beyond sending to Vera

¹ *Present State of the West Indies* (1775), p. 12.

Cruz azogas—ships laden with mercury for amalgamating metals into ingots in the Peruvian mines¹—she failed signally to provide her colonists with the goods they needed. New Spain was thus encouraged to drift into economic discontent. With a view to remedying the lack of a regular slave supply, the Spanish Government as early as 1517 entered into an *Assiento* or contract, whereby in consideration of a commission on each ‘piece’ imported, the Crown granted the exclusive right of shipping negroes into its American lands to foreign adventurers. This privilege was enjoyed in turn by Flemings, Genoese, Germans and Portuguese, and between 1701 and 1711 by the French Guinea Company.² The undertakers themselves failed with curious consistency to make a profit.

Under these circumstances the Spanish colonies were chafing under their economic restraints at the time of the Treaty of Utrecht, and Philip v. was willing to secure for them a better supply of both negroes and European merchandise if a concession on his part would at the same time benefit his own exchequer, and confirm the departure of the British Govern-

¹ *Present State of the West Indies* (1775), p. 13; *Recueil des Instructions données aux amb. de France* (Espagne, éd. Morel Fatio et Léonardon [1899]), iii. 227.

² Lamberty, *Mémoires* (1736), vii. 124.

ment from the war policy of Marlborough. The Assiento compact alone would involve but the despatch of 4800 slaves a year to Spanish America, subject to the payment to the Crown of $33\frac{1}{3}$ pieces of eight (£7, 4s. 5d.) per head on that number, whether actually imported or no.¹ Combined, however, with the more novel privilege of breaking partially into the Spanish trading monopoly, the offer of the Assiento sufficed to dazzle English imagination when on the full tide of the Tory reaction. Of the many commodities in which the colonists had been previously stinted, wine, brandy, oil, linen, calico and earthenware were the chief, and might all be supplied from England. In return for such goods, importers would be able to draw gold, silver, cochineal, vanilla and logwood from the fair at Porto Bello, which until 1737 lasted forty days in each year. This place was the depôt for all the riches of Peru, which were landed at Panama on the Pacific coast of the isthmus of Darien, and carried across the mountains on mules' backs. The Tory ministry therefore gladly accepted a term in the Treaty with Spain (13th July 1713) which was afterwards considered Oxford's most 'valuable legacy for his

¹ *A True Account of the Rise of the South Sea Company* (1743), pp. 7, 8.

country.’¹ For a period of thirty years the right of shipping 4800 sound, healthy and merchantable negroes every year to Spanish America was vested in Great Britain, subject to the payment of the usual duties to the Spanish Crown. The English Crown waived later its right to claim a similar percentage. One ship of 500 tons (afterwards increased to 620) was to be allowed to fare annually to stated ports with European goods.

These two rights were granted by the British Government to the South Sea Company in accordance with Oxford’s promise at the time of its incorporation in 1711, and in consideration for the large loans which it had advanced to the state at low rates of interest. Without such grants the British monopoly of trade with South America bestowed upon the Company by Queen Anne would have been barren indeed. The promise of wealth held out by the concessions of 1713 contributed to the great inflation of the value of the Company’s stock in the bubble of 1720. Yet in practice the *Assiento* and the right to trade were both severely confined from the first. Negroes might only be conveyed in two ships a year, and none could be sold for more than 300 pieces of eight at Sancta Marta, Cumana or Maracaybo.

¹ *Houstoun’s Works* (ed. 1753), p. 163.

The profits of the annual trading-ship were whittled away by the reservation of $\frac{23}{80}$ thereof to the Spanish Crown,¹ and though license was obtained for two vessels to accompany the ship itself as tenders, their joint cargoes were wholly inadequate to meet the actual demand in America or to give the Company returns proportionate to its capital or its expectations.

Nevertheless the failure of the Company to profit by its grant is singular. A negro could be bought in Guinea for £10 worth of goods, and sold in the Spanish West Indies for from 280 to 300 pieces of eight (*i.e.* from £60, 13s. 4d. to £65),² more than twice the price obtainable in British colonies ;³ while English goods were so much preferred to Spanish that no Cadiz merchant could dispose of his cargo in America until that of the annual ship and its tenders had been completely sold. Yet except in 1731 each of the ten voyages of the Company's ship resulted in pecuniary loss.⁴ Moreover, while the Spanish King claimed full duties as on 4800 negroes imported each year, the Company's actual shipments seldom exceeded half that number, although the Spanish governors were

¹ Lamberty, *Mémoires* (1736), viii. 360-2.

² Houstoun's *Works* (1753), pp. 147, 224.

³ Defoe's *Plan of the English Commerce* (1737), p. 244.

⁴ Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776), Book v. ch. i. pt. 3, art. 1.

not remiss in repressing infringements of their monopoly. Houstoun, a Scots surgeon employed for many years in the Company's factory at Cartagena, attributes the failure of its slave-trade to its original exclusion from the cheapest slave-markets by the Royal African Company,¹ but this disability ended in 1721 when an arrangement was made by which the South Sea Company engaged to procure all its slaves from the African Company at the rate of £22, 10s. 'per piece' from the Gold Coast, Accra or Whydah, and £18, 10s. 'per piece' from Angola.² In any case, it would not account for the unsuccessful voyages of the trading-ship. Nor can they be ascribed to its huge over-capitalisation. In 1722 over £33,800,000 was sunk in South Sea stock, and no doubt before the trading department was divided in 1723 from that which dealt with annuities, the concessions of 1713 gave far too little scope for returns of sufficient magnitude to provide a considerable dividend on so vast a sum. Yet in fact the returns were inadequate even in relation to the comparatively small capital appropriated to the American trade, and this

¹ Houstoun's *Works* (1753), p. 151. Apparently the average price of negroes in this market was only £2 per head (see Defoe's *Plan of the English Commerce* (1737), p. 244), so the African Company made a very good bargain in 1721.

² Douglass's *Summary* (1760), i. 77.

failure perplexed the age. The total profits made between 1724 and 1734 only amounted to £32,260.¹

Adam Smith afterwards attributed the Company's losses to the defects attaching to all large joint-stock companies,² in which individual initiative then found little play. Partly perhaps, as was then alleged, they were due to the covert hostility of Spain, and to her seizure of all the Company's available assets in 1718 and 1727,—such explanations are never unpopular. In a measure, however, it can be ascribed to the daring of British and New England interlopers, whose competition early became so keen as to drive the South Sea Company itself into the adoption of illicit methods for extending the all too narrow scope of its privileges. The Spanish governors were sometimes willing to connive at schemes which provided for the wants of the colonies to an extent far beyond that literally authorised in 1713, or by the later modifications of the *Assiento* which had been granted at Madrid. Therefore the two tenders, which were permitted to attend the annual ship, grew in bulk to large flotillas, so that the lawful cargo was replenished as fast as it was sold. Meanwhile the inter-

¹ Douglass's *Summary* (1760), i. 75.

² *Wealth of Nations* (1776), Book v. ch. i. pt. 3, art. 1.

lopers, whose trade was sanctioned neither by treaties nor by the English Crown, and whose doings were illegal according to both English and Spanish law, 'cut' the Company's prices by flooding the market with English goods fifty per cent. cheaper than the Company's, and a hundred per cent. cheaper than those sent from Spain.¹ They sold slaves at the unremunerative rate of about £28 per head,² while many servants of the Company were tempted into private trade on their own account. The contraband traffic in merchandise as distinguished from negroes realised high profits, and enriched a large class in England. It was said that New Spain and Cuba derived half their provisions from this source,³ while long caravans of mules used to carry packs of smuggled British goods from Porto Bello to Panama, where they were re-shipped for Callao.⁴

Spain did not acquiesce long in the abuse of the concessions she had made, and in her resistance lay the genesis of the war of 1739. One reason for resentment was the impossibility of retaining the American trade for her own

¹ *Present State of the Revenues and Forces of France and Spain* (1740), p. 26.

² *Houstoun's Works* (1753), p. 224.

³ *Present State of the Revenues and Forces of France and Spain* (1740), p. 23.

⁴ *A Proposal for Humbling Spain* (ed. 1740), p. 9.

galleons in the face of unlimited foreign competition. The monopolist ideals of the old colonial system were not peculiar to England, and in Spain they were ardently adopted by the rising political school of Ustariz and La Quadra. Another motive for Spain's resistance lay in the recurring incidence of diplomacy upon her colonial policy. Whenever England crossed the ambitious dreams of 'the Termagant of Spain,'¹ she felt that in the wide deviation from the narrow privileges granted to Britons in 1713 she had good grounds for a grievance which was sound in law, and for claims which were enforceable in fact. As early as 1727² spasmodic attempts were made to repress the violation of Spain's preventive rules. Ships known as *Guarda Costas* were fitted out by private persons, who received commissions from the governors to guard their coasts, and seize vessels engaged in illicit commerce.³ They brought into use the right of search, which at that time and for at least a century afterwards was regarded as the lawful corollary of a nation's right at International Law to prohibit any intercourse between its colonies and aliens.⁴ There was nothing in the

¹ *Portland MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Report for 1901)*, vii. 477.

² Harris's *Hardwicke* (1847), i. 328.

³ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, x. 486.

⁴ Vattel's *Law of Nations* (ed. Chitty, 1834), p. 39.

Anglo-Spanish treaties of 1667, 1670, and 1729 which affected the legality of such measures, although the Spaniards clearly exceeded their rights in searching ships on the high seas far beyond what could fairly be considered their territorial waters.

In Walpole's day, however, International Law had no more definite sanction than any other phase of positive international morality. 'Spanish insults and depredations'¹ were complained of in Jamaica in 1728, and the words run as a refrain to countless protests through the ensuing years. Long lists of ships 'rum-maged and plundered'² were submitted indignantly to a supine Government. In 1730 the governor of Jamaica appealed to the governor of Cartagena to save his countrymen from lying 'under the ignominy of being called the robbers of mankind,'³ but they chose to risk their reputation for honesty rather than forego the more material delight of 'plundering with impunity.'⁴ In 1733 the *Guarda Costas* dared to attack a large convoy,⁵ and as the Spanish courts invariably confirmed their captures by condemning ships and cargoes and

¹ Townshend MSS. (*Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, xi. 4 [1887]), p. 296.

² *Ibid.* pp. 148-9.

³ *English Hist. Review* (1889), iv. 742.

⁴ Marlborough MSS. (*Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, viii. 1 [1881]), p. 18.

⁵ Boyer's *Pol. State of Great Britain* for April 1738, lv. 321-5.

imprisoning the English seamen, they became careless in discriminating between ships really guilty of smuggling and those plying in good faith between Great Britain and her own West Indian colonies. Any British ship sailing near Spanish coasts with cargoes of logwood or cocoa-nuts¹ was seized with an avidity which foreshadowed the modern doctrine of the 'continuous voyage.'

Further points of difference between the two powers arose with regard to the English claims to cut logwood and own huts on the coast of Central America, particularly on that washed by the Gulf of Honduras, and to gather salt on the coast of Tortuga. The first had been enforced for over fifty years along the small creeks on the eastern coast of Yucatan, and also among the friendly Indians of the Mosquito shore² by bands of lawless sailors and logwood cutters from Jamaica. Logwood was then used by dyers for the making of black, red, musk and murrey colours, and was long after this time 'esteemed in Europe for blacks and violets,'³ the only competing product being

¹ *Gentleman's Magazine* (1739), ix. 33; *Townshend MSS.*, *ut supra*, p. 148.

² *Present State of the Revenues and Forces of France and Spain* (1740), p. 24.

³ *Weston Underwood MSS.* (*Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, x. 1 [1885]), p. 200.

Brazil wood from Rio, 'whereof there comes to Portugal no great quantity.'¹ At one time the Spaniards had been paid as much as £130 per ton for this staple, and the reduction of its price to but one-thirtieth of that amount was due to the energy of the British logwood cutters.² Hitherto the Spaniards had tolerated their trespass partly because they were redoubtable fighting men, partly 'on grounds of natural equity by which the rigour of laws between nations ought to be moderated.'³ Permission to gather salt off Tortuga had been expressly given at Madrid in December 1715. A last source of contention was the southern boundary of Georgia. Founded in 1732, and peopled in 1739 by some two thousand English, Scottish, Jewish, and German Protestant settlers, of whom only two hundred and sixty had immigrated at their own expense and risk,⁴ the colony was watched with jealous eyes by the Spaniards in Florida. In violation of the Treaty of 1713, they established themselves north of the River St. Matthew, and early in 1737 Oglethorpe pressed the trustees of Georgia for the immediate despatch of troops to protect the colony against a Spanish force gathering at

¹ Beawes' *Lex Mercatoria* (ed. 1813), ii. 262.

² *History of Jamaica* (1774), i. 515.

³ *Weston Underwood MSS.*, p. 201.

⁴ *Townshend MSS.* (*Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, xi. 4 [1837]), p. 267.

St. Augustine. Their leader, Montiano, stooped even to invite the slaves of Carolina to enter Spanish service, and partially succeeded in arousing a servile insurrection.¹

Few aspects of Walpole's career are better known than his attitude towards the agitation provoked in England by these differences with Spain. He fought hard for peace against the forces of unrest which always accompany commercial discontent and popular impatience of political monotony. Queen Caroline died in November 1737, and he knew that his power was waning while petitions and deputations were showered upon him. Jenkins's case was widely canvassed in March 1738. In May Walpole checked the violence of Parliament and obtained a vote of £3,750,000 on account of Spanish 'injuries and insults,'² without binding himself to offensive action. So interested was the public in the debates on the vote, that in spite of the expressed intention of Parliament to admit no strangers to the galleries of the House of Lords, a crowd of ladies of fashion, including two duchesses and the Countess of Huntingdon, besieged its doors from nine in the morning until five in the afternoon, when their patience was rewarded by

¹ Ortiz y Sanz, *Historia de España* (1803), vii. 465.

² *Keiton MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., xii. 9 [1891])*, p. 196.

success.¹ Parliament was prorogued until February 1739 to enable Sir Benjamin Keene to settle the disputes at Madrid. Keene, 'one of the best kind of agreeable men I ever saw, quite fat and easy with universal knowledge,'² was as convinced as Walpole of the inexpediency of war, and he concluded the Convention of the Pardo on 14th January 1739, N.S., in the hope of averting an open breach. The Convention was ratified on 15th January by the King of Spain and on the 24th by George II. The Spaniards had admitted £200,000 out of the £340,000 damages claimed by England to be due to her subjects in respect of vessels and cargoes wrongfully seized, but in the negotiations £60,000 was deducted from that amount to compensate Spain for the impossibility of restoring to her in 1721 the ships which Byng had destroyed off Cape Passaro in 1718. After a further reduction of £45,000 for prompt payment of the residue in cash instead of in bills of exchange, the sum of £95,000 was admitted by the Convention to be due as a balance to the Crown and subjects of Great Britain, and to be payable by Spain, less certain sums already restored by her. Spain deter-

¹ Hastings's *Life and Times of Selina, Countess of Huntingdon* (1844), i. 23-4.

² *Horace Walpole's Letters* (ed. 1857), i. 75; cf. *Chatham Correspondence* (ed. 1838), i. 50.

mined not even to pay this amount until the South Sea Company paid £68,000 to the Spanish Crown in respect of duties alleged to have been underpaid in consequence of an incorrect assumption as to the rate of exchange. Thus, however honestly conceived, the Convention could not satisfy the country. The conditions which clogged the payment of £95,000 within four months of the exchange of ratifications were injurious to national pride. They involved the disavowal of Byng's victory and the sacrifice of the South Sea Company, without regard for its counterclaim for 'millions' of money¹ against Spain for damages caused by the sacking of its factories in 1727. As one journal put it, Spain stood in the position of 'Cross I win, pile you lose,'² for the settlement of the money questions did not affect the still disputed right of search, while it was accompanied by the untimely withdrawal of Haddock's fleet from the Mediterranean.

The Convention was approved by Parliament on 8th March 1739, notwithstanding the fierce opposition of Pulteney and Wyndham and the personal efforts of the Prince of Wales. The 'Patriot' Whigs then seceded from the House

¹ Boyer's *Pol. State of Great Britain* for March 1739, lvii. 216.

² *Ibid.*, lvii. 217.

of Commons on 9th March, to show their resentment, thereby inviting the taunt that they were 'a pack of runaways.'¹ In May, however, when the plenipotentiaries met to draw a definitive treaty, Spain refused to fulfil her pledge to pay £95,000 until she received the sum demanded by her from the South Sea Company. The storm once more broke against Walpole's pacific measures. Anxious to please George II., and bent on retaining office, he gave Vernon instructions in July to sail against Spanish America, and declining Fleury's offer in August to guarantee Spain's payment of £95,000 if the British squadron was withdrawn from the Mediterranean, he declared war on 19th October 1739. He foresaw that Spain would receive France's succour, though he did not know the actual terms of their Family Compact of 1733. Such forebodings have been thought by some to justify his famous gibe at the joy which welcomed his plunge into armed conflict: 'They are ringing their bells now; they will be wringing their hands soon.'²

One characteristic of the agitation which made Walpole tread the strange paths of war and empire-building has always been recognised. Few factions have been animated by less

¹ *A Review of the whole Political Conduct of a late Eminent Patriot* (1743), p. 141.

² Coxe's *Walpole* (1798), iii. pt. 2, 618.

patriotism than the Patriots of the lobby. Their denunciations of a standing army and a strong navy, and their resistance in 1739 to the proposed enlistment of marines, contrast deplorably with their thirst for immediate war. Pulteney was so far from being a true promoter of the expansion of England, that his donation to Whitefield's orphan house in Georgia is his one solitary contribution to the good of the empire that history records. Little indeed could be said for the public if he represented fairly the men to whom he appealed. The hatred of the army expressed by the Patriot members of Parliament, and their sole anxiety to exploit Englishmen's sufferings in Spanish seas at Walpole's expense, have discredited their memory more effectually than his. In fact, however, the opposition party was far worthier than its leaders, and therefore this aspect of the agitation need not be considered at length. It reflects the purely ephemeral in a national movement, which in other respects embodied some of the master tendencies in English history. We have to distinguish public opinion from private malice. Yet the latter's prevalence calls for a few words. The oratorical heat of Pulteney and Argyle reflected a literary fervour, which ascribed Walpole's peace policy to greed for power and to the fear that his

peculation and corruption would be exposed. His aim was to defraud the country of reparation,

‘And prone his own curst dictates to perform,
He bribes the tumult and buys off the storm.’¹

Pulteney’s school always implied that the triumph of Walpole was the triumph of the foreigner. ‘God prosper our arms with success,’ he wrote to Vernon in November 1739, ‘and make you the instrument of retrieving the honour of your country.’² The Convention figures in the opposition press as ‘rotten,’³ as ‘a trick, a quirk, a mere grimace,’⁴ due to the unwillingness of ‘this monster of a Vizier to part with any of the public treasure for any noble purpose’ in view of ‘his inability to conduct a war.’⁵ One critic prayed that Walpole’s enemies might ‘persecute his soul and take it; yea, let them tread his life down upon the earth, and lay his honour in the dust.’⁶ Behind such abuse rankled a sense of helplessness before the year 1740. If Walpole was indeed a Verres or a Wolsey, he had behind him all the resources of patronage and wealth.

¹ *The Mock Campaign* (1740), p. 12.

² *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor* (1747), p. 5.

³ Thurloe, *The Expediency of One Man Dying* (1742), p. 28.

⁴ *The Learned Speech of Judge Pitt* (1740), p. 9.

⁵ *The Court Secret* (1742), p. 55.

⁶ *Some Observations on the Occasional Writer* (1738), p. 24.

‘Hence venal magistrates were bought for gold,
And a corrupted people bought and sold.’¹

Of the 262 members of the House of Commons who approved of the Convention with Spain, no fewer than 234 were placemen with joint salaries of £212,956, 13s. 4d.² ‘Against so much folly and corruption’³ it was hard to fight, for, as one partisan observed in 1737, ‘as soon as it appeared that we had not the loaves, the multitude left us and followed Sir Robert.’⁴ He had also long held the confidence of the country by the merits of his work. ‘Sir Robert,’ wrote the Duchess of Marlborough in despair, ‘has all the money and power, and there are such a number of fools and knaves to support whatever he has done or shall do.’⁵ Bolingbroke’s powers of abuse had always been beyond controversy. ‘Walpole is a changeling if he is not a traitor to Britain,’⁶ he now wrote, with the assurance of an expert. Himself an old assailant of the South Sea Company and of ‘all the little practices of contraband,’⁷ his end

¹ *Verres and his Scribblers* (1742), p. 55.

² *Besant’s London in the Eighteenth Century* (1902), p. 18.

³ *Duchess of Marlborough’s Private Correspondence* (ed. 1838), ii. 205.

⁴ *Marlborough MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., viii. 1 [1881])*, p. 18.

⁵ *Duchess of Marlborough’s Private Correspondence* (ed. 1838), ii. 178.

⁶ *Coxe’s Walpole* (1798), iii. pt. 2, 548.

⁷ *The False Accuser Accused* (1741), p. 28.

was clearly but 'to clog the wheels of Government,'¹ not to plead a great cause rejected. Yet his denunciations of 'a faction headed by the most profligate man in the kingdom,'² helped to mould the nature of the opposition polemics.

A fiercer vein ran through the pamphlets of the day when the war party felt that success was at hand. 'The rudest and most opprobrious language'³ was flung at Walpole and 'the servile voices'⁴ which kept him in place. 'I think 'tis thought a fault to wish anybody dead,' remarked the Duchess of Marlborough in 1739, 'but I hope 'tis not one to wish he may be hanged for having brought to ruin so great a country.'⁵ Inane protests were made against his maintenance of the small standing army of the time, as being designed 'to bridle the people, influence elections, make a parade at reviews, and guard his own carcase from danger.'⁶ He was said to batten upon 'the sweat of the labourer, the art of the mechanic, the peril of the mariner, and the profit of the

¹ *The False Accuser Accused* (1741), p. 50.

² Coxe's *Walpole* (1798), iii. pt. 2, 523.

³ *Hare MSS.* (*Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, ix. [1895]), p. 242.

⁴ Pope's *Poetical Works* (ed. 1856), i. 311.

⁵ *Duchess of Marlborough's Private Correspondence* (ed. 1838), ii. 223.

⁶ Thurloe, *The Expediency of One Man Dying* (1742), p. 7.

merchant,¹ and with less absurdity his enemies attacked his monopolisation of power, his organised corruption, his nepotism, his application of secret-service money to party purposes,² and 'feathering well thy nest.'³ His drift into war did not save him from the fate of one who prefers expediency to principle, for its mismanagement involved the accusation that 'the great man had more desire to tire us of the war than our enemies,'⁴ the sentiment, 'This man or this country must sink,'⁵ and the suggested epitaph,

' In this foul grave lies he
Who dug the grave of British liberty.'⁶

This strain in the literature of 1739 is not unfamiliar in party warfare, and represents the most fleeting element in political dialectics. A far more suggestive feature is its mercantile ardour. London had led the protests against Spanish policy, and when war was proclaimed at St. James's, Charing Cross, Chancery Lane, Wood Street and the Royal Exchange, huge crowds 'expressed the greatest satisfaction by their acclamation for a war with Spain,'⁷ and

¹ *A Key to the Business of the Past Session* (1742), p. 49.

² *The Interest of the Princes of Europe* (1739), p. 34.

³ Wilkins's *Political Ballads* (1860), ii. 270.

⁴ *A Review of the Late Motion for an Address, etc.* (1741), p. 16.

⁵ *Stopford Sackville MSS.* (*Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, ix. 3 [1884]), p. 8.

⁶ *Are these Things so?* (1740), p. 13.

⁷ *Trevor MSS.* (*Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, xiv. 9 [1895]), p. 35.

delighted to see the Prince of Wales drinking success to England in the Rose Tavern at Temple Bar. The city distrusted Walpole as one who 'commenced the war against his grain,'¹ and who stood for an insularity which had had its day. It gloried in Vernon's taking of Porto Bello with six ships in December 1739, and refused to see in his failure before Cartagena in April 1741 more than the effects of army jealousy and ministerial neglect. 'It is Admiral Vernon's birthday,' wrote Horace Walpole later in that year, 'and the city shops are full of favours, the streets of marrow-bones and cleavers, and the night will be full of mobbing, bonfires and lights.'²

The enthusiasm for war was no less marked in other trading centres. Among the petitioners to Parliament, who at last conquered Walpole's scruples, were the master, warden and associates of the Bristol Merchant Adventurers, the merchants and shipowners of Bristol, 'the merchants trading from Liverpoole to the British plantations in America,' the merchants of Glasgow and of Kingston Jamaica, the trustees for the establishment of Georgia, 'the merchants, shipmasters and others of Aberdeen,' the Merchant Company of Edinburgh, the merchants

¹ *Britannia in Mourning* (1742), p. 66.

² *Horace Walpole's Letters* (ed. 1857), i. 81.

trading from the port of Lancaster, the corporations of Liverpool, Dunfermline, Dundee, Montrose, Stirling, Lauder, Cupar and Kinghorn, and a host of shipowners, merchants and mariners, upon whom had fallen the hand of Spain.¹ Not more than five or six merchants, and they obscure and of the Romish persuasion, could be found to sign counter-petitions. Recruits came in plentifully in the autumn of 1739, notably in Scotland. Places called Porto Bello and inns at the sign of Vernon's Head still attest to the width of the influence of eighteenth-century commercialism in its naval aspect. Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow merchants² joined in the London petition for greater diligence in the conduct of the war in January 1742; the Royal Exchange Assurance Society helped to prepare evidence of the extent of the injuries inflicted by Spain upon the mercantile marine. It was said that not ten thousand out of ten million Britons had approved the Convention;³ so unrepresentative of public opinion was the Parliament of the day.

Happily the commercial zeal responsible for

¹ *Journals of the House of Lords*, vol. xxv., and *House of Commons*, vol. xxiii, *passim*.

² *A Short Account of the Late Application made by the Merchants of London* (1742), p. 9.

³ *Address to the Electors of Great Britain occasioned by the late Secession* (1739), p. 4.

the war was not untouched by idealism. The recognition of liberty is the standing justification of the British empire, and it was to this feeling that the agitators of 1739 appealed with a political ability which our own age has imitated. Prints of English prisoners chained hand and foot, and being flogged at Cartagena, were industriously circulated. Patriot Whigs realised the magic of the cry of English slavery in enlisting the humane among their ranks. The case of Jenkins's ear was then but one weapon in a large armoury, though now the most famous. The *Journals of the House of Commons* disclose that on 16th March 1738 Captain Robert Jenkins was ordered to 'attend this House immediately,'¹ his attendance being fixed on 17th March for 'Tuesday morning next.'² His story of the mutilation of his ear by one Fandino, when the Spaniards seized his brig, the *Rebecca* of Bristol, in 1730, was no doubt heard by the Committee of the whole House among the 'further evidence touching the matter referred to them'³ on that Tuesday. When examined as to his feelings when ill-treated, he answered that he had only recommended his soul to God and his cause to his country. The phrase was a godsend to the opposition, and the

¹ *Journals of the House of Commons*, xxiii. 94.

² *Ibid.* xxiii. 102.

³ *Ibid.* xxiii. 118.

ear figured at once in caricature and song. Walpole was assailed as a mere negotiator in affairs which wanted a man of blood and iron.

‘Our merchants and tars a strange pother have made
With losses sustained in their ships and their trade ;
But now they may laugh and quite banish their fears,
Nor mourn for lost liberty, riches and ears.’¹

Yet references to this specific case of Spanish cruelty are curiously infrequent in the party tracts. *England's Triumph, or Spanish Cowardice Exposed*, alleged to be written by one Jenkins, ‘who has too sensibly felt the effects of Spanish tyranny,’² though by no means a despicable print, contains no mention whatever of Jenkins's sufferings. Boyer's *Political State of Great Britain* alludes casually to ‘Spanish depredations on our estates, persons and ears.’³ One ministerial writer argues that ‘even the ears . . . of a man (whatever the compassion he deserves) are not worth a general war where millions of money must be spent, where myriads of men must suffer and perish.’⁴ In the House of Commons, Sandys⁵ cited the case of Jenkins in

¹ Wright's *Caricature Hist. of the Georges* (1877), p. 116.

² *England's Triumph* (1739), title-page.

³ Boyer's *Political State of Great Britain* for April 1738, lv. 327.

⁴ *Appeal to the Unprejudiced concerning the Present Discontents* (1739), p. 29.

⁵ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, x. 1085.

argument, while Pope ventured in lines upon the year 1738 to scoff at the incident,

‘And own the Spaniards did a waggish thing
Who cropp’d our ears and sent them to the King.’¹

For the rest there is singularly little reason to graft the memory of Jenkins’s ear upon the very name of the war that followed its mutilation after nine years of oblivion.

The truth is that the cry of Spanish atrocities, of ‘dark scenes and iniquitous practices’² rested principally on evidence drawn from a different quarter. The miseries of English prisoners in Old and New Spain were objects of far more general anxiety. Pictures of sailors, worked to death by the enemy, were circulated with harrowing details. As the electors of New Sarum explained to their two members in March 1742, English people ‘were never born to walk in chains.’³ Letters from Cadiz in February 1738 told the public that compatriots were being ‘used like slaves.’⁴ In March 1738 it was stated in the House of Commons that ‘seventy of your brave sailors are now in chains.’⁵ Early in 1739 Argyle asserted that nearly 100 Britons were ‘daily labouring under

¹ Pope’s *Poetical Works* (ed. 1856), i. 300.

² *Somerset MSS.* (*Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, xv. 7 [1898]), p. 124.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Trevor MSS.* (*Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, xiv. 9 [1895]), p. 13.

⁵ Cobbett’s *Parl. Hist.* x. 571.

confinement, chains and insults.’¹ On 24th March 1738 a collection was made at Lloyd’s Coffee House in Lombard Street ‘for the support of the wives and children of those poor unfortunate sailors who are now made slaves and prisoners by the Spaniards’;² and readers of journals heard horror-struck of ‘300 slaves in irons and chains, and crawling with vermin,’ confined in one room at Cadiz, where ‘beans full of vermin and a little salt fish’ were their only food.³ No wonder a generous people lamented ‘her free-born sons in Spanish dungeons chained,’⁴ welcomed Pitt’s desire to resist ‘the inhuman tyranny of Spain,’⁵ and sanctioned his derision of the Convention. ‘The complaints of your despairing merchants’ showed its futility, he said. ‘The voice of England has condemned it.’⁶

The class to whom this blend of business and humane arguments made most appeal was remote from that ‘Venetian oligarchy,’ whose virtues are immortalised in the pages of Burke, and whose vices are stigmatised for ever in the third chapter of *Sybil*. The government and the Whig lords, upon whom it chiefly relied, wished admittedly that ‘it were possible to let

¹ Cobbett’s *Parl. Hist.*, x, 1145.

² Boyer’s *Political State of Great Britain* for April 1738, lv. 330.

³ *Ibid.* p. 344.

⁴ *Gentleman’s Magazine* (1739), ix, 596.

⁵ Cobbett’s *Parl. Hist.*, x, 1281.

⁶ *Ibid.* x, 1283.

the people of England and Queen of Spain worry each other'¹ without embroiling their respective states. The claims of the London merchants meant nothing to the great Whig families. Hardwicke, though afterwards, like Newcastle, he supported the war, admitted as Lord Chancellor in May 1738 that for Parliament to declare against all search 'will be very justly looked upon by the court of Spain as precluding them of the rights of a search to which they are entitled by the laws of nature.'² Bishop Hoadly pointed out that the Spanish case was no more illogical than our own claim to enforce the Navigation Act. The war party turned for help to a different class. 'I really believe,' wrote the author of *England's Triumph* in 1739, 'that there is not one man in ten thousand throughout the British dominions but would rejoice to see the vaunting Bragadocias humbled in the dust, and would contribute all in his power to that end.'³ This is the unanimity of a nation as distinguished from the small class who governed the country, and the victory it won over the ministry foreshadowed the growth of democracy.

Walpole's party affected to despise the

¹ *Trevor MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., xiv. 9 [1895])*, p. 24.

² Harris's *Hardwicke* (1847), i. 413.

³ *England's Triumph* (1739), p. vi.

business element among the petitioners for war. 'Sturdy beggars'¹ was a description of merchant politicians, wrung from him in the heat of the excise conflict of 1733, and it was now a useful weapon² in the opposition armoury as illustrating his alleged contempt for trade. With strange infelicity of judgment the Government propagated information as to the occupations of the aldermen and commoners of the Common Council, who had urged reprisals against Spain,³ in order to deride their base and mechanic stations in life, and to discredit their public counsel. Zealots in their ranks even abused the New England auxiliaries of the troops to be sent to the West Indies with 'an heap of Billingsgate'⁴ as men of low degree. Hence the onslaughts of an offended middle class upon a minister whose supporters had forgotten the popular basis of his power, and its determination to displace a foe of industry by one who would

' Speak what he thinks, and freely plead the cause
Of Britain's commerce, liberty and laws ;
Exert his power to check corruption's swing,
And serve at once his country and his king.'⁵

The war of 1739 is the first purely 'trade war'

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, viii. 1306.

² *The Mock Campaign* (1740), p. 20.

³ Besant's *London in the Eighteenth Century* (1902), p. 16.

⁴ *Journal of the Expedition to Carthagen* (ed. 1744), p. 54.

⁵ *Are these Things so?* (1740), p. 6.

in English history. Spain was indeed denounced as the enemy of our civil and religious rights,¹ and Heaven asked for assistance 'to this country, to Europe and to the Protestant religion.'² Irish Catholics, who volunteered for service, were rejected in October 1739 as Papists unfit to fight.³ Yet in the main, theology was conspicuously missing in the dialectics of the opposition, and it remained a mere side issue even after the Continental conflict diverted men's minds from trade to 'the Protestant cause, the peace and liberties of Europe.'⁴ Similarly the propaganda of the forward party had no dynastic bias. George II. answered petitioning traders in 1737 'with the utmost marks of paternal goodness,'⁵ and assured the House of Lords in 1738 that 'I am sensibly touched with the many hardships and injuries sustained by my trading subjects in America,'⁶ in accents which bore no trace of a Hanoverian origin.

It is notable too that in the West as in the East Indies, British commercialism aimed at no territorial aggrandisement. The end in view

¹ *The City of Bristol's Letter to Mr. Southwell* (1742), p. 4.

² *A True Copy of Cromwell's Manifesto, etc.* (1741), p. 44.

³ Fortescue's *History of the British Army* (1899), ii. 57.

⁴ *The Consequences of His Majesty's Journey to Hanover* (1740), p. 11.

⁵ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, x. 359.

⁶ *Journals of the House of Lords*, xxv. 237.

was trade not empire, the enjoyment of a monopoly without the responsibilities of government. 'Great Britain,' according to Houstoun, 'wants no castles but floating ones.'¹ Havannah was indeed a desirable annexation, as it commanded the Florida channel through which all ships bound for Europe used to pass.² 'Our hearts,' said Pulteney in 1740, 'are bent on Cuba.'³ The acquisition of Buenos Ayres also might give England control over the noble highway to the mines of Potosi, and an opportunity to supply them with mules, horses and food.⁴ Yet such objects were clearly for commercial purposes alone. 'We are a trading people,' is one patriot's conclusion; 'we form no pretensions on their dominions; we do not affect conquests.'⁵ This is the spirit of eighteenth-century England before she was educated by Clive and Hastings. Cartagena was to be prized not as another addition to the soil of the empire, but as a market for English beer and cheese, linen and clocks, and for the Buckingham lace with which Spanish ladies loved to adorn their 'pillow-biers, sheets and shifts.'⁶

¹ Houstoun's *Works* (1753), p. 405.

² *Gentleman's Magazine* (1738), vii. 296.

³ *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor* (1747), p. 25.

⁴ *A Proposal for Humbling Spain* (ed. 1740), pp. 8, 14, 19; cf. *Gentleman's Magazine* (1739), ix. 653.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 44.

⁶ *The Importance of Jamaica to Great Britain* (1740), p. 72.

In the judicious combination of enterprise and caution lies the genius of a shopkeeper. When Glover presented a petition by London merchants in January 1742, he alluded to the taunt that it related to 'the merchants' war.' The charge, he said, was true. They were 'proud to be esteemed the authors of a just and necessary war, undertaken to restore the freedom of navigation and vindicate the declining honour of their country.'¹

The mercantilism of the war fever is clearly brought out in a tract called *The Advantages and Disadvantages which will attend the Prohibition of the Merchandizes of Spain*. The writer, a Suffolk farmer, explained that England's imports from Spain might be bought almost entirely from friendly markets. Wines were mere luxuries, but if necessary, they could be procured in Portugal, Italy and the Rhineland² or superseded by brewing pale malt liquors at home.³ Soap could be bought from France, Leghorn and Joppa;⁴ oil from Portugal, Leghorn and Galipoli;⁵ raisins, figs, oranges, lemons, nuts, cocoa, capers and olives from Smyrna, Portugal, Genoa, Leghorn or Lucca;⁶ iron from Scandinavia and our own colonies;⁷

¹ *A Short Account of the Late Application, etc.* (1742), p. 51.

² *The Advantages and Disadvantages, etc.* (1739), p. 8.

³ *Ibid.* p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 11.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 10.

⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 12, 13.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 14.

indigo and cochineal from the East Indies and the plantations. Such steps would deprive Spain of her best customers,¹ and ruin her wine trade by the loss of an annual consumption of 10,000 tuns of wines and a quantity of brandies.² England would not suffer in the least. The one difficulty was the cessation of the influx of Spanish wool, of which 6000 packs (worth in all £120,000)³ were then annually imported, and used to make some 90,000 suits of Spanish cloth.⁴ Yet this industry only affected about 27,000 people in England,⁵ and these but partially, and they might as profitably manufacture English wool. The statute 13 Geo. II. c. 27, which prohibited all commerce with Spain, and was vigorously enforced, is the best commentary on the success of this tract. It represents the quintessence of business calculation in the heyday of the mercantile system. There were few doubters. The capture of 'Caraccas' was notoriously a lucrative exploit, and a war in Spanish seas involved no such general dislocation of trade at home as in later times is the chief deterrent from the policy of 'trade wars.'

It does not follow that the commercial tone of the agitation of 1739 deprived it of finer

¹ *The Advantages and Disadvantages, etc.* (1739), p. 30.

² *Ibid.* p. 9.

³ *Ibid.* p. 16.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 21.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 22. The manufacture of Spanish cloth had greatly declined. See *Gentleman's Magazine* (1739), ix. 479.

elements. It is pleasant to find insistence on sea-power blending with indignation on account of fellow-countrymen oppressed and of markets endangered. The English people were already 'the islanders';¹ their fleet already 'sufficient to beat all the naval forces of Europe,'² and their ships better manned than galleys intrusted to enchained slaves.³ Walpole was abused for starving the navy,

'While records tell that, sunk by coward wiles,
A nest of pirates awes the Queen of Isles';⁴

but however injured by neglect, the seamen of George II. soon redressed the balance of naval power in Europe. A characteristic compilation of 1741 showed that between July 1739 and July 1741 Spain had captured from Great Britain ships and cargoes to the value of £612,000, while Great Britain had captured from Spain ships and cargoes to the value of £1,617,400.⁵ Such success was fitting in a war partly undertaken on behalf of persecuted English sailors. They and the sea-power for which they stood were at least above party.

¹ *Second Political Dialogue between Pasquin and Marforio* (1737), p. 19.

² *The Ministerial Virtue* (1738), p. 11.

³ *Present State of the Revenues and Forces of France and Spain* (1740), p. 33.

⁴ *The Mock Campaign* (1740), p. 20.

⁵ *The Profit and Loss of Great Britain in the Present War with Spain* (1741), p. 34.

‘We sailors,’ writes one Benjamin Bowline in 1738, ‘are not politicians,’¹ and their cause was that of modern England. It is significant that not only was ‘God save the King’ first sung in 1740, but that the same year witnessed the first publication of Arne’s rendering of ‘Rule Britannia.’

No less happy is the appeal to history which runs through every manifesto of the war party. Reverence for traditions and institutions which are rooted in the past is deep seated in the English nature. Its influence in 1739 is particularly notable for the point of the analogies it prompted and the splendour of the examples it drove home. Some pages in past annals were recalled for purely practical purposes, like the reprint of Pointis’s account of the taking of Cartagena by the French and buccaneers in 1697 when the booty amounted to two and a half millions; but even this aroused love of country as well as of lucre by recalling the sack of that city in 1585 ‘by the valour of a few Englishmen’ under Drake, when ‘our land was enriched with the spoils of our proud enemies in a reign when the public good and honour of England was the chief business at court.’² Such allusions

¹ *Gentleman’s Magazine* (1738), lv. 17.

² *Account of the Taking of Carthage* (1740), p. iv.

strove to wake in Hanoverian England the remembrance of the greatest dead, 'the Edwards and Henrys of England.'¹

'Ask ye what Britain was? With dread surprise
See Edward, Henry and Eliza rise.'²

Men were asked to recollect 'illustrious Edward,'³ who adorned an era when the land never dreamed that she should ever be

'Of France the mimic and of Spain the prey,'⁴

while prose eulogies and verses on the Armada helped to 'call to mind the happy reign of glorious, English-hearted Elizabeth.' As at other periods of military depression the name of the great protector was regretfully invoked. If Cromwell were alive Spain would not now 'sing and rejoice.'⁵ His manifesto against Spain, originally published in 1655, was reprinted in 1741 to show 'what cruelties and barbarities in the West Indies we will be exposed to if we do not now make the Spaniards feel the weight of our resentment.'⁶ Samuel Johnson wrote short lives of Drake and Blake,⁷ while one writer condemned his own

¹ *Present Interest of the People of Great Britain* (1740), p. 31.

² *The Mock Campaign* (1740), p. 9.

³ *Britannia in Mourning* (1742), p. 65.

⁴ Johnson's *London* (1738) [Chalmers's *English Poets* (1810), xvi. 572].

⁵ *Ministerial Virtue* (1738), p. 4.

⁶ *A True Copy of Cromwell's Manifesto* (1741), p. xv.

⁷ Boswell's *Johnson* (ed. Hill, 1888), i. 147.

generation for permitting Spain no longer 'to fear the thunder of our cannon and the shouts of our navies.'¹ Others confuted Spanish claims by alleging that all America was legally British soil by reason of its discovery in 1120 by Madoc, Prince of Wales,² or wisely recalled the more authentic glories of Marlborough's warfare, achieved in days before the clergy put Whiggism before England:

'So quick they conquered, and we prayed so fast,
Thanksgivings wearied us quite out at last.'³

Such sentiments found most poetic expression in Johnson's satire of *London*, published in May 1738, and full of the historic sense. Referring to Greenwich he wrote:

'Struck with the seat that gave Eliza birth,
We kneel and kiss the consecrated earth;
In pleasing dreams the blissful age renew,
And call Britannia's glories back to view;
Behold her cross triumphant on the main,
The guard of commerce and the dread of Spain;
Ere masquerade debauched, excise oppress'd,
Or English honour grew a standing jest.'⁴

The same inference of revolt against Walpole and quietism was drawn by the republication of *A Proposal for Humbling Spain*, which had sug-

¹ *Ministerial Virtue* (1738), p. 5.

² Winsor's *History of America* (1889), i. 71; vii. 209.

³ *The Mock Campaign* (1740), p. 6.

⁴ Johnson's *London* (1738) [Chalmers's *English Poets* (1810), xvi. 571].

gested in 1711 the extension of Marlborough's triumphs from Europe to South America. Considerations were appended to the tract in order to give it present application. *England's Triumph, or Spanish Cowardice Exposed*, written in 1739, contained 348 pages packed with narratives of British victories over Spain and France on sea and land, from the days of Raleigh to those of Byng. Hinting at the ineptitude of expecting to attain success without keen effort, the author said that there was once a time when England was not to be bullied with big words or frightened with Spanish rhodomontades, and when the fear of France and Spain did not deter her from that 'ardour and vivacity in arms' which in the end secure peace better than all 'the management of ambassadors and the finesse of treaty-makers.'¹

Another characteristic of the war party, which history has unjustly overlooked, is its plea for the defence of Georgia and South Carolina. The risk of the loss of Georgia to Spain was very grave.² Oglethorpe spent the summer of 1739 in traversing the wildernesses west of Savannah in search of Red Indian allies. Should he not withstand the enemy, England would lose a strategic base of great value both

¹ *England's Triumph* (1739), p. 4.

² Egmont, *Faction Detected by the Evidence of Facts* (1743), p. 29.

as against the Spaniards and as against the French on the Mississippi.¹ Our claim to the province was said to be based in law upon 'near an hundred years' uninterrupted possession.'² The arguments, however, which most won Georgia the assistance of the mother-country, and which were also more truthful in fact, were purely colonial in spirit, and evince a notable grasp of the true uses of empire. Several tracts, stiffened by affidavits sworn by settlers at Savannah, attested to the promise of Georgia as a field for emigration. They told of its cattle and poultry, its oak and hiccory, its rich rice fields and abundant vegetables.³ Its silk might relieve the home-country from sending bullion to Italy; its wine might displace that of Continental Europe in the British market, for thanks to the skill of Abraham de Lyon, a Portuguese Jew who had settled at Savannah in 1733, its grapes were already 'as big as a man's thumb, almost transparent, and in great bunches.'⁴ Protestant refugees from Salzburg produced the best crops in North America at Ebenezer; Highlanders

¹ *Faction Detected by the Evidence of Facts* (1743), p. 29.

² Robins's *Observations on the Convention* (1739), p. 29.

³ See *State of the Province of Georgia* (1740); *An Impartial Inquiry into the State and Utility of Georgia* (1741); Tailfer's *Narrative of the Colonisation of Georgia* (1741).

⁴ *An Impartial Enquiry, etc.* (1741), p. 20.

flourished at New Inverness and Darien, which settlements stood in the most exposed portion of Georgia. It would be wrong to allow a ministry to sacrifice the hopes of thousands of industrious colonists, and the welfare of generations to come for the sake of a dishonourable peace. If the logwood cutters were abandoned, Jamaica would be injured irremediably. Such pleas show how closely the much abused agitation of 1739 is to be associated with the main stream of English expansion.

It is pleasant too to find that the cause of British colonisation moved the hearts of the poor and illiterate, who in general in the eighteenth century were not distinguished by much enlightenment. George Whitefield obtained the cession of 500 acres from the trustees of Georgia in May 1739 for the use of his orphan-house, and thousands of humble Englishmen answered his appeal for financial help with a fine devotion. Of the £47 that he collected at Kennington on 9th May 1739, £16 were in halfpence; of the £52, 19s. 6d. collected at Moorfields on 13th May, more than £20 were in halfpence.¹ Such figures are eloquent as to the station of life of the men who realised most clearly that the march of British expansion should not outpace that of

¹ Tyerman's *Whitefield* (1876), i. 215.

philanthropy and religion. The enthusiasm that Whitefield aroused on behalf of Georgia was by far the purest motive that actuated the hatred felt for Spain.

Thus public spirit told no less than party passion in driving Walpole into war. The serious and the sober saw in the tide of affairs a greater issue than 'the dazzling glory and *éclat* of military operations which amuse and please the giddy multitude.'¹ When London rejoiced at the 'vast deal of good news from the fleet'² in the first stages of the struggle, its feelings were remote from the personal vindictiveness of Argyle and Pulteney. Men yearned for efficiency in administration, the most tantalising ideal of the English race. 'You know how impatient people are here to have the Spaniards blown up,'³ wrote Wager to Vernon in October 1739. If true success were not somehow achieved, the war 'must end to the eternal reproach of the nation.'⁴ Men were tired of squandering money on reviews at home and demonstrations at sea. 'A vast fleet fitted out at an immense expense and sent a swan-hopping'⁵ would never bring the enemy to

¹ *The Interest of Great Britain steadily pursued* (1743), p. 57.

² *Suffolk Letters* (ed. 1824), ii. 174.

³ *Original Letters to an Honest Sailor* (1747), p. 3.

⁴ *City of Bristol's Letter to Mr. Southwell* (1742), p. 4.

⁵ *Thurløe's Expediency of One Man dying* (1742), p. 28.

book. Half measures could only fail

‘To teach the Spaniards to give plund’ring o’er
And what’s already plunder’d to restore.’¹

In this respect the pamphlets of 1739 typify English wisdom. To ‘talk big in Billingsgate language’² wins no campaigns. A navy asleep off Spithead and an army dressed and powdered in Hyde Park gave ‘poor satisfaction to our mariners for the barbarities they have sustained.’³

‘In silent moan the honest farmer grieves
To think his country no redress receives;
Better these troops on Spanish main were shown
Than kept for fools to gaze at on our own.’⁴

With curious premonition of the topical poetry of another age, one writer deplored the tendency to treat war like a cricket match,⁵ and to ignore the best application of the nation’s strength.

‘Safe let them sleep, unhurt by scattering balls,
Unless when football or when cricket calls;
Frenchmen may mediate or Spaniards plunder,
While Britons generously withhold their thunder.’⁶

There is nothing new under the sun. Later-day British diplomacy has rarely been the envy of the world. Napoleon said the English were better at blockading. In Walpole’s time it

¹ *On the Scarcity of the Copper Coin* (1739), p. 6.

² *Houstoun’s Works* (1753), p. 247.

³ *Ministerial Virtue* (1738), pp. 26, 29.

⁴ *The Mock Campaign* (1740), p. 18.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 28.

was already burdened by the necessities of the Parliamentary system, and the want of that irresponsibility which can alone give the strength and secrecy that make success. 'We are cruelly the dupes of all nations in our treaties with them,'¹ is a typical reproach of 1739. In the previous year the Government had discovered that in its negotiations with Spain it had relied upon the wrong treaty. 'We scramble out of it as well as we can,'² writes Horatio Walpole. It is, however, to be borne in mind that an English opposition is never satisfied. 'If we entered into alliances,' writes a Government supporter in 1739, 'the nation was bubbled; if we made none we stood alone, and the nation was weak and unsupported.'³

Judged historically, many claims of the forward party were true. The war was as inevitable as they asserted. 'God prosper the arms of Great Britain'⁴ is no less unexceptionable a sentiment in their polemics. The justice of their cause is no doubt more problematic. 'We did not enter upon the war,' said 'a known lover of the people' in 1740, 'till we

¹ *A Review of all that hath passed between Great Britain and Spain* (1739), p. 38.

² *Trevor MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., xiv. 9 [1895])*, p. 14.

³ *Gordon's Appeal to the Unprejudiced concerning the Present Discontents* (1739), p. 15.

⁴ *An Address to the Electors of Great Britain occasioned by the late Secession* (1739), p. 63.

had no other means of doing ourselves justice.’¹ Without affecting to decide the question, we must hesitate to deny to men who saved Georgia from extinction, and who fought for the truly English cause of ‘the open door,’ the moral luxury of calling their conflict ‘just and unavoidable,’² ‘just and necessary,’³ ‘unavoidable on our side.’⁴ One writer stigmatised peace at any price in golden words; ‘Long-suffering and meekness make a maybe excellent quality in a private man, and make a very good tailor or cobbler, but a very bad governor or minister.’⁵ To such theorists Spain, and Spain alone, was responsible for inflicting ‘upon us all the miseries of the most severe war.’⁶

The war party has to be regarded also in relation to the dialectics it assailed. Gordon, one of the few able pamphleteers who swam against the stream, said that England was ‘never more misled and hot and unreasonable’⁷ than in attacking the Convention. Keene, who realised that failure might involve the loss of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, despaired in April

¹ *A Letter to a M.P. concerning the Present State of Affairs* (1740), p. 38.

² *Houstoun's Works* (1753), p. 193.

³ *Journals of the House of Lords*, xxv. 428.

⁴ *A Letter to a M.P. concerning the Present State of Affairs* (1740), p. 39.

⁵ *The Ministerial Virtue* (1738), p. 24.

⁶ *The Present State of the National Debt* (1740), p. 7.

⁷ *Gordon's Appeal to the Unprejudiced concerning the Present Discontents* (1739), p. 6.

1739 of her 'folly and madness.'¹ The cause which these thinkers represented is indeed no less permanent and hardly less powerful in English history than that of territorial and trading expansion, and their doctrine of non-intervention was Walpole's legacy to the Whig party. Two tracts of 1739 are striking examples of a political insularity, based on sound reason and good sense. The author of *Popular Prejudices against the Convention with Spain* asked shrewdly whether the war party's jests as to 'our pacific fleets'² were not very vapid if England's objects could be obtained as effectually without conflict.³ The prizes of all wars were precarious.⁴ With our own colonial system it was absurd to deny the right of search,⁵ and the Spaniards had no monopoly of cruelty towards interlopers. The writer had himself seen Spaniards sold publicly as slaves in British colonies.⁶ National security was too holy a thing to be frittered away on an undertaking as fruitless as the siege of Troy, and on ambitions as mad as those of Charles XII.⁷

The Grand Question whether War or no War with Spain was a no less effective challenge to 'those that delight in war.' It pointed to the

¹ Coxe's *Walpole* (1798), iii. pt. ii. 520.

² *Popular Prejudices against the Convention* (1739), p. 5.

³ *Ibid.* p. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 9.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 13.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 21.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 7.

doubtfulness of success, the want of allies abroad,¹ the probability of French hostility,² the unlikelihood of reducing either Cadiz or Havannah.³ 'Fighting pitched battles in the field or engaging in a great fight on sea are very different things from battles fought over a dish of tea or a glass of wine.'⁴ The outbreak of war would mean the immediate seizure of all British assets in Spanish territory, a prediction which, notwithstanding the South Sea Company's treaty rights, was verified in the sequel.⁵ As another writer observed, responsible ministers were necessarily more judicious in diplomacy than 'an angry person in his closet, a merchant who has lost his ship.'⁶ The *Grand Question* is therefore a powerful plea for peace. It exposes the practical futility of war beyond making 'a number of poor people very miserable.'⁷

Many moderate men were driven into Walpole's camp by their dislike for the 'abandoned creatures'⁸ who posed as patriots without the least intention of effecting any object beyond his fall. If they were sceptical as to Walpole's

¹ *The Grand Question* (1739), p. 9.

² *Ibid.* p. 10.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 14, 18.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 8.

⁵ *Houstoun's Works* (1753), p. 409.

⁶ *A Letter to a M.P. concerning the Present State of Affairs* (1740), p. 41.

⁷ *The Grand Question* (1739), p. 17.

⁸ *Some Observations on the Occasional Writer* (1738), p. 15.

virtue, they could still recognise that many of his foes were as far beneath him in their sense of duty as the devil beneath the sun in 'that remarkable speech in Milton.'¹ Less real value, however, attached to the later propaganda of the peace party, as the inspiration is drawn more from self-interest than principle. After the wild joy aroused by the fall of Porto Bello, a long delay in operations culminated in Wentworth's failure to support Vernon before Cartagena in April 1741 and in miserable disaster. After all, the war might be 'a greater curse than the long series of injuries it was calculated to redress.'² England was alleged to be already burdened by a large debt and decayed trade, and it was suicidal to fight customers 'useful above all others to us,'³ to whom, in the twenty years before 1739, more manufactures had been sold than to all other Continental peoples.⁴ Disillusion strengthened the promptings of the commercial instinct. Walpole's enemies when they attained office were no more ardent in conquering Spanish America. The West Indies were no more considered 'than they were before Columbus

¹ *Some Observations on the Occasional Writer* (1738), p. 30.

² *A Key to the Business of the Session* (1742), p. 44.

³ *Conduct of the late Administration with regard to Foreign Affairs* (1742), p. 33.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 68.

discovered them.’¹ The people, ‘poor blundering dupes,’² found that their resources were drained to sustain the fortunes of Hungary, not of Georgia, and were expended ‘with a lavish Don Quixotism’³ on objects never contemplated by the agitators of 1739. The old cry that they were befooled by ‘Patriots’ and stock-jobbers soon rose again. Swift’s *Conduct of the Allies* was reprinted,⁴ and the war was ascribed to a desire ‘to wean the people from a watchfulness of their freedom.’⁵ Walpole was again praised as ‘the best read in human nature of any man of his time.’⁶ Speculators mourned the disappearance of American treasure from the horizon of the South Sea Company, and recorded in indifferent verse the sad fall in its dividends.⁷

It is to be admitted at once that the peace tracts, especially those of 1739, are worthy of all respect. The Duchess of Marlborough might term them ‘either nonsense or false,’⁸ but they were in fact eminently to the point.

¹ *A Key to the Politics of the Principal Powers of Europe* (1743), p. 53. ² Hervey’s *Miscellaneous Thoughts* (1742), p. 62.

³ *Ibid.* p. 64.

⁴ In *Good Queen Anne Vindicated* (1748).

⁵ *A Key to the Politics of the Principal Powers of Europe* (1743), p. 55. ⁶ *The Peace Offering* (1746), p. 15.

⁷ *The Art of Stock-jobbing* (1746), p. 19.

⁸ *Duchess of Marlborough’s Private Correspondence* (ed. 1838), ii. 201.

It was true that three months' war would involve more losses than twenty years of 'Spanish depredations,'¹ and that the commercial utility of peace is usually beyond dispute. It is also possible that the unanimity for war, so loudly claimed in London and the trading centres, may well be exaggerated. Walpole's conduct had estranged the journalists, and 'it is the folly of too many to mistake the echo of a London coffee-house for the voice of the kingdom.'² Admirers of Walpole and his cast of thought, lovers of peace under whatever provocation, men to whom insularity is precious and isolation splendid, will always find in the Government pamphleteers of 1739 admirable examples of cool and courageous adherence to principle. 'Wit is monopolised by politics,'³ said Horace Walpole of that time; and of the honesty and skill engaged in the conflict of pens, his father's partisans had no trifling share.

Nevertheless, the ideals of the war party possessed qualities which have made great accessions to the happiness of mankind. If their contentions were largely bad in law, and if the taint of the slave-trade makes half their aspirations vicious, they yet championed the

¹ *Appeal to the Unprejudiced concerning the Present Discontents* (1739), p. 29.

² *Good Queen Anne Vindicated* (1748), p. 59.

³ *Horace Walpole's Letters* (ed. 1857), i. 161.

twin causes of English colonisation and of English naval power at a time when at least two provinces beyond sea stood in danger of destruction, and when 'the spirit of our seamen, nay, their very race, was visibly running to decay.'¹ With these two causes human freedom and British influence are for ever entwined. They gave a glow otherwise impossible to the opposition literature. Much of this was, of course, purely personal in its aims and transient in its influence, but Johnson's *London* won him his first laurels, and they have never withered, while another poem, the ballad called *Admiral Hosier's Ghost*, won praise even from Horace Walpole,² and still delights the reader with its pathetic cadence. Hosier had died of disease with 4000 of his men in the summer of 1727 while lying idle in Spanish waters,³ when, but for Walpole's orders, he might have conquered Porto Bello. His shade appears to the fleet of 1740.

' As near Porto Bello lying
On the gently swelling flood,
At midnight with streamers flying
Our triumphant navy rode ;

¹ Egmont's *Faction Detected by the Evidence of Facts* (1743), p. 27.

² *Horace Walpole's Letters* (ed. 1857), i. 52.

³ *Du Cane MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. for 1905)*, p. 35.

There while Vernon sate all glorious
 From the Spaniards' late defeat,
 And his crews with shouts victorious
 Drank success to England's fleet.'

The living are warned that it is better to die fighting than to perish of inertia.

'I by twenty sail attended
 Did this Spanish town affright,
 Nothing then its walls defended
 But my orders not to fight.
 O! that in this rolling Ocean
 I had cast them with disdain,
 And obey'd my heart's warm motion
 To have quelled the pride of Spain.'¹

This ballad was the work of Richard Glover, and had a brilliant vogue. 'The patriots cry it up, and the courtiers cry it down, and the hawkers cry it up and down.'² The incomparably greater influence of pamphleteering than oratory in moulding public opinion is brought out by the honours lavished upon Glover. Compared favourably by Lyttelton with Milton,³ he was rewarded for his poem by being selected to draw and present the petition of 300 London merchants to Parliament in January 1742, when he described his clients as 'a peculiar object of your indul-

¹ *Percy Reliques* (1794), ii. 382; Wilkins's *Political Ballads* (1860), ii. 259; Wright's *Caricature History* (1877), p. 124.

² *Horace Walpole's Letters* (ed. 1857), i. 52.

³ Phillimore's *Lyttelton* (1845), i. 100.

gence, as they appear before you distinguished by uncommon hardships, loaded with grievances, and suppliants for your protection.'¹ It is well known that the war these men desired not only gave them no redress, but contributed nothing more positive than example and experience to increase the power or to swell the trade of Great Britain. Success, however, is not the touchstone of merit, and posterity has hardly done them justice.

¹ *A Short Account of the late Application, etc.* (1742), p. 9.

CHAPTER III

‘NO JEWS; NO WOODEN SHOES’

A FRENZY OF 1753

By the common law of England every person, of whatever parentage, born within the dominions of the Crown is a British subject, except the child of a foreign ambassador. In the opinion, therefore, of the most learned counsel of the day,¹ Jews actually born in England required no naturalisation in 1753 in order to possess all the rights of citizenship, except those from which they were precluded by laws imposing religious tests. Such rights would include the power to hold land, for the disability by test ceased to affect Jewish landowners in the reign of George I.,² and applied afterwards only to offices of trust. These, under the statute 13 William III. c. 6, still required before acceptance not only the oaths

¹ Webbe's *Question whether a Jew was capable to purchase and hold Lands* (1753), *passim*; Tucker's *Second Letter to a Friend* (1753), pp. 18-20; *Further Considerations on the Act* (1753), pp. 53-4; argument of Sir S. Romilly in *re Bedford Charity*, 2 Swanston's *Reports* (1822), p. 511.

² 10 Geo. I. c. 4.

of allegiance and of abhorrence of Papal doctrines, but the oath abjuring the Pretender in its full form, ‘upon the true faith of a Christian.’

Jews born abroad shared, however, of necessity the disabilities, which then debarred all aliens from owning English land or ships, from acquiring political rights and offices, and by virtue of the Navigation Act of 1660 from trading with British colonies. Naturalisation was therefore more than a merely sentimental objective for foreign-born Jews who had settled in Hanoverian England. It might be obtained in a qualified form by the king’s grant of denization by letters patent, a privilege which had no retrospective operation, and which did not enable persons to take lands by inheritance. It was occasionally obtained under a statute of Charles II.,¹ which entitled aliens engaged for three years in dressing hemp and flax, or in making fishing-nets or tapestry hangings within England, Wales or Berwick to be naturalised, or under an analogous statute of George II.,² which related to persons serving for two years on a man-of-war or on a merchant-ship in time of war. Yet in general, and in its then fullest form, it was procured by private Acts of Parliament, subject to a disabling clause, which prevented persons thereby naturalised from

¹ 15 Car. II. c. 15.

² 13 Geo. II. c. 3.

becoming members of either house of Parliament or of the Privy Council, and from holding offices of trust, either civil or military, or grants of Crown lands.

The use of such Acts of Parliament had been placed beyond the reach of Jews by the limitation of their availability to persons who 'had received the sacrament of the Lord's Supper within one month then next before any bill for that purpose, and also should take the oath of supremacy and oath of allegiance.'¹ In 1740 this sacramental test was dispensed with in the cases of Jews who had lived, or who should live, for seven years in the American plantations without more than two months' absence.² In taking the oath of abjuration they were relieved from saying the words, 'upon the true faith of a Christian.' Between 1740 and 1753, 185 West Indian Jews³ availed themselves of this Act, of whom 140 lived in Jamaica.⁴ In Georgia, South Carolina and Rhode Island Jews were even allowed to hold offices without submitting to any tests whatever. Such was the state of the law when the Pelham ministry brought in the famous bill of 1753, 'to permit persons professing the Jewish religion to be

¹ 7 Jac. I. c. 2. ² 13 Geo. II. c. 7.

³ *Jewish Quarterly Review* (1907), xix, 318.

⁴ *Orford Memoires* (ed. 1852), i, 317.

naturalised by Parliament, and for other purposes therein mentioned,’ of which the proposal to deprive Jews of the right to present to advowsons was the most important. Three years’ residence in Great Britain or Ireland, without more than three months’ absence, and the practice of the Jewish religion were to be essential qualifications to any endeavour to make use of the privileges conferred under the bill.

The promoters of the measure were no doubt influenced partly by Jewish appreciation of citizenship, and partly by their connection with Samson Gideon, the oracle of Jonathan’s coffee-house in Exchange Alley, who had raised loans for the Government in 1745 and 1749. What, however, served most to disarm any reluctance they might feel to bring forward the bill was its intrinsic unimportance. Its application could only be narrow and occasional. The number of Jews in the country had been estimated at 6000 in 1738,¹ and was perhaps 8000 in 1753,² of whom only a minority were foreign born. These could not claim naturalisation as of right, but to procure it would be obliged to proceed by private bill legislation in Parliament, a method which was too expensive for the poor, and which subjected every application to the

¹ Tovey’s *Anglia Judaica* (1738), p. 302.

² *Considerations on the Bill* (1753), p. 17.

discretionary veto of the legislature. Moreover, persons naturalised would still be disabled from becoming members of either house of Parliament or of the Privy Council, from holding offices or places of trust, whether civil or military, in Great Britain and Ireland, and from becoming grantees of Crown lands. The ministry did not expect that the class affected by the bill would be objected to upon the ground of their Judaism, because English-born Jews were already deemed competent to hold lands, and to exercise all such rights of citizenship as were not the subject of existing religious tests.

Under these circumstances the bill was introduced in the House of Lords by Lord Halifax on 3rd April 1753, and its three readings took place on 3rd, 6th and 16th April without any division.¹ It was read for the first time in the House of Commons on 17th April 1753. The second reading on 7th May provoked the first symptoms of opposition. It was suggested in debate that the Government was not only invading the birthright of Englishmen,² but 'giving the lie to all the prophecies in the New Testament.'³ On the other hand, stress was laid on the good work done by loyal

¹ *Journals of the House of Lords*, xxvii. 73, 80, 92.

² Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xiv. 1366.

³ *Ibid.* xiv. 1381.

Jews during the rising of 1745, on the favourable attitude of the bishops, and on the fact that ‘even a Papist born here of foreign parents’ was entitled to the privileges of British citizenship.¹ The second reading was accordingly carried by 95 votes to 16. On 21st May a petition was presented to the House of Commons in favour of the bill, signed by over a hundred city merchants, ‘all Christian, and generally known for moral, worthy men.’² The opposition delivered a counterstroke the same day, when the sheriffs of the city of London presented a petition from the Common Council at the bar of the House, in which the bill was denounced as ‘tending greatly to the dishonour of the Christian religion.’³ On 22nd May further petitions were laid before the House in favour of the bill by several merchants, manufacturers and shipwrights, against it by certain London traders, including no less than 28 devout stock-jobbers.⁴ After some of these petitioners had been examined,⁵ Egmont moved the adjournment of the third reading for a period of one month. As an old ally of the Prince of Wales, in whose behalf he had become famous

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xiv. 1383.

² *Considerations on the Bill* (1753), p. 31.

³ *Journals of the House of Commons*, xxvi. 827.

⁴ *Considerations on the Bill* (1753), p. 28.

⁵ *Journals of the House of Commons*, xxvi. 829.

as a 'manager and fomenter of mischief,'¹ he realised the opportunity of the opposition, and declared that friendly intercourse between Jew and Christian was utterly impossible.² His motion was rejected by 96 votes to 55, and the bill became law.³

The agitation which sprang up against this measure during the following six months ranks among the most remarkable popular movements in eighteenth-century England. The political monotony of the Pelham administration was rudely broken. There was always a singularly southern element in English character before the evangelical revival, and it was an easy task for the opposition to arouse in the mob a fanaticism which involved neither danger nor self-sacrifice. The bishops who had supported the bill were fair targets for the organisers of riot, and were charged with delivering the keys of every church door in England to those who had murdered the Lord from Heaven.⁴ Thomas Hayter, bishop of Norwich, was disturbed by a rabble while engaged in confirmations, and the ignorant were assured that he intended to confirm Jews on Saturdays and Christians on Sundays.⁵ The member for Exeter tried to

¹ *Life and Letters of Lady S. Lennox* (ed. 1901), i. 38.

² Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xiv. 424.

³ 26 Geo. II. c. 26.

⁴ Abbey and Overton's *English Church in the Eighteenth Century* (1878), ii. 396.

⁵ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xiv. 1431.

avoid its resentment at his vote for the bill by dispersing papers, which vouched for his orthodoxy in keeping strict observance of Sundays, and in spending Saturdays in travel and other profane occupations, impossible to him were he a Jewish convert.¹ The newspapers protested that ‘we have rich blasphemers and extortioners enough amongst us already.’² Placards, blending in odd confusion dislike for Jews and for Huguenots, paraded the cry, ‘No Jews; no wooden shoes!’ Grand juries at assizes joined with devout electorates of rotten boroughs and pious shareholders in city companies to protest against an Act which had delivered trade and religion to be ‘trampled upon by Jewish tyranny.’³ The dialectics that purported to justify their cause were marked by that readiness to appeal to the Englishman’s faith, and to his devotion to trade interests, which characterised the political partisans of the age. Jealousy of the alien, and fear for Church and State were then recognised as splendid counters in the great game of national politics, and in 1753 they were played consummately well. With all her common-sense and genius for building an empire, Hanoverian England was crassly ignorant. Beneath the

¹ Cobbett’s *Parl. Hist.*, xiv. 1432.

² *Gentleman’s Magazine* (1753), xxiii. 346.

³ *Ibid.* xxiii. 468.

literary and travelled Whig oligarchy ranged classes whose education rarely soared higher than the most elementary needs. If he lived in London, the English labourer might possibly have seen some of the few thousand Jews who had been drawn to this clime from the sunshine of the Mediterranean shores by the fame of British liberty.¹ Outside the metropolis and Bristol, however, the race was only represented by a handful of travelling pedlars, and it followed naturally that ninety-nine out of every hundred Englishmen were as ignorant of a Jew's humanity and aspiration as their ancestors had been in the days of Shakespeare and Marlowe. In 1753 the countryman was seldom able even to read the news of London, and it was a light task for the opposition zealots to distort the provisions of the Act which they assailed. They told how Jewish gold and ministerial treachery had corrupted Parliament,² and plunged an innocent nation into depths of profanity and Judaism.

‘ But, Lord, how surprised when they heard of the news
That we were to be servants to circumcised Jews,
To be negroes and slaves instead of true Blues,
Which nobody can deny.’³

¹ See Beaconsfield's *Life of Isaac Disraeli* prefixed to the 1849 edition of *Curiosities of Literature*.

² *Seasonable Remarks on the Act* (1753), p. 11.

³ Wilkins's *Political Ballads* (ed. 1860), ii. 312 ; Abbey and Overton, *ut supra*, ii. 399.

It is not surprising that the theological note should run through most of the tracts written to whip public opinion into fury. The devices of bigotry were not invented by Torquemada, and the Stöckers and Drumonts of our own time, still strive to find for it some specious intellectual basis. Most men in western Europe have learnt to regret the prostitution of religion to the service of fanaticism, and over this aspect of the agitation of 1753 the historian has gladly drawn a curtain. As a religious fever it is but a trivial incident in the long record of Jewish suffering, while in the annals of England it has been rightly forgotten. Its importance in other ways, however, makes it advisable to examine shortly the theological trend of the pamphlets that were written to shield from imaginary attack the Christianity professed by Britain in the era of Bolingbroke and Hume.

One partisan with the auspicious pseudonym of Britannia wrote complacently: ‘Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate Thee? I hate them with a perfect hatred.’ He besought his countrymen to reject the idea of association with ‘the only murderers and crucifiers of our Saviour,’¹ and repeated the hackneyed fable of St. Hugh of Lincoln,² with apposite quotations from the Psalms and Spanish laws against

¹ *An Appeal to the Throne* (1753), p. 15.

² *Ibid.* pp. 16-17.

heretics.¹ Another, who styled himself Archiacus, protested against Englishmen being forced to partake in the judgments pronounced by God² upon those whom all mankind recognised as crucifiers of Christian children and poisoners of wells.³ 'Be ye not unequally yoked with unbelievers.' The proposed naturalisation would lead to the abolition of the religious tests, which were the glory of England. Jews might then be chosen jurymen or even members of Parliament,⁴ in which event 'our famous and renowned island' would become the home of 'infidelity bare-faced,' and be known as 'little Jewry.'⁵ Another writer declaimed against one of the chief clerical supporters of toleration as being a man who tried to turn God's church into Satan's synagogue,⁶ and who was persuading the nation to prefer the friendship of Jews to 'the riches of eternity.'⁷ The corporation of Reading insisted on its members protecting the constitution and the Protestant religion from their Jewish enemies.⁸ A pamphleteer who called himself 'a Christian,' and dedicated his tract to Sir

¹ *An Appeal to the Throne* (1753), p. 25.

² *Admonition from Scripture and History* (1753), p. 21.

³ *Ibid.* p. 24.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 26.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 27.

⁶ *Remarks on Tucker's Letter on Naturalization* (1753), p. 11.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 4.

⁸ *Reading Corporation MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., xi. 7. [1888])*, p. 206.

Crisp Gascoigne, the lord mayor, reminded his readers of the fate of Judas,¹ and answered arguments drawn by the ministry from the experiences of France, where Jews were said to be favoured,² by referring to George II.’s patriotic disdain for all French fashions. Tories, who feared the spread of deism, urged that baptism should be an essential condition precedent to naturalisation,³ and joined the Whig opposition in maintaining that Jews, under all circumstances, could never be other than ‘robbers, traitors and murderers, whom the divine vengeance pursues.’⁴ It was urged that passages such as ‘O pray for the peace of Jerusalem,’ which glorified the Jewish race, should be carefully expurgated from the Psalms.⁵

Such ecclesiastical animosity was the best weapon against the Government, but the Jews were also attacked as detrimental to the country’s commercial interests. At that time great importance attached to Spain and Portugal as the best markets for English goods, and as being without native industries of their own:—

¹ *A Full Answer to a Fallacious Apology* (1753), p. 17.

² In actual fact, except at Bordeaux, the condition of Jews in France in 1753 was worse than in England. See *Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* (1899), i. 6, 10, 15; *Jewish Quarterly Review* (1907), xix. 543.

³ *The Rejection and Restoration of the Jews* (1753), p. 30.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 32. ⁵ *Gentleman’s Magazine* (1753), xxiii. 429.

' . . . Fair regions with the webs
Of Norwich pleased, or those of Manchester,
Light airy cloathing for their vacant swains
And visionary Monks.' ¹

It is well known that *autos da fe* were frequent and popular pastimes in Portugal before Pombal's accession to power in 1755, and also in Spain, so that it was plausibly argued that these ideal customers would resent Britain's encouragement of heretics, and punish her by buying less. This type of reasoning jostles the theological in odd combination. We see the blend of the two lines of thought in *A Review of the Proposed Naturalization of the Jews*, written by Jonas Hanway, the traveller and philanthropist, during the leisure time involved in taking the waters of Tunbridge Wells.²

Hanway believed that the long continued dispersion of the Jews was 'an argument in favour of the truth of our holy religion,'³ and was not therefore to be modified by any act of our legislature. He was also of opinion that the horrors of Jewish persecution throughout Europe and Barbary were too consistent to be based upon any fallacy in reasoning,⁴ and that the continental custom of imposing prescribed

¹ Dyer's *The Fleece* (1757), p. 121.

² Pugh's *Hanway* (1788), p. 122.

³ *Ibid.* p. 123.

⁴ *Review of the Proposed Naturalization* (1753), pp. 50-3.

badges upon Jews was a noble device whereby ‘no Christian might ever behold a Jew without calling to mind his Redeemer.’¹ He did not think that the Jews added materially to the wealth of England, for of the 7000 in this country barely twenty families were opulent,² and hardly any were skilled in art or manual labour.³ A few merchants and physicians were no doubt good citizens, such as Gideon who held £200,000 of Government stock,⁴ and Benjamin Mendez Da Costa, whose virtues ‘might make such Christians blush whose power is equal to his’;⁵ but in the main Jews were not only poor but immoral, and their encouragement entailed the alienation of the Portuguese.⁶

A livelier pamphlet in the same cause showed that naturalisation under the Act would cost but £100 per head,⁷ and that wealthy Jews would probably help their co-religionists to obtain it. The writer then developed an onslaught on the ministry and the Jews with a witty extravagance which provokes the suspicion that he was not a partisan but a cynic. The Act had been modelled on Dutch ideas of tolerance as if Britons ought to stoop to imitate ‘such low, filthy, mechanical, drudging, peddling,

¹ *Review of the Proposed Naturalization* (1753), p. 54.

² *Ibid.* p. 67.

³ *Ibid.* p. 69.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 72.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 83.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 87.

⁷ *Seasonable Remarks on the Act lately passed* (1753), p. 13.

insignificant fellows.’¹ Imitation of this kind meant the loss of Portuguese friendship, and was a death-blow to the hopes of those Englishmen who aspired to receive grants of Portuguese titles.² Any large increase of the Jewish population would mean the introduction of a second Sabbath to the hurt of trade,³ and the invasion of the meat-market by Jewish poulterers and butchers.⁴ Less brawn, ham and bacon would be sold, and as Jews claimed to be of older lineage than the great English families, duelling would increase.⁵ The Wandering Jew, that strange old vagrant,⁶ would probably place his wisdom and wide knowledge of the world at the service of these ‘black, ill-looking fellows,’⁷ who threatened to renew the vengefulness of Shylock⁸ upon unsuspecting Protestants. Religion would in time be corrupted by a Hebrew taint, which ‘probably in consequence of some such ill-advised Act’ had grievously impaired the orthodoxy of ‘the great and most Christian empire of Abyssinia.’⁹ Britons would suffer too in lotteries and on the turf, as the Jews were skilled in astrology and prophecy,¹⁰ and had only been prevented from impoverishing

¹ *Seasonable Remarks on the Act lately passed* (1753), p. 16.

² *Ibid.* p. 17.

³ *Ibid.* p. 23.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 20.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 25.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 14.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 26.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 28.

⁹ *Ibid.* p. 24.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 27.

the land in old days by the vigour of ‘King John and others of our best princes.’¹

Far more bitter was William Romaine’s *Answer to a Pamphlet entitled Considerations on the Bill*. The writer was an Anglican divine of a gloomy Calvinistic temper, who then enjoyed wide popularity as morning preacher at St. George’s, Hanover Square. In his eyes the general assumption in law that English-born Jews were British citizens in any event was false according to Christian tenets and ‘the authority of the laws of God.’² He lavished upon the Jew verses culled from the writings of their own heroes, by which he sought to identify the seekers after naturalisation with ‘those of the circumcision, whose mouths must be stopped, who subvert whole houses, teaching things which they ought not, for filthy lucre’s sake.’³ He ridiculed the ministry’s excuse that naturalisation would lead to conversion; persons who delighted to crucify Christian children on Good Friday⁴ were not of the stuff from which converts are made. Since Cromwell’s day Judaism had lost few adherents,⁵ and the London Jews behind Pelham were far from being prompted by this motive when they won

¹ *Seasonable Remarks on the Act lately passed* (1753), p. 28.

² Romaine’s *Answer, etc.* (1753), p. 14.

³ *Ibid.* p. 17.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 23.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 27; but see Tovey’s *Anglia Judaica* (1738), p. 299.

his support for the Jew Bill.¹ Romaine denied the alleged indebtedness of England to the Jews, who volunteered for the defence of London and maintained the credit of the Bank of England in 1745. Neither achievement served to win Culloden fight, nor entitled the Jews to 'strut about and look so big in borrowed feathers.'² To protect 'the old Christian interest' was a different thing to the Jacobitism with which the writer's party was taunted. They were men of means and good repute, and their aim was to save Britain from 'the foreign outlaw Jew, who has no God, no king and no country.'³ A comic 'Hebrew Journal' supported Romaine's dialectic, by picturing a Judaised Britain with Sir Nadab Issachar as attorney-general, and the Right Honourable the Earl of Balaam as prime minister.⁴ History may well laugh at such gibes.

Arguments of this character were in many respects cruel and perverse, but they did not inculcate personal violence,⁵ and during the whole crisis justice continued to be equably administered in the courts to Jew and Gentile

¹ Romaine, *ut supra*, p. 31.

² *Ibid.* p. 64.

³ *Ibid.* p. 96.

⁴ Picciotto's *Anglo-Jewish History* (1875), pp. 90-1.

⁵ See, however, *Carlisle MSS.* (*Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, xv. 6 [1891]), p. 207; and Besant's *London in the Eighteenth Century* (1902), p. 262.

alike.¹ It is also clear that much of the rhetoric of the day was only surface deep. The country at large was too unfamiliar with Jews, and too remote in sympathy with the Whig faction which taught the existence of a grievance against them, to feel any close counterpart to the fierce anti-Semitism of Continental Europe. The bishops most honourably dissociated the Church from the bigotry around them at the risk of being charged with ‘indecent’ irreligion.² These no doubt are redeeming features in a movement that otherwise reflected the common attributes of racial warfare. The opposition recognised the magic of catchwords and invented sounding mottoes that attracted every class. ‘Christianity and Old England for ever,’³ was the cry of the London streets; ‘No Jews,’ the password at Worcester;⁴ while Somersetshire electors shouted, ‘No Judaism; Christianity for ever’; and at Newton in Lancashire ribbons were embroidered with the words, ‘No Jews; Christianity and the constitution.’⁵ ‘No long beards nor whiskers; Christians for ever,’⁶ struck a more personal note. Those

¹ See *The Case and Appeal of James Ashley* (1753), p. v.

² Warburton’s *Letters to Hurd* (ed. 1808), p. 113.

³ Tucker’s *Second Letter to a Friend* (1753), p. 3.

⁴ *Horace Walpole’s Letters* (ed. Toynbee, 1903), iii. 187.

⁵ *Gentleman’s Magazine* (1753), xxiii. 342.

⁶ Abbey and Overton’s *English Church in the Eighteenth Century* (1878), ii. 401.

who read the actual provisions of the Jew Act may deem such phrases inapt, but they were valued missiles to throw at Pelham. Nor was caricature a less effective weapon. Prints depicting 'The Circumcised Gentiles, or a Journey to Jerusalem,'¹ 'The Racers Unhorsed, or the Jews Jockeyed,'² and 'The Prospect of a New Jerusalem,'³ are not hard to imagine. Partisans indulged freely in pork banquets and 'hogs' puddings,' and decked their wives and daughters with trinkets in the form of crosses.⁴ The toast, 'No mass-house, no conventicle, no synagogue; high church for ever,'⁵ was widely and deeply drunk.

It is interesting to turn from propaganda, which have been the common stock of generations of persecutors, to the arguments advanced in defence of the Jew Act. The first type is unimportant and includes pleas more distinguished by charity than acumen. Such pleas are those of men, too generous to respond to the cry of fanatics, but whose own ideas are naïve and unconvincing. One writer, for instance, confessed his alarm for religion, but

¹ *Gentleman's Magazine*, xxiii. 195.

² Wright's *Curicature History of the Georges* (1877), p. 181.

³ *Gentleman's Magazine* (1753), xxiii. 495; *Motives to the Senseless Clamour against the Act* (1753), p. 21.

⁴ Besant's *London in the Eighteenth Century* (1902), p. 180.

⁵ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xv. 95.

thought that the Act was a real step in God's long task of redeeming His chosen people.¹ Jews who had lived in lands subject to the Roman faith had never had a fair chance of hearing the gospel. ‘Fetch them home, blessed Lord, to Thy flock’ is no unworthy prayer to close his *Earnest and Persuasive Exhortation to the Jews*.² Yet though so serious a writer as Smollett believed naturalisation to be but the prelude to Jewish awakening to ‘the shining truths of the gospel,’³ and though we know that the Methodists of the day believed that the general conversion of the Jews was at hand,⁴ we know also that this hope was too shadowy to be the real buttress of the Government policy. Even more visionary, however, was the motive of the theologian, who suggested that England should at once accomplish the full and final restoration of the Jews to Palestine, and identify her realm with the ‘remote islands’ mentioned in prophecy.⁵ It was well too that the ministry could rely on reasoning more solid than Mr. Whiston's prophecy, uttered at Tunbridge in 1746, to the effect that all

¹ *An Earnest and Persuasive* (1753), p. 3.

² *Ibid.* p. 27.

³ Hume and Smollett's *History of England* (ed. 1825), xi. 385.

⁴ Hastings' *Life and Times of Selina, Countess of Huntingdon* (1844), i. 114.

⁵ *Full and Final Restoration of the Jews* (1753), p. 14.

infidels would become Christians within twenty years.¹

It may be admitted that the hopes expressed by the Government's religious partisans were not only in a measure delusive, but were also wholly disproportionate to the trifling changes in English law effected by the provisions of the Jew Act itself. Yet they were redeemed from irrelevance and folly by a noble insistence that whatever the merits of the legal question might be, it was a Christian's duty to lay aside racial envy and hatred, to feel a broad sympathy with all human kind. No true follower of Christ would dream of truckling to Spain and Portugal, and to the spirit of 'that vilest of courts, the tribunal of the Inquisition.'² Partisans of toleration deprecated the loud orthodoxy of the members of the London Common Council, who had asserted that any increase in the number of their Jewish competitors in business would 'falsify our own prophets and verify the predictions of their's.'³ One critic asked aptly whether such prophets were not in fact identical, and argued that naturalisation was a step towards conversion.⁴ Such thinkers resented the cant of a generation which had up to that

¹ *Full and Final Restoration of the Jews* (1753), p. 16.

² *Ibid.* p. 15 ; cf. *Motives to the Senseless Clamour* (1753), p. 29.

³ Bowyer's *Remarks on a Speech made in Common Council* (1753), p. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 14.

time extolled the virtues of scepticism, and loathed the theology of all enthusiasts. One high-minded divine asked indignantly where in the Bible God had forbidden Christians to harbour unbelievers, or instructed them to visit the sins of the fathers on the children as the executors of His own vengeance.¹ In view of the rights already legally vested in natural-born Jews, the plea that the opposition was fighting to maintain the religious character of the state was unarguable.² ‘Has God then cast away his people? God forbid,’³ quoted another champion of tolerance. Recalling the world’s indebtedness to Israel for its ethical system and its conception of God, he reminded his readers to what race Abraham and Joseph, Joshua and David were proud to belong.⁴ The same moral beauty characterised the writings of Josiah Tucker, afterwards the distinguished pamphleteer and economist, and at that time chaplain to the bishop of Bristol, and rector of St. Stephen’s in that town. It will be seen later by what political arguments Tucker won his first hold upon the public, but his religious views were no less conspicuously enlightened. After citing Biblical passages in point, he asked

¹ *Diaspora* (1754), p. 30.

² *A Letter to the Publick on the Act* (1753), pp. 9, 13.

³ *The Case of the Jews considered by a Christian* (1753), p. 15.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 18, 19.

‘How can any persons dare to call themselves Christians and yet attempt to change the nature of Christianity’ by preaching persecution?¹ The recitation of the prayer that ‘God would be pleased to fetch the Jews home to his flock’² ought to dispose of the doctrinal objections of aggrieved traders, and ‘to put an end to all this commercial canting.’³ Tucker prayed that it might be the lot of the Church of England not only to have been the glory of the Reformation but to bring within the Christian fold ‘the ancient people of God.’⁴ Such liberality of thought was an intolerable provocation to a mob already exasperated by Tucker’s attacks on the practice of cock-throwing on Shrove Tuesday; so it burnt him in effigy in the streets of Bristol.⁵

The work of Tucker and his friends served to vindicate Anglicanism from the reproach of cruelty, but of course the main arguments advanced by advocates of Jewish naturalisation were candidly secular. Its chief practical value was said to lie in its gift to Britain of fresh brains and fresh capital. The Jews had contributed largely to the rise of several American provinces; Rivera, a Portuguese Jew, had intro-

¹ Tucker’s *Letter to a Friend concerning Naturalization* (1753), p. 11. ² *Ibid.* p. 13. ³ *Ibid.* p. 21. ⁴ *Ibid.* p. 42.

⁵ Graetz, *Geschichte der Juden* (1870), xi. 52.

duced the manufacture of spermaceti at Newport, Rhode Island, in 1745. In England they were described by counsel in a famous trial of 1752 as ‘very beneficial in their knowledge of trade to those kingdoms where they reside,’¹ and it was commonly recognised that but for their ability, this originally obscure tribe of poor shepherds would not have alone survived among the ancient races of the world.² Their long struggle for existence had eliminated the weak; their long exclusion from liberal pursuits had sharpened their faculties for business. Hence it was urged that the encouragement of Jewish settlers would lead to the growth of the foreign shipping trade.³ The more merchants a country possessed the richer it became, and for this reason Jews had been ‘caressed by both Turks and Papists.’⁴ No one who troubled to read the Act which was assailed would fear a large influx of ‘the tag, rag and bobtail’⁵ of Jewry. It could only influence the rich and industrious. Wealthy members of the Jewish community always supported its poor, and prevented them from becoming a burden to the public.⁶ The assets already owned by English Jews in 1753

¹ *The Case and Appeal of James Ashley* (1753), p. 10.

² *An Apology for the Naturalization of the Jews by a True Believer* (1753), p. 3.

³ *Ibid.* p. 18.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 22.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 20.

⁶ *Full and Final Restoration of the Jews* (1753), p. 1.

were estimated at five millions,¹ and the state would suffer if this sum went abroad, or if Jews sold their holdings of Government stock.

It was on this aspect of the question that Tucker made his mark. As a young curate he had crossed swords in religious controversy with Whitefield and Wesley, but time had mellowed his fervour, and he was now more an economist than a theologian. 'Your knowledge in all the branches of trade is very extensive and far beyond mine,'² Lord Townshend had written to him in 1752, and he put his economic aptitude to excellent use. He explained that the existing status of English-born Jews deprived the opposition of some of its favourite points.³ He showed that the dislike to the Act had been originally the outcome of the envy of a small clique of London merchants, who wished to engross all foreign trade,⁴ and had therefore played upon the religious scruples of the landed gentry. Self-interest not dogma dictated their exclusion of Jews from the Turkey Company.⁵ The ordinary Englishman was 'the dupe and bubble of wily monopolists.'⁶

¹ Tucker's *Second Letter to a Friend* (1753), p. 21.

² Townshend MSS. (*Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, xi. 4 [1887]), p. 376.

³ Tucker's *Letter to a Friend concerning Naturalization* (1753), p. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 9.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 19, 20, 23; cf. Tucker's *Reflections on opening the Trade with Turkey* (1753), pp. 5, 6, 14.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 8.

The theological appeals made ‘to jurymen and day-labourers’ by Common Councilmen in London and by the close corporations of ancient boroughs, were but ‘bugbears and scarecrows,’¹ designed to obscure the true issue before the nation.

There seems no reason to doubt the accuracy of the contention that the Act itself involved little more than the naturalisation of a few wealthy men of business, and the attraction of new men and new capital to England from countries where Governments were less benign. Supporters of the ministry pointed out that no one contemplated making a Jew a justice of the peace or deputy-lieutenant.² ‘He can never expect to be prime minister,’³ said one writer laughingly. It was idle to allege that the Act meant that Westminster Abbey and St. Paul’s were to be converted to synagogues,⁴ or that London was to be sold to foreign Jews.⁵ History showed that hostility to Jews did not make for the prosperity of a nation; it had contributed to the decline of Spain and Portugal. On the other hand, toleration leads to loyalty, and Jews would assuredly fight for hearth and

¹ Tucker’s *Letters to a Friend concerning Naturalization* (1753), p. 10.

² *Motives to the Senseless Clamour against the Act* (1753), p. 5.

³ *Ibid.* p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 2.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 11.

home when admitted to citizenship.¹ The Act in no way affected their existing right to immigrate, and there was moreover no likelihood of any large immigration. It was not thought probable that Jews would be attracted to Scotland,² while any influx of West Indian merchants from Amsterdam would not interfere with the prosperity of 'the natural-born English drayman or chimney-sweeper.'³

One of the wisest controversialists of the day was the country gentleman who wrote *Reflexions upon Naturalization*, a fine plea for sanity and public spirit against 'the crafty and malignant.'⁴ He showed that a great empire admits necessarily of alien blood. One-tenth of the population of Athens had been of foreign origin.⁵ Quoting Bacon's dictum that only states liberal of naturalisation are fit for empire,⁶ he pointed admiringly to the Romans' policy of absorbing into their own polity the patriotism and religion of conquered nations. 'These were a people born for empire.'⁷ Dutch toleration had won for Amsterdam its opulence and splendour, and secured for it the place once held by Antwerp.⁸ The Levant had formerly

¹ *The Case of the Jews considered by a Christian* (1753), p. 22.

² *Ibid.* p. 23.

³ *Seasonable Remarks on the Act* (1753), p. 17.

⁴ *Reflexions upon Naturalization* (1753), p. 7.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 12. ⁶ *Ibid.* p. 15. ⁷ *Ibid.* p. 16. ⁸ *Ibid.* p. 17.

been a great market for English goods ‘and bales of softest wool from Bradford looms,’¹ but its custom had since been transferred to France owing to the activity of her Jewish merchants.² Surely it would be well to add Jewish skill and initiative to the commercial assets of England, which would profit by its new citizens as surely as the Turks had profited by the policy of toleration at Smyrna,³ and the Duke of Tuscany at Leghorn.⁴ ‘What a shame is it to our own religion and nation that bloody Papists afford a peaceful asylum to Jews, whilst Christians and Protestants exclude their distressed and persecuted brethren.’⁴ This eloquent plea was no less ably supported at a later date by a clerical writer, who attributed Jewish peculiarities to environment, and argued⁵ that if there had been any radical difference between the natures of Jew and Gentile, it would have been superfluous for governments to impose distinguishing badges.

The same breadth of view is displayed in two tracts, written respectively in July and October 1753 by a London merchant, who veiled his identity under the name of Philo-Patriæ. He

¹ Dyer’s *The Fleece* (1757), p. 123.

² *Reflexions, ut supra*, pp. 79, 91.

³ *Ibid.* p. 75.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 20.

⁵ *Remarks upon some Passages in Warburton’s Dedication* (ed. 1759), p. 48.

compared the progress of lands like Holland, France and Tuscany, where Jews were not discouraged,¹ with the deterioration of races which persecuted them. The loyalty of English Jews had been proved in 1745 when they joined the city militia in large numbers, and by agreeing to accept bank-notes at par, had prevented a run upon the Bank.² Each state has the class of Jews it deserves, for a Jew in a free country is as impressionable to its ideas as cloth to dye,³ and consequently those of Britain are no less distinguished by their patriotism and love of liberty than by their ability on the exchange.⁴ The writer named several London Jews of the day as famous for their philanthropy.⁵ They were all of the Sephardim, and though the very names of their families and business houses disappeared before a century elapsed,⁶ their charity seems in fact to have been nearly as effectual in reconciling Christian England to the presence of a Jewish element as was the reputation of Jewish pugilists and musicians in the next generation. Philo-Patriæ pointed out that Dutch Jews had been pathfinders for the Dutch

¹ *Considerations on the Bill* (1753), pp. 7, 11, 71.

² *Ibid.* pp. 41-2.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 6, 7, 34.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 7.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 34.

⁶ Picciotto's *Anglo-Jewish History* (1875), p. 94; see also the *Jewish Encyclopædia*, *passim*.

East India trade,¹ and they might transplant to London the headquarters of their enterprises in diamonds and coral. Jews had already helped the development of England’s silk and cotton industries and her trade in the South Seas. Above all, they had been the pioneers of the British West Indian trade. It was possible that they might open new markets for English goods in the Caspian region, or in the direction of the North-West passage.² It was untrue that they hated Englishmen as Christians, or that they were the blasphemers of Popish imagination.³ Liberty of conscience was the basis of Protestantism, and Christianity itself was but Judaism perfected.⁴ The virtues of the Jewish people were innate, while their vices were but the fruit of laws which had restricted their careers and degraded their ambitions.⁵

The Pelham ministry was not, however, composed of men who put principle before expediency. They had behind them, it is true, some courageous pamphleteers, and the goodwill of men like Chesterfield, who was too rational to feel anything but disdain for what he called ‘that narrow mob-spirit of intolerance

¹ *Considerations on the Bill* (1753), p. 15.

² *Ibid.* p. 77; *Further Considerations* (1753), pp. 44, 45.

³ *Ibid.* p. 62.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 3.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 6.

in religious, and inhospitality in civil matters.’¹ Yet they were faced by an indignant people on the eve of a general election, and they bent to the storm. The Act after all was unimportant, and office was sweet. On 15th November 1753, the first day of the new session, Newcastle brought forward a bill in the House of Lords to repeal the unpopular Act so far as it related to naturalisation. His idea was to leave the provision against Jews’ presenting to advowsons undisturbed, but in view of the alleged implication that they could possess such a right at common law apart from statutory prohibition, that provision shared ultimately the fate of the more contentious clauses. Newcastle’s speech was described by one critic as being ‘if possible rather worse than usual,’² and by another as the utterance of a man, ‘frightened out of his wits at the groundless and senseless clamours against the Jew Bill.’³ He maintained his original conviction that ‘a Jew may be an honest man and a good citizen,’ and said that his Government was only yielding to ‘the artifice of those who are secretly enemies to our present happy establishment.’⁴ The charge of Jacobitism, however irrelevant, was

¹ Chesterfield’s *Letters* (ed. 1845), ii, 343.

² *Bedford Correspondence* (ed. 1842), ii, 138.

³ Chesterfield’s *Letters* (ed. 1845), ii, 94.

⁴ Cobbett’s *Parl. Hist.*, xv, 92.

then considered a useful thrust at oppositions. Temple with more heat protested against the proposed surrender to ‘an unchristian high church spirit,’¹ but Hardwicke, never a warm friend of Jewish toleration, accepted the inevitable, and the bishops, bowing to what Orford happily termed the onslaughts of ‘little curates and drunken aldermen,’² acquiesced in repeal with ironical reflections upon the need to aid ‘weak and misguided consciences.’³ Dodington in his *Diary* pays no mean tribute to the ‘sentiments of charitable comprehension and liberty of conscience,’⁴ expressed by Secker, bishop of Oxford, and Drummond, bishop of St. Asaph. The bill was read for the third time in the House of Lords on 22nd November, Temple alone recording a dissentient protest.⁵

The measure was sent to the Commons at a time of great ferment, as the opposition still raged against the original Act as being ‘directly contrary to the decrees of God recorded both in the Old and New Testament.’⁶ The preamble cast an aspersion upon them by suggesting that the general desire for repeal was due to factious

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xv. 95.

² *Orford Memoires* (ed. 1852), i. 311.

³ *Bedford Correspondence* (ed. 1842), ii. 139.

⁴ Dodington's *Diary* (ed. 1784), p. 255.

⁵ *Journals of the House of Lords*, xxviii. 167.

⁶ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xv. 126.

endeavours 'to raise discontents and to disquiet the minds of many of his Majesty's subjects,' and it was therefore attacked in committee. William Pitt glorified the debate by denunciations of 'the old high church persecuting spirit,'¹ and of 'our ridiculous laws against aliens, our persecuting, unchristian laws relating to religion.'² Admiral Vernon on the other hand championed the cause of the 'honest, unambitious country curates'³ who had rescued England from being betrayed by their bishops into conversion to Judaism. On 28th November the preamble was retained on a division by 113 votes to 47, and the repealing bill was then passed unanimously.⁴ It remains the trophy of much misguided zeal.⁵ On 4th December an attempt to repeal the Act of 1740, which provided for the naturalisation of Jews in the plantations, was defeated by 208 votes to 88.

The agitation discloses the shallowness of English civilisation in 1753. The politicians who organised it were in their hearts essentially tolerant and impartial towards all creeds and causes. They professed themselves 'true Revolution Whigs,'⁶ and were admittedly far from

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xv. 154.

² *Ibid.* xv. 155.

³ *Ibid.* xv. 160.

⁴ *Journals of the House of Commons*, xxv. 856.

⁵ 27 Geo. II. c. i.

⁶ *Answer to Considerations on the Bill (1753)*, p. 67.

being ‘actuated by monkish principles.’¹ Clear-sighted and well-informed, they thought the prize of a parliamentary advantage worth a passing deviation from their real tenets. They understood how to win a mob, and their propaganda must be compared with that of Bismarck’s reptile press against Lasker, and of Goldwin Smith and MacColl against Beaconsfield. Ginosdden and wholly uneducated, the people at large responded to their appeal with a hearty piety that echoed the Sacheverell episode of 1710, and foreshadowed the Gordon riots of 1780. So easily indeed did the opposition gull the public that it was not even necessary to shape the case they presented to the country with any but the rudest art. ‘Christianity and Old England for ever’ sufficed as a war-cry to epitomise every grievance which the Jew Act was alleged to involve. Constitutionally, the only importance of the movement lies in the long postponement not merely of reform in naturalisation law, but of Jewish political and municipal emancipation. As late as 1818 it was gravely argued in court that Jews were in law perpetual enemies, ‘for between them, as with the devils whose subjects they be, and the Christian there can be no peace,’² and Lord

¹ *Orford Memoires* (ed. 1852), p. 319.

² 2 *Swanston’s Reports* (ed. 1822), p. 501.

Eldon laid down the time-worn principle that Christianity was part of the law of the land. Of all aliens those who vaunt their alien ideals will always be the least desired, and the English people moves slowly with an incorrigible perseverance in the wisdom of prejudice.

The most remarkable feature in the anti-Jewish propaganda of 1753 is the absence of an economic element. The effects of immigration upon the wealth of the country, and upon its relations with foreign states were considered. Reference was made by no means unjustly to the abuse thrown at Jewish converts to Christianity by their former co-religionists,¹ for the old maxim *nemo potest exuere patriam* has never been more stringently applied than by those who see a fatherland in Zion. Yet it was impossible for the opposition to rely mainly on non-religious grounds. The position of the Jews in the England of George II. did not warrant such a course. Tovey, principal of New Inn Hall, Oxford, wrote in 1738 a very dispassionate survey of their history in this country, from which the immunity of the British people from any grave competition on their part is very clear. The Sephardim of London lived then in the neighbourhood of Bury Street and St. Mary Axe, and were

¹ *A Full Answer to a Fallacious Apology* (1753), p. 15.

mostly engaged in the shipping trade or in importing bullion. They were regarded with general respect. Gideon, the most eminent among them, was Pelham’s financial ally. He obtained an Act of Parliament to confirm his right to hold land at Belvidere in Kent, and was also lord of the manor of Spalding.¹ When he died in 1762 he left a fortune of £580,000, and the reputation among Christians and Jews alike of having been ‘the father of the poor.’² Alvaro Lopez Suaso, Francis Salvador and Anthony da Costa had been promoters of the colony of Georgia.

Meyer Löw Schomberg and his son Isaac were the fashionable doctors of the day; Alexander Schomberg was a promising officer in the navy; Moses Mendes, grandson of Fernando Mendes, physician to Catherine of Braganza, was a popular playwright. Several of the prolific Mendez da Costa family were noted philanthropists, and they in company with the Franks and Salvadors were admitted by all classes in 1753 to be ‘generous and open-hearted.’ One had been interested in Anson’s voyage round the world;³ another became, in spite of an unbalanced character, librarian and

¹ Nichols’s *Literary Anecdotes* (1812), iv. 85.

² *The Case of the Jews considered by a Christian* (1753), p. 30.

³ Anson’s *Voyage round the World* (1748); list of subscribers.

fellow of the Royal Society, fellow of the Society of Antiquaries, an expert in conchology and the author of a natural history of fossils.¹ Other Jews of Portuguese origin had made their mark in journalism; a merry Jewish author 'with chocolate cheek' figures in Goldsmith's poem, 'The Haunch of Venison.' Such men had secured the success of Handel's *Judas Maccabaeus* in 1747, and they conducted Jewish charities with recognised ability.² Jews from Germany were far less numerous, and generally less enlightened; their star has risen since. Travelling pedlars and jewellers of the type depicted in Hogarth's print of 'The Election' were establishing connections at Dublin, Bristol and Birmingham, and old-clothes dealers were common in London, but no Jews settled at Manchester until 1780, and the bulk of the British people derived their entire knowledge of the race from the pulpit and the stage.

Under these circumstances we cannot wonder at the exclusion of industrial arguments from the speeches and tracts of the time. No one could then pretend that naturalisation was really tantamount to inviting aliens to oust British labour, or to grind the faces of the

¹ Nichols, *ut supra*, ii. 292.

² Maitland's *London* (1739), pp. 518-9.

British poor. The squalor of the immigrant is modern. The Jews of Bevis Marks had no dealings whatever with the peasantry; their debtors were not Englishmen at all. Bearing in mind then the fervour of the movement against them, it follows clearly that anti-Semitic feeling is by no means necessarily economic. Goldwin Smith and his school hold that the Jewish question is always but a question of finance, that anti-Semitism has never been the mere rancour of theologians. It may be left to the moralist to decide whether pillage or piety is a fairer motive for persecution, but it is obvious that if the frenzy of 1753 was conceived in the political lobby, it was brought to birth as a purely religious enthusiasm. It cannot possibly be regarded as a sign of economic indignation. Nor are there better grounds for imputing to the opposition those political pretexts that have been devised in recent times to vindicate similar outbursts. The Jews of 1753 too obviously exercised no influence at all over the press or politics of Europe. The capitalists among the community in England were so far from directing their finance with a cosmopolitan indifference to British interests that we have to attribute to their services to the ministry the introduction of the Jew Act itself. It would seem, therefore, that popular

fury was simply due to the dim tradition of mediæval prejudice, fanned into a flame by the art of the journalist and the hatred of the theologian. The soul of anti-Semitism has rarely been betrayed so nakedly.

The effects of the movement upon the Jews in England have seldom been considered. It has been generally assumed that it stimulated the trend towards conversion to Christianity. Were this the case, the event would be contrary to Börne's wise dictum that persecution is to the Jew what the wind is to the traveller. The sharper the blast, the more closely he wraps himself in the cloak of isolation and Judaism; when the sun of freedom and prosperity shines, he throws it off. We know that oppression has always intensified the power of the synagogue; it has always transformed an unprogressive and anti-social religion into a glorious solace, and driven Hebrew imagination back to the East. The tendency among English Jews on the eve of the Act of 1753 was towards fusion. In Jamaica and Barbados, in Georgia, Rhode Island, South Carolina and New York social contact was undermining tribalism, and in London several Jews had made their way into English society. So anxious were they to dissociate themselves from non-English connections that the Great Synagogue declined in

1753 to relieve immigrants who had left their native countries without good cause.¹ Hence the frenzy of their religious assailants was a cruel blow to men who had begun to feel a British patriotism, and it had a twofold result. In the main it forced the Jews to realise again that they were outcasts in a strange land; it retarded the natural process whereby Jews become assimilated to the people among whom they dwell. The conservative theology of the rabbis was strengthened by an increased influx of co-religionists from abroad, who brought with them from less happy environments ideas on religion and policy which excluded the thought of intermarriage with Christians, and of identifying themselves enthusiastically with the state to which they belonged. Removed as it was from simple theism by a mass of superstitions and Asiatic dietary regulations, eighteenth-century Judaism itself offered no compromise between rigid Hebrew formalism and absolute surrender to Christian influences. A friendly writer described British Jews in 1754 as being as expectant as ever of a sudden summons by the Messiah to return to Zion.²

A second consequence that resulted from the frenzy of 1753 was directly contrary to its

¹ Booth's *Life and Labour of London* (1902), iii. 174.

² *Diaspora* (1754), p. 51.

general effect. In a few cases the approximation of English Jews to the national character and habits had been already so complete that when the mental gates of the Jewish population closed anew in 1753, they parted company from their fellows. Frequent association had led these individuals to put their country before their race, and they continued to drift steadily towards Anglicisation. Sampson Gideon ceased to attend a synagogue, and brought up his children as Anglicans. An ardent patriot, he offered bounties to recruits when the Seven Years' War broke out in 1756, lent £40,000 to George II. 'in his quality of Elector of Hanover,'¹ and on 21st May 1759 obtained a baronetcy for his son, who was then a boy at Eton. It is to be observed that he still subscribed secretly to Hebrew organisations, and by his will desired to be laid to his rest in the Portuguese Jews' burying-ground at Mile End, and to be prayed for 'as a Jew and a married man.' Not inappropriately his tomb was adorned by a 'basso reliefo representing the story of Joseph and his brethren.'² The career of his son was the logical sequel to his own. Winning his way into the charmed circle of

¹ *Annual Register* (1758), p. 103.

² Picciotto's *Anglo-Jewish History* (1875), p. 63; Nichols's *Literary Anecdotes* (1812), ix. 642; *Annual Register* (1762), p. 108; Lyson's *Environs of London* (1795), iii. 476.

White’s club,¹ and elected member for Coventry, he triumphed over the politicians who persisted in calling him ‘the Jew,’ or ‘Mr. Pitt’s Jew,’ and who discerned in his every action ‘the cloven foot.’² Thomas Orde, Pitt’s Irish secretary, deplored his leader’s partiality for Gideon, while the great minister’s visit to his seat in Kent provoked jealous comment from George Selwyn and other less favoured partisans. On 17th July 1789 he took his wife’s surname of Eardley, and in the same year the Irish peerage was said to be ‘defiled’ by his elevation to the rank of Baron Eardley of Spalding.³ From him the Childers family trace their descent. His sister was converted to Methodism at one of the ‘spiritual routs’ that gladdened the drawing-room of the Countess of Huntingdon, and her home at Bath became a centre for all that was best and most sincere in Calvinistic society.⁴ The elder Gideon’s contemporary, Mendes, the dramatist, pursued a similar line of conduct; he married an Englishwoman, and his descendants rejoiced

¹ *Carlisle MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., xv. 6 [1897])*, p. 471.

² *Portland MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., xiv. 2 [1894])*, p. 333; Alger’s *Napoleon’s British Visitors and Captives* (1904), p. 61.

³ See *Portland MSS., ut supra*, p. 323; Nichols, *ut supra*, i. 685; ix. 643; Alger, *ut supra*, pp. 61, 229; *Carlisle MSS., ut supra*, p. 666.

⁴ Tyerman’s *Whitefield* (1876), ii. 405, 407; Hastings’s *Life and Times of Selina, Countess of Huntingdon* (1844), ii. 3-4.

in time in the possession of a baronetcy and the Anglo-Saxon surname of Head. In 1771 the elders and general vestry of the Great Synagogue thanked the Home Office for its attempt to exclude such Jewish immigrants from Poland as could not pay the usual passenger freight on the packet boats.¹ This tendency among wealthy and cultivated Jews to be absorbed in the English people, and to dislike being identified with foreigners, was due to the underlying tolerance of the eighteenth century, and might perhaps have been the main stream of Anglo-Jewish history but for the reaction of 1753.

It would be improper to discuss the ethics of the conversions by which Gideon and his fellow-thinkers lightened their task of Anglicisation. It is the common experience of Judaism to forfeit in every generation the allegiance of those who refuse to recognise any eternal distinction between Jew and Greek. The most memorable feature of their work was the claim they set up that Jews could be good Britons, while the tendency even among Jews of more orthodox type to assert that their creed admitted of patriotism, as well as of merely racial sentiment, was particularly noteworthy. These aspects of the Jewish question in Eng-

¹ *Home Office Papers, 1770-2* (ed. 1881), p. 357.

land under George II. contrast strikingly with its position at that time in other countries, where the loftiest Jewish ambition was to be left in peace. In 1736 appeared *The Complaint of the Children of Israel*, in which a very different aim was attributed to English Jews. The writer called himself Solomon Abrabanel, and though his satirical thrusts at Nonconformity justify perhaps a suspicion that he was rather an Anglican wit than a Jewish patriot, his views are admittedly quite consistent with those of many Jews of his day, and they are quoted as those of a recognised Jewish author in several tracts of 1753. He said that the Hebrew was as loyal to England as the Huguenot or Scot, and claimed for his community a place among the other dissenting bodies then protesting that though ‘obliged to contribute to every public charge, they were yet excluded from every public employment.’¹ He urged, in fact, that the Church of England was more beholden to Jews than to dissenters, for it owed to them not only the five books of Moses, but Christianity itself; and they were not Jews who, in the preceding century, had swept the bishops from their cathedrals, and sold the chapter lands.² The rabbi in his black

¹ *The Complaint of the Children of Israel* (1736), p. 3.

² *Ibid.* p. 12.

coat and short bib might almost be mistaken for a Protestant minister.¹

Thus the object of many educated Jews in the England of George II. was, like that of the French Huguenots in London, to become if possible more British than the Britons, and to resent the primitive rites and theories which parted them from the society in which they moved. Their aim was quite compatible with the maintenance of sympathy with oppressed co-religionists still penned in the dark and narrow Jewries of Continental Europe, and also compatible with profound respect for the past history of their unconquerable race. Consequently all who prefer this objective of assimilation in the already variegated stock of the British empire to the separatist notions embodied in later-day Zionism, will regret that their task was made far more difficult by the outburst of racial antagonism in 1753. It strengthened the fallacy that Jews are of necessity perpetual aliens. It left to the nineteenth century the achievement of proving how liberally their genius can respond to the ideals of the modern state system wherever self-isolation has ceased to be a dogma. In Börne and Heine the Jewish intellect devised the aspirations of young Germany; in Crémieux and

¹ *The Complaint of the Children of Israel* (1736), p. 37.



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perhaps in Gambetta it contributed to those of republican France; in England it formulated in the brain of the greatest Jew since St. Paul the no less distinctively national creed of British imperialism. It would be delightful to believe that the vision of the future Anglicisation of his co-religionists in these islands was granted to the Benjamin Disraeli who arrived in London from Italy in 1748—‘a man of ardent character, sanguine, courageous, speculative and fortunate,’¹ to believe that he dreamed the destiny of the grandson who broke so gloriously ‘his birth’s invidious bar’; but he is little more than a name, and appropriately to its later-day traditions he is silent.

As the trend of Jewish thought towards the goal of fusion with the rest of the population was stemmed by the events of 1753, its interest is mainly historical. Of more material and present moment to the student of British politics is the concurrent tendency among English statesmen to encourage the Jews to be proud of English citizenship. We have seen above that the opposition found it expedient to advocate a different cause, and for party purposes to awaken bigotry in an ignorant electorate. Yet men like Pelham and Chesterfield were the more faithful representatives of

¹ *Curiosities of Literature* (ed. 1849), i. xxiii.

the Whig oligarchy which governed Hanoverian England, and lovers of tolerance must be grateful to them and to their followers for their prediction that the land in which they lived would in time be no less dear to English Jews than to those more truly the sons of its soil.¹ In an age which still countenanced throughout Europe a system of mediæval oppression, and which aimed at excluding Jews from every liberal calling, it is refreshing to find in England the dawn of a better day. The best minds in the country seem to have grasped the lesson, taught afterwards to successive generations of Germans by Mendelssohn, Börne and Lassalle, that the struggle for Jewish emancipation was but part of the wider liberation war of humanity against the cruelty of castes and sects.

It is also significant that the actual proposer of the Jew bill in the House of Lords was the eager advocate of colonisation, whose name is commemorated for all time in the capital of Nova Scotia, and that the most eloquent defender of the Jews in the House of Commons was the Great Commoner himself. Thwarted though it was by faction, the insignificant Jew Act of 1753 heralded not only the slowly accomplished victory of religious toleration, but the dis-

¹ *Case of the Jews considered by a Christian* (1753), p. 27.

covery that successful territorial expansion cannot be achieved without some relaxation of the principle of race. A great empire is compatible indeed with the assertion of the spirit of nationality, but not with insistence on the letter. The most notable advocates of generosity in 1753 were also pioneers of Greater Britain, and they anticipated in this respect the political genius which secured for Britain Canadian loyalty during the American Revolution and the war of 1812. Indeed this seems to have been the first occasion when the pioneers of Greater Britain expressed the emphatic opinion that the wings of expansion should never be pinioned by any narrow enforcement of racial or ecclesiastical uniformity. Their combination of the practice of liberty with the sense of empire has been one of the eighteenth century's most fruitful legacies to English statesmanship.

It is also not extravagant to believe that the ministry and their literary supporters pointed out the only way by which a nation may really profit by the presence of a Jewish element. They refused to be repelled by the two historic Jewish tendencies—to become absorbed either in the subtleties of Talmudism or in the mysteries of the money market. They saw that the roots of the first tendency

lie in the pressure of adversity, of the second in the too sudden acquisition of wealth without the sense of responsibility to any community wider than a sect. They realised that character is determined by environment, and that the worst political result of the ghetto system was its prevention of the Jews from partaking, except as taxpayers, in the duties and privileges of the nation at large. For these reasons the friends of the Jew Act of 1753 declined to bow to the fetish of national exclusiveness, and thought that it became an empire to educate all the races within its boundaries to the breadth and splendour of their trust. In order to effect this object they inculcated the common citizenship of all British subjects, whatever their religious tenets.

Contemporary Europe chose, and many nations even in our own time have chosen, to persist in an oppressive policy, which serves to intensify every Jewish failing, and to force the race to swaddle itself more than ever in the toils of rabbinism. Honour will therefore always attach to the men who sought in 1753 to enrich the national character of England by what George Eliot called oriental sunlight. In order to give scope to the full mental and moral capacities of the Jewish people in their midst, they tried by tolerance and trust to draw

them from their alien status. For the moment they were beaten, but later history proves that the course they advocated has been far more effectual to sap the separatism of Israel than the fires of the Spanish Inquisition or the great gates of the German Judengassen. It is also the one means of consecrating the high domestic virtues of the Jews, and their precious intellectual gifts of imagination, pertinacity and insight to the service of the state.

CHAPTER IV

THE WINNING OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
A WAR PANIC OF 1770

THE Falkland Islands were sighted in 1584 by Cowley,¹ in 1592 by John Davis, and in 1594 by John Hawkins, who called the group Virginia or Hawkins's Maiden Land.² A Dutchman, Sebald de Wert, visited them in 1598, and re-christened them Sebald's Islands. Dampier in 1684 observed 'three rocky, barren islands without any tree';³ five years later Strong gave the name of Falkland to the sound between the two largest islands, a term afterwards extended to the islands themselves.⁴ Next came French explorers, Beauchêne in 1701 and Fouquet in 1714,⁵ who devised for them the new appellation of the Malouines. Lost in the loneliness of the south Atlantic, 480 miles north-east of Cape Horn, they remained uncolonised,

¹ Snow's *Two Years' Cruise off Tierra del Fuego* (1857), i. 73.

² Pernety, *Histoire d'un Voyage aux Malouines* (1770), i. 14.

³ Burney's *Voyages in the South Seas* (1816), iv. 139.

⁴ *Ibid.* iv. 331.

⁵ Pernety, *ut supra*, i. 15.

though the Spaniards, who styled them the Malvinas or Malomas, regarded them as the natural appanages of Patagonia and the Rio de la Plata,¹ fragments of the New World, given by Columbus to Castille and Leon, and dedicated to the service of Spain by the Papal bull of 1493.

In 1748 Anson suggested that England should occupy the islands as a shelter for whalers and as a possible base of operations against Spanish America, but desire for peace prevented the adoption of his advice. The French, however, were less cautious. In September 1763 Bougainville sailed for the Falklands, and on 3rd February 1764 he founded the first settlement on its shores at Port Louis on East Falkland, at the head of Berkeley Sound. Negotiations were opened by Choiseul with a view to acquiring from Spain the right she claimed to the territory,² but they ended with his abandonment of the French project on 1st April 1767 when he relinquished all interest in the islands in deference to Spanish jealousy and for a consideration.³ Other races have therefore profited by the rapid increase in the numbers of the horses and cattle that the French had

¹ Burney, *ut supra*, v. 155.

² Ruville's *Chatham* (Eng. tr. 1907), iii. 206.

³ *Chatham Correspondence* (ed. 1839), iii. 119.

introduced, and Port Louis became the Spanish station of Puerto Soledad.¹

Meanwhile, on 23rd January 1765 John Byron had planted a small English colony on the west coast of West Falkland, and built a hamlet, which he called Port Egmont in honour of the first lord of the Admiralty who had sent him out. His action did not pass unheeded in Spain. Chatham was at that time trying to extort from her the ransom promised to England by the archbishop of Manila on its capture in 1762, and he offered to abandon Port Egmont as an inducement.² The bargain proved abortive, but the governor of Buenos Ayres, one Francesco Buccarelli, did not intend to waive Spanish claims. On 28th November 1769 two Spanish ships approached the British settlement, and were ordered to depart by Captain Hunt its commander. On 6th March 1770 Hunt left for England in the *Tamar* sloop, and immediately on his arrival at Plymouth he sent an express to the Admiralty to report the threatened interference of the Spaniards. He was too late to save the colony from its fate. On 4th June 1770, the day after his coming to Plymouth, five frigates

¹ *Annual Register* (1771), p. 6; see also Weddell's *Voyage towards the South Pole* (1825), p. 94.

² Ruville's *Chatham* (Eng. tr. 1907), iii. 205.

containing 1600 men, 'of whom 526 were choice regular troops,'¹ 27 guns, 4 mortars and 200 bombs, arrived at the Falkland Islands from Buenos Ayres, and their commander, Madarriaga by name, called upon the garrison to surrender.

Resistance was impossible. The whole English population of the settlement consisted of Captains Farmer and Maltby with the crews of two sloops, one of which had sunk, and a handful of marines. Their only considerable building was 'a wooden blockhouse built at Woolwich,'² full of stores and provided with neither guns nor loopholes. After negotiations, which did not discredit the defenders, articles³ were signed on 10th June 1770 by which they surrendered Port Egmont. The news was sent to Buccarelli, and for the next twenty days by detaining the rudder of the British sloop, the Spaniards prevented the garrison's departure. They then marched on board with the honours of war, and landed in England in October.

Their experiences were already the talk of the country. James Harris, afterwards first Earl of Malmesbury, then represented the

¹ *Annual Register* (1771), p. 233.

² Johnson's *Thoughts on the late Transactions* (1771), p. 24.

³ *Annual Register* (1771), pp. 236-7.

British Government at Madrid. In the age of Clive and Pitt, when the history of heroes was so often the history of youth, his diplomatic ability was unaffected by the fact that he was only twenty-four. On 23rd August 1770 he wrote to Weymouth, who was Lord North's secretary of state for the southern department, that information had reached Cadiz of the despatch of a strong force from Buenos Ayres to dislodge the English from the Falklands.¹ During September he had frequent interviews with Grimaldi, the Spanish secretary of state and foreign minister, whom he asked to disavow the acts of Buccarelli and to restore the islands to Great Britain.² Grimaldi is said to have wanted peace; certainly he had allowed the Spanish navy to decay, but he was bound to maintain the traditional claims of his Government, while Aranda and O'Reilly, relying on French assistance, were unwilling to make any concessions whatever to English dignity.

The position of the British ministry had been singularly difficult from the moment of North's accession to power in January 1770. It had but just emerged from the troubles of 'Wilkes and liberty,' and was already entangled in its long and fatal struggle with the American

¹ *Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence* (ed. 1845), i. 51.

² *Ibid.* i. 52; *Home Office Papers, 1770-2* (ed. 1881), pp. 104-6.

colonies. It had to face the bitter hostility of London, the perpetual attacks of the various Whig cliques out of office, and the sullen criticism of Chatham. Peace was clearly not only a party but a British interest, and yet George III. and North both realised that to preserve it in 1770 they might have to abandon a national claim and give the opposition at the same time a great opportunity. The court dreaded having to provide its enemies at home with the most effective of all party cries. On the other hand, it was sceptical as to the advantage of owning desolate and unexplored islets far beyond the pale of civilisation. They did not seem worth the risk of renewed war with the two Bourbon powers at a time when English politics were the prey of faction. The Home Office had received a report from Hunt in July 1770 which described the soil as black, spongy and poor, and stated that the only fish obtainable were mullets and smelts.¹ The admiralty possessed a *Journal of the Winds and Weathers at the Falklands* from 1st February 1766 to 19th January 1767, which had been compiled by Captain John M'Bride of H.M.S. *Jason*. It disclosed a dreary picture of isles swept constantly by storm and sleet, where even in the summer the west wind blew so

¹ *Home Office Papers*, 1770-2 (ed. 1881), p. 85.

fiercely 'that it is sometimes an hour before a cutter can row to the shore, although the water is smooth, and but the distance of one cable and a half.'¹ Whales, sea-lions and seals, 'covered with short, light, tawny hair,' were the only products of value.² In October 1770 these and other particulars were furnished to Samuel Johnson to enable him to draw a defence of the Government should it decide upon some compromise with Spain.³ Happily for North, he found his hesitation reflected in that of Grenville and his friends, who formed an important section of the opposition. Grenville himself died on 13th November 1770, but his connection came to the conclusion that the reports of eye-witnesses as to the value of the Falklands deserved more consideration than the protests of irresponsible patriots. Thomas Coleman, one of the lieutenants of marines who were serving in the islands, had written to Grenville in March 1770, that they were 'the most detestable place I ever was at in my life,'⁴ a wild expanse of heath 'wherever you turn your eye,' where corn would not grow, and 'fishy geese' were the only local means of

¹ M'Bride's *Journal* (ed. 1775), p. 13; for M'Bride see Charnock's *Biographia Navalis* (1798), vi. 556.

² Dalrymple's *Collection of Voyages* (1775), p. 9.

³ Johnson's *Letters* (ed. 1892), i. 167.

⁴ *Grenville Correspondence* (ed. 1852), iv. 505.

sustenance.¹ The loneliness was appalling; 'our voyage was the shortest to this place any ship has ever made, but God knows disagreeable enough.' Even in summer the air was bitterly cold.² It seems probable that the climate was in fact then less temperate than now, while later experience has shown that the first settlers were unfortunate in their choice of a site, Port Egmont being peculiarly bleak,³ and its harbour being too spacious.⁴

Doubts as to the utility of the prize, for which Spain threatened to contend, made British policy pacific, and led the ministry to conceal the progress of its negotiations from a suspicious public. It was resolved to exact at all events some reparation. Naval ascendancy was of paramount importance should war break out, and the best warship then afloat, the *Britannia*, was launched with unusual ostentation. Though she carried 120 guns, she could sail 'as pertly as a frigate.'⁵ Harris was instructed to ask for the restoration of the islands, without, however, any clear indication as to the lengths in controversy to which the state was prepared to go. In November the idea of

¹ *Grenville Correspondence* (ed. 1852), v. 506; cf. Weddell's *Voyage towards the South Pole* (1825), p. 83.

² *Grenville Correspondence* (ed. 1852), v. 508.

³ Weddell, *ut supra*, p. 95.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 82.

⁵ *Horace Walpole's Letters to Mann* (ed. 1843), ii. 112.

postponing the assembly of Parliament pending an understanding with Spain was rejected, as such a step might suggest that Great Britain was inclined to give way.¹ Johnson had prepared a tract to demonstrate the worthlessness of the Falklands in case the Government should decide to yield, but it was withheld from publication in case a different result might be achieved by war or diplomacy, in which event the islands might become precious symbols of the ministry's devotion to colonial projects. North in fact prepared two king's speeches for the opening of Parliament, the one martial, the other peaceful, according to what might then be the attitude of the Spanish court.²

While George III. and his ministers temporised with an anxiety which was perhaps undignified but by no means unworthy, the opposition attacked their policy with characteristic invective and acumen. Whatever might be the issue of negotiations, it was bound, in their judgment, to be sinister. The country was impressed with the information that the Falklands had been invaded in time of peace, and with circumstances derogatory to British honour. Men protested that a colony, planted on an island English by right of discovery and

¹ *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North* (ed. 1867), i. 35.

² Walpole's *Memoirs of the Reign of George III.* (ed. 1845), iv. 184.

English by right of first occupation, had been rudely expelled. They did not care to consider whether Spain had not acquired by purchase the title, which France claimed to the islands in virtue of Bougainville's settlement.¹ It was clear that Spain's proprietary claims were tainted by their partial dependence upon a pretension that England had always repudiated since first she broke her bondage to the Roman Church. The Rockingham Whigs emphasised Byron's too glowing description of the Falklands in 1765. Moreover, they found with delight that in the account of Anson's voyage round the world,² written by his chaplain Richard Walter in 1748, the islands had been liberally endowed with good harbours and woods and with a temperate climate. Anson had thought them not only useful as a resort for British whalers in preference to Brazil, but as being 'of prodigious import'³ in the event of a war with Spain. His judgment weighed heavily with all Englishmen, who cherished sea-power, and who had been taught to regard his views as both authoritative and non-partisan. In Dyer's poem of *The Fleece* they had read of the prospects of empire in the Pacific, and of the disadvantage under which England would always

¹ Pernety, *Histoire d'un Voyage aux Isles Malouines* (1770), i. 26.

² *Voyage round the World* (1748), p. 91.

³ *Ibid.* p. 92.

labour in possessing no port south of the West Indies—

‘ . . . till on Falkland’s isle

The standard of Britannia shall arise.’¹

They learnt from Byron, the pioneer of the settlement, and from Falkner, an English Jesuit missionary, of the geese, and of the celery, cresses and sorrel, in which the islands abounded,² while the naturalist Pernety, ‘librarian to the King of Prussia,’ in a work published at Paris in 1770, had given them alluring landscapes of the Falklands, and pictures of their birds and beasts. Territory so greatly desired by a foreign rival had natural attractions to optimistic empire-builders.

The knowledge that a British enterprise over sea was possibly to be sacrificed to a state which he had humbled, woke Chatham from mental isolation and physical lethargy. Though irritated by his associates in opposition, and politically weakened by Granby’s death on 20th October 1770, he was still a power. He scented the old struggle against indifference in high places to imperial needs, and he detected signs of weakness in the brave language of the King’s speech on 13th November. Ignorant as he was of the actual state of negotiations with

¹ Dyer, *The Fleece* (1757), p. 150.

² Burney’s *Voyages in the South Seas* (1816), v. 131, 147-8.

Spain, he readily assumed that North's reluctance to protest too loudly or to prepare for war too eagerly was 'highly criminal.'¹ On 21st November 1770 he deemed war inevitable,² and all that remained of his influence was flung into the scales against the Government. Yet he was thoroughly hampered. In the first place George III. had already established in office a strong party of King's friends, and successfully adopted a principle of selection which was no less dear to Chatham himself than to Bolingbroke. Secondly, there was complete want of real sympathy between himself and his allies of the moment, and no less deep was the discord between the Rockingham nobles and the more Radical group of Wilkes and his London supporters. Lastly the ministry's negotiations with Spain had been carried on so secretly that even the British embassy at Paris had to work in the dark.³ Chatham had therefore no materials whatever upon which to base his attack upon Lord North.

In the House of Lords Richmond moved for the production of papers on the question from 12th September 1769 to 12th September 1770. Weymouth answered that their disclosure would

¹ *Chatham Correspondence* (ed. 1839), iii. 490.

² *Ibid.* iii. 495.

³ *Walpole's Memoirs of the Reign of George III.* (ed. 1845), iv. 184.

be indiscreet, and deplored that the delicate process of diplomacy should be broken by 'the raving of the rash.'¹ Hillsborough, the colonial secretary, guaranteed that the dispute was on the verge of being settled, and deprecated the Whig desire to rush into a war 'for every shadow of offence.'² Chatham in reply pleaded for the rescue of 'an injured, insulted, undone country'³ from the craft of Spain and the criminal indifference of the ministry. Vigorous naval preparations would alone save England and her colonies from lying 'at the mercy of the house of Bourbon.'⁴ He was supported by Shelburne, but the motion was lost by 65 votes to 21, and his attempt to call Hunt to give evidence at the bar of the House was no more successful. Other speakers might still be 'babes to him,'⁵ but they were more judicious. In the Commons Dowdeswell moved a similar resolution on 22nd November with the assistance of Burke and Pownall, but the ministry triumphed by 225 votes to 101.

During the winter George III. appears to have directed his Government with uncommon moderation and good sense. He urged the necessity of reparation by Spain so warmly that

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xvi. 1083.

² *Ibid.* xvi. 1086.

³ *Ibid.* xvi. 1092.

⁴ *Ibid.* xvi. 1102.

⁵ Walpole's *Memoirs of the Reign of George III.* (ed. 1845), iv. 205.

Masserano, its ambassador, said to Weymouth that 'he saw we meant war.'¹ On 28th November negotiations were practically at a breakdown,² and Harris was instructed to warn the lieutenant-governor of Gibraltar and the British consuls throughout Spain of the imminence of conflict. Under George's advice, North pressed François (otherwise Francès) the French chargé d'affaires in London to act as a pacific intermediary, but the king's own mind was resolute, and displayed a temper with which he is not always associated. 'Every feeling of humanity as well as the knowledge of the distress war must occasion, makes me desirous of preventing it if it can be accomplished, provided the honour of this country is preserved.'³ François profited by his acquaintance with the aims of both states to make half a million pounds by speculating in British stocks,⁴ but his services to the cause of peace were ambiguous, and during the early days of December 1770 reliance on Choiseul's co-operation stiffened the attitude of Spain.⁵ On 1st December Harris was told that Masserano was unyielding.⁶ George recognised that Spain could

¹ *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North* (ed. 1867), i. 40.

² *Home Office Papers, 1770-2* (ed. 1881), p. 106.

³ *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North* (ed. 1867), i. 41.

⁴ *Ibid.* i. 43.

⁵ *Ibid.* i. 47.

⁶ *Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence* (ed. 1845), i. 59.

hardly be expected to punish Buccarelli, but he neither wished nor dared to accept the Spanish occupation of the Falklands as an act of finality.

Accordingly on 19th December Rochford was moved from the northern to the southern department in place of Weymouth, 'a genteel man of excellent natural sense,'¹ but weaker than Rochford, and suspected of sympathies with Chatham. On the 21st orders were sent for the recall of Harris from Madrid, and on the 26th George frankly despaired of being able 'to preserve to my subjects the blessing of peace.'² Two days later, however, news reached England that Choiseul, the French minister for foreign affairs and for war, had fallen on 24th December. Louis xv. had consistently shrunk from being dragged into another great war; Madame du Barry had roused him from lethargy, and the moderate Duc d'Aiguillon was now to succeed Choiseul. It was at once recognised that peace was after all a possibility. On the 27th December Charles III. held a council which decided to offer a compromise to England. In London George III. grasped eagerly at the new chance of reconciliation, and Harris, when 'at Algoa, an incon-

¹ *Burke Correspondence* (ed. 1844), i. 75.

² *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North* (ed. 1867), i. 47.

siderable village upwards of sixty leagues from Madrid,'¹ received counter-orders to go back. On 2nd January 1771 the French king wrote definitely to the Spanish court that he was not to be relied upon in the event of war, though his influence could be used to forward Spanish interests in diplomacy. Grimaldi having objected to treat with Harris before he was officially reaccruited, the latter was duly furnished with a fresh authority and told that negotiations were renewed on 18th January.

Even now, however, peace was far from assured, and the British Government felt forced to push on its preparations for war. On 1st January an ode by William Whitehead, 'poet laureat,' was performed at noon before the king and queen, the latter 'dressed in a crimson silk saque.'² The poet threatened that any foe-man who tried to take advantage of England's domestic feuds by waging war should 'weep in blood his dire mistake.'³ Great exertions of a more effective nature were made to enlist 12,000 recruits, but so low was the rate of pay in the army, and so niggardly the habitual attitude of Parliament towards both services, that North felt he could never raise this small number in Great Britain alone. On 11th January recruit-

¹ *Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence* (ed. 1845), i. 63.

² *Annual Register* (1771), p. 65.

³ *Ibid.* p. 218.

ing parties were sent to Leinster, Munster and Connaught,¹ notwithstanding the legal disability which then stayed Roman Catholics from fighting for their country. Attempts were made to increase the navy establishment from 16,000 to 25,000, and on 15th January Rodney was gladdened by the news that he should command in the West Indies if war should break out.² The opposition meanwhile railed against the ministry for its slackness, and Chatham's known sentiments helped to bring in supporters to the Rockingham party, notably Lord George Germain, who soon trod other paths.³ Yet when their public spirit was really tested, the war party acted with inglorious inconsistency. On 11th January a pressing guard was reprimanded by the lord mayor for beating their drums in the city of London. A navy officer was unable to induce either the aldermen sitting at the Guildhall or the lord mayor to back press warrants.⁴ No better evidence of the difficulty in which North's enemies floundered could be afforded than the opinion of Junius on 16th January. He had been preparing an attack on the Government for cowardice and want of patriotism,

¹ Fortescue's *History of the British Army* (1902), iii. 41.

² Mundy's *Rodney* (1830), i. 104.

³ *Chatham Correspondence* (ed. 1839), iv. 62, 64.

⁴ *Annual Register* (1771), p. 67.

when he heard that four warships were about to sail to the Falklands. 'Depend upon the assurance I give you,' he wrote to Woodfall, 'that every man in the administration looks upon war as inevitable.'¹

Four days later a peaceful convention with Spain was published to an astonished people. Rochford, though described by Horace Walpole as having few claims to sense 'and none at all to knowledge,'² had ably carried out the king's policy, and had taken every advantage of the changed attitude of France and the reported unreadiness of the Spanish fleet. By a declaration,³ drawn on 22nd January by Masserano and accepted the same day by Rochford as secretary of state, Spain agreed to restore Port Egmont and the English artillery, stores and goods, which had been left and inventoried by Captains Farmer and Maltby when the place had been evacuated. This concession was expressed not to affect in any way the Spanish king's claim to a prior right of sovereignty over the islands. It was thus a practical compromise, saving the dignity of both nations, but leaving the ultimate question undecided. The Government realised that the punishment of Buccarelli

¹ *Letters of Junius* (ed. 1878), ii. 33.

² Walpole's *Memoirs of the Reign of George III.* (ed. 1845), iv. 84.

³ *Journals of the House of Commons*, xxxiii. 88.

and the abandonment to England of the whole islands were at the time unobtainable, and that it was no small achievement to have accomplished what it had. On 7th February 1771 the Spanish court gave orders for delivering Port Egmont to the British.

The indignation of the war party reached high tide only after 22nd January. Previously it had agitated in ignorance; it now fought in daylight. Chatham professed to believe that ministerial policy had been abject in its weakness,¹ and that Buccarelli's disgrace should have been an essential term in any agreement.² The convention was 'infamous and criminal to my judgment beyond the famous convention of yore.'³ His followers drew other analogies to 1739, and lashed popular irritation into panic. In the House of Lords the reading of Masserano's declaration, and of Rochford's acceptance of his offer, was received in profound silence, and Chatham and Richmond again struggled in vain to procure the production of all papers since 1st January 1770 that related to the negotiations. The Commons debated the question on 25th January 1771, Dowdeswell leading the assault. Barré, with his customary violence, ascribed North's wish for peace to the corrupt

¹ *Chatham Correspondence* (ed. 1839), iv. 73.

² *Ibid.* iv. 80.

³ *Ibid.* iv. 87.

influence of the sharpers and jobbers of the alley, and stated that by its scandalous and infamous compromise, the ministry had stabbed the nation's honour to the heart.¹ Burke said the Spanish declaration was as worthless as a Birmingham button, and complained that preparations for war had cost the country three millions without effecting any genuine redress.² Complete want of unity in the opposition ranks frustrated their hopes. The Bill of Rights group, who gathered round Wilkes, Glynn and Sawbridge, had little in common with the Rockingham aristocrats, while Chatham, hating the democratic tone of the former and the party theories of the latter, 'kicked and cuffed friend and enemy' alike.³

The untiring work of the man who aimed at being the Patriot King at the head of a united people, now won its reward. While the war party took refuge in pamphlet literature, George triumphed at Westminster. The old Whig families were split more asunder than ever by his clear-sighted selection of ministers from every clique, by his dexterous manipulation of places and pensions, by his staunch

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xvi. 1341.

² *Ibid.* xvi. 1345.

³ *Horace Walpole's Letters to Mann* (ed. 1845), ii. 118 ; cf. *Burke Correspondence* (ed. 1844), i. 229, 251 ; and Albemarle's *Rockingham* (1852), ii. 197.

confidence in the power of money and the weakness of human nature. The great figure of Chatham passed from the turmoil of the debate on the Falklands into the shadow of seclusion. The king, though bitterly libelled by tract and caricature, held his own course with the same stubborn irresponsibility which had immeshed him in the days of 'Wilkes and liberty,' and which was to entangle him even more fatally during the American War. On 13th February 1771 the Commons were asked to pass an address of thanks for the communication of Masserano's declaration of 22nd January, and for the happy result of ministerial diplomacy. Dowdeswell again protested against the absence of censure on a governor who had raided a British colony and insulted the flag. Burgoyne's patriotism had not yet been discredited by his slanders against Clive, and his 'fine, set speech'¹ told somewhat against the Government. He could not 'reconcile the part we have acted to any ideas I have ever conceived of national dignity or public honour,'² and he asked when Spain would pay the ransom promised long ago to England for the restoration of Manila. Pownall, who represented colonial interests in Parliament, lamented their

¹ Walpole's *Memoirs of the Reign of George III.* (ed. 1845), iv. 275.

² Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xvi. 1365.

surrender to Spanish menaces and French mediation. The address was then carried by 271 votes to 157, while the Lords rejected an amendment to their similar address by 107 votes to 38. A protest, described as 'most nervous and argumentative,'¹ was signed by 19 peers, who deplored the disgraces heaped by a timid Government on 'the hitherto untainted honour of the British flag.'² George III., beyond telling North that 'the great majority yesterday is very creditable for the administration,'³ accepted victory with masterly reticence. Pownall made a last attempt to organise Parliamentary resistance on 5th March 1771, but his motion was thrown out by 130 votes to 43.

In the eighteenth century, however, the voice of Parliament was not necessarily the voice of England. As in 1739 and 1753, the ministry represented all that was most temperate and tolerant in educated society. It sought as in 1739 to lift foreign policy above the tumult of party conflict. Whigs of a later day admitted that at this crisis George III. had by some fatality chosen for once the better part, and held that Chatham was wrong in pleading for a war

¹ *Annual Register* (1771), p. 53.

² *Cobbett's Parl. Hist.*, xvi. 1384.

³ *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North* (ed. 1867), i. 57.

with Spain. 'We are indebted to George III.,' wrote John Nicholls, 'for having protected us from that calamity.'¹ Public opinion in 1770 and 1771 was less judicious. The opposition could point out how far short of British claims were the actual Spanish concessions. England allowed the old pretension to a Spanish right of property over all the South Sea to remain unrefuted, and she consented to return to Port Egmont on a precarious tenure. Suspecting, moreover, that the ministry had informed Spain of the probability of an early evacuation even of that settlement, the assailants of North were not men to refrain from using the difficulties of the state for the advantage of party.

There was much in the war spirit to appeal to the England of 1771. Her court had become thoroughly unpopular owing to George's early submission to the influence of his mother and Lord Bute, and to his later achievements in the science of patriotic kingship. Whether the Falkland Islands were a desert or a paradise, they had been occupied by Britons, and the implied surrender of the whole territory except Port Egmont was a source of humiliation. Bernard Penrose, who served as surgeon's mate in an expedition which sailed to the islands in

¹ Nicholls's *Recollections* (1822), ii. 30.

December 1772, expressed the typical opinion here when he wrote that however miserable were the islands, it was better to make that discovery as the result of experience than as 'the effect of credulous timidity, overawed by foreign menaces.'¹ The opposition pamphleteers exploited the fear of a French and Spanish invasion, and the evils of the 'double cabinet' system, in order to teach the people the necessity of action. They explained that taxes had been raised only to be frittered away, and that the ministers thought more of speculating in the funds than of increasing the real strength of Britain. George III. was caricatured as absorbed in the industry of a button-maker in ridicule of his hobby, while the Spanish king was depicted in the act of bribing the Princess Dowager, and undermining the constitution and the empire.² Plans for the conquest of Manila and Mexico, of Vera Cruz and Buenos Ayres, and of Arica the port of Potosi, were propagated by eager patriots.³

By far the most powerful assailant of the ministry was, however, Junius, then on the full tide of celebrity. 'He was,' said Samuel Johnson, 'one of the few writers of his despicable

¹ Penrose's *Account of the last Expedition to Port Egmont* (1775), p. 5.

² Wright's *Caricature History of the Georges* (1877), p. 324.

³ *Gentleman's Magazine* (1770), xl. 568-9.

faction, whose name does not disgrace the page of an opponent.' On 30th January 1771 he wrote a letter to the *Public Advertiser*, asking 'where will the humiliation of this country end.'¹ The convention was on the face of it illogical like most compromises, and Junius rallied the Government on its inconsistencies with merciless satire. Buccarelli had been styled by the ministry as no better than a common robber at the time when they pretended to believe he had acted without his sovereign's authority; but it was now idle to suggest that his insult to England had been unofficial and *ultra vires*, as Spain herself treated him as a deserving servant. The opinions of Anson and Egmont, and the anxiety of Spain attested to the true utility of the Falklands. Since 1765 they had always been called the territory or dominion of the British Crown; North now styled them mere possessions.² They should have been restored entirely to England, and the failure of our diplomacy had been due to the palpable insincerity of our preparations for war.³ Britain's enemies knew well that they need fear nothing from George III., in spite of all the taxes he had wrung from the landed and commercial interests upon the pretext that conflict

¹ *Letters of Junius* (ed. 1878), i. 318.

² *Ibid.* i. 319.

³ *Ibid.* i. 321.

was imminent. The navy, which had been so recently 'the terror of the world'¹ was rotting in decay. The state was too spiritless to strike a single blow. 'The infamous convention with Spain'² gave the lie to Weymouth's assertion, in a letter written on 17th October 1770 to the court of Madrid, that nothing short of the unconditional restoration of the islands would satisfy the country. With great earnestness Junius strove to have the doors of Parliament opened to the public on the days when the question of the Falkland Islands was to be debated.³ This endeavour was frustrated by George III.'s anxiety to stifle criticism. He was impervious to the argument of Junius that the convention 'wounds irreparably the honour of the king as a private man, and the glory of the kingdom,'⁴ while Junius's taunt that Rochford's acceptance of the Spanish offer was composed 'in barbarous French,'⁵ left George's personal reputation intact.

Early in March 1771 appeared the long delayed vindication of the ministry, which Samuel Johnson had prepared so long before as October 1770. His *Thoughts on the late Transactions respecting Falkland's Islands* were published anonymously and without direct

¹ *Letters of Junius*, i. 323.

² *Ibid.* ii. 339.

³ *Ibid.* ii. 34.

⁴ *Ibid.* ii. 343.

⁵ *Ibid.* i. 322.

reward from the Government,¹ but they were none the less officially inspired,² and on 20th March 1771 the sale of copies was suspended for the time at the request of Lord North. The tract had, however, by then been sufficiently circulated, in its writer's opinion, 'to do all the mischief,'³ and its success was clearly helped by his personal renown. As Mrs. Thrale said, 'Tis Johnson not Falkland's Islands that interests us,'⁴ and his friends even dreamed of sending him to the House of Commons.⁵ Johnson opened his pamphlet with a short survey of the history of the islands in dispute, and with reference to Anson's idea of annexation, he urged that there was no evidence that they would be of any use to England except as 'a station for contraband traders, a nursery of fraud, and a receptacle of theft.'⁶ He showed how Byron's optimism of 1765 had been confuted by M'Bride's experiences in 1766.⁷ The geese, alleged by Byron to be the willing prey of anybody who cared to pelt them with stones, proved in fact to be 'too wise to stay.'⁸ No corn would grow in the islands, and their dependence upon the home-country for supplies would therefore be permanent. The Govern-

¹ Boswell's *Johnson* (ed. 1888), ii. 147.

² *Ibid.* ii. 373. ³ *Ibid.* ii. 136. ⁴ *Ibid.* iii. 19. ⁵ *Ibid.* ii. 136.

⁶ *Thoughts on the late Transactions* (1771), p. 9.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 15.

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 16.

ment recognised, he said, the need of reparation, but peaceful means were no less effective to secure it than 'the roar of empty menace.'¹ We were not a people to prefer the last of remedies to the first. Masserano's declaration gave us all we really wanted, and was itself a sufficient answer to Chatham's violent rhetoric, 'to the feudal gabble of a man, who is every day lessening the splendour of character, which once illuminated the kingdom.'² It would be folly to insist on an admission of British claims in law when they had been recognised in fact, to declare war 'for the empty sound of an ancient title to a Magellanick rock,'³ when every material point had been already gained. In the event of conflict France and the United Provinces would probably help Spain.

If on the practical issue Johnson has the best of the controversy, he is on less sure ground in contesting the merits of Chatham's colonial ideals. In the age that preceded the younger Pitt's truly national party, a Tory still professed the unambitious insularity of the Toryism of Queen Anne's day. Johnson, like Swift and Harley, put no trust in empire. To him the glories of Chatham's conquests in the Seven Years' War were barren indeed. England had

¹ *Thoughts on the late Transactions* (1771), p. 26.

² *Ibid.* p. 37.

³ *Ibid.* p. 45.

then beaten Spain, and had won Havannah; 'May my country be never curst with such another conquest.'¹ The Whigs were now clamouring for an attack on Cartagena, but Johnson recalled how in an earlier war that object had destroyed thousands of Englishmen, 'poisoned by the air, and crippled by the dews, where every hour swept away battalions.' To him the Canada, conquered on the plains of Germany, was but a useless trophy of many lives and millions of money, wantonly sacrificed at the altar of territorial expansion. Upon this question we have travelled far since 1771, and it would now be idle to dispute the virtues of a policy which has added incalculably to the influence of England and the happiness of mankind. Johnson's work will retain its value not as the expression of a faulty conception of England's mission in the world, but of a sound disbelief in waging war for issues of no importance.

The *Thoughts on the late Transactions* are the last words in the literary controversy on the question, but they are by no means the last chapter in the story of the Government's dealings with the Falklands. On the evening of 13th September 1771 three British ships cast anchor off Port Egmont.² On the 16th they

¹ *Thoughts on the late Transactions* (1771), p. 50.

² *Gentleman's Magazine* (1771), xli. 568.

landed marines to take formal possession, and on the 17th the Spaniards left the islands for ever. The lot of the new garrison was not cast in a pleasant place, and by 23rd February 1773, when they were cheered by the coming of the *Penguin* shallop with provisions, they had almost despaired of surviving the desolation and want that distressed their station. Penrose belonged to the crew of the *Penguin*, and his account of the nature of the Falklands was uncoloured by party feeling. While recognising that the popular eagerness of 1770 had 'shown the world that nothing can deter Great Britain from asserting her rights,'¹ he drew a dismal picture of the few houses made of stone and sods, of pease destroyed by mice, and of wheat which never ripened. It was true that the men's health was good, but they disliked geese without onions, and the heart and liver of the young cubs of sea-lions were their only savoury fare.² Their only amusements were occasional shots at geese and snipe; their only visitors were four whalers. A dangerous heath fire raged in November 1773.³ Worn out by monotony of occupation, the little garrison spent its Saturday holidays in washing linen, mending clothes, and thinking mournfully of

¹ Penrose's *Account of the last Expedition to Port Egmont* (1775), p. 5.

² *Ibid.* p. 20.

³ *Ibid.* p. 59.

friends in England.¹ It is therefore easy to understand the joy which greeted the arrival of the ship *Endeavour* on 23rd April 1774 with orders for the evacuation of the settlement. The move was hastily effected. An inscription on lead was affixed to the blockhouse, reminding all nations that the Falkland Islands were and would remain 'the sole right and property of his most sacred Majesty, George III.';² and the union jack was left flying over the deserted spot to be 'a mark of possession.'³ As it was unfurled, the departing seamen gave three cheers. Two boats were left ashore, with a ram and ewe and pair of pigeons, in order to help the possible enterprise of posterity. The garrison then sailed away and reached Spithead on 19th September 1774.

The reasons for evacuation were much questioned in England. Government apologists suggested that it was due to the discovery that the islands were not worth the expense and trouble of their maintenance. The opposition alleged that the vaunted arrangement with Masserano had been in fact conditional upon England's fulfilling a verbal assurance that the restoration of Port Egmont was to be a sham.⁴

¹ Penrose's *Account of the last Expedition to Port Egmont* (1775), p. 44.

² *Ibid.* p. 76.

³ *Ibid.* p. 77.

⁴ *History of the Life of Chatham* (1783), p. 209.

There is no substantial evidence on either side. The length of time between the convention and the abandonment of the islands, the absence of any Spanish expostulations in the diplomatic correspondence after 1771, and the circumstances attendant to the evacuation, all favour the version of the king's partisans. Furthermore, the preparation of plans for the defence of the Falklands between February and November 1772 would be inexplicable if such version were incorrect.¹ Harris certainly had no knowledge of the alleged secret stipulation,² and it has seemed undeserving of more than casual mention to the most learned of later-day historians of the period.³ On the other hand, the verbal assurance which figures in the Whig version would not only be characteristic of George's attempt to pacify Spain and English opinion at the same time, but would help to explain Masserano's readiness to yield. The point is, after all, not particularly material, for the British Government withdrew its garrison from the Falklands in a manner which carefully preserved its right to reoccupy the whole islands whenever it might so desire. Spain made no protest against this conduct, and

¹ See *Home Office Papers, 1770-2* (ed. 1881), pp. 437, 438, 573.

² *Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence* (ed. 1845), i. 66-7.

³ *Ruville's Chatham* (Eng. tr. 1907), iii. 272.

therefore we can only conclude that the British intimation of the probability of withdrawal from Port Egmont must have been loose and vague, even if it was given at all.

The agitation of 1770 and 1771 recalls that of 1739. In both cases a factious opposition attacked the peace policy of the party in office; in both cases the men who agitated for war resisted every measure by which the Government proposed to strengthen the armed forces upon which the country would have to rely. In both cases too jealousy of Spain and anxiety for sea-power were elements in the opposition propaganda. In the earlier movement it is hard to say whether its leaders were more animated by hatred of Walpole or of the enemy; in the later by hatred of George III. or of the invaders of the Falklands. On the other hand, Walpole gave way in 1739 because he could count neither on royal favour nor on his own moral courage, while in 1770 the king's support gave to North something of his own genius for obstinacy.

The chief contrast between these two war-fevers lay in their widely differing influence upon public opinion. To the average Englishman of 1739 the clamour for conflict was the first break in a long monotony of undramatic politics. The complaints of the West Indies

and Georgia made the British grievance appeal with particular force to the large classes interested materially, as well as sentimentally, in the prosperous working of the old colonial system. The causes of maritime supremacy and colonial expansion added radiance to the opposition dialectics. In 1770 British politics ran in very different channels. For years they had been full of excitement. Only five months before the Falklands became the pivot of national disputation, Wilkes had been released from the King's Bench to the joy of London, and in the same month of April had appeared Burke's *Thoughts on the Present Discontents*. By March 1771 the Falklands controversy was itself forgotten in men's new absorption in the Government's prosecution of printers who had published reports of Parliamentary debates. Consequently all the cleverness of Junius and all the weight of Chatham's great name failed to give to the Spanish negotiations of the day the disproportionate significance that they desired. In spite of the imminence of war and of popular scepticism as to the ministry's patriotism and integrity, the storm of abuse was far less forcible because it had become far more common. Cool-headed observers could not forget that the whole territory in dispute was but 'a morsel of rock that lies somewhere

at the very bottom of America.’¹ They knew that the Rockingham critics were essentially the men who had failed, and suspected any cause acclaimed as splendid by such indifferent judges as the mob of eighteenth-century London.

Another material difference between the two crises lay in the contrast between the enthusiasm of the colonies towards the war of 1739, and their apathy to English claims in 1770. The earlier hostility to Spain had been felt more keenly if possible in Jamaica than in London; the struggle had involved issues that were largely colonial in character. The name of Vernon was significantly commemorated in the home of the Washingtons on the bank of the Potomac, and hundreds of volunteers from Virginia, Massachusetts and Rhode Island served in the expedition against Cartagena. Even the secluded Bermudas had raised an Independent Company. The later friction, however, had no echo in British America, which had already drifted far towards revolt. The Falklands themselves were strictly not colonies at all; the only settlement there had been merely a naval station.² Indeed it was

¹ Horace Walpole's *Letters to Mann* (ed. 1843), ii. 109.

² Rochford was, however, approached by one intending settler in January 1772. See *Home Office Papers, 1770-2* (ed. 1881), p. 417.

suggested that Spain's high-handed interference had been encouraged by her knowledge that England would no longer be able to look for military help to her sons beyond the sea.¹ The panic of 1770 was neither so widespread nor so emotional as that of 1739.

It does not, however, follow that the prize of the Falkland Islands was intrinsically more hollow than that of illicit trade with Spanish America. Early in the nineteenth century malefactors were shipped thither from Buenos Ayres,² and after that city had become the capital of a republic, which had won its freedom from Spain, its people conceived the idea of planting a settlement on the Falklands. In November 1820, the site of the old French station of Port Louis³ was occupied by an annexation party under the command of one Jewitt, who called himself 'colonel of the marine of the United Provinces of South America.' James Weddell, the explorer, was present at the time, and states that Jewitt based his Government's title upon its succession to Spanish sovereignty over that region.⁴ In 1826 the new settlement was handed over to an adventurer called Louis Vernet, but in 1831 it

¹ *Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence* (ed. 1848), i. 60.

² *Alcedo's Dictionary of America* (Eng. tr. 1812), ii. 432.

³ *Journal of the Royal Geog. Soc.* (1833), iii. 94.

⁴ Weddell's *Voyage towards the South Pole* (1825), p. 103.

was destroyed by a punitive expedition from the United States, upon which the British Government determined to anticipate the Americans by reviving her claim of 1770. On 30th December 1832 the flag of England was planted by the crew of the sloop *Clio* on the site of Port Egmont,¹ where the mounds and stone walls of the original British colony were to be seen as late as 1857.² A few remaining Buenos Ayres soldiers were expelled from East Falkland, which became the most prosperous of the group under the new conditions.³ When Darwin visited Berkeley Sound in the *Beagle* on 1st March 1833, he found a British officer in charge of a murderous and mongrel population, and thought the islands hopelessly desolate.⁴ Happily they escaped being used as a penal settlement in accordance with suggestions made in 1841,⁵ 1857⁶ and 1863,⁷ and the subsequent success of sheep-farming has enabled them to be independent of money help from home,⁸ and to survive mid-Victorian indifference to the fate of colonies over sea.

¹ *British America; the Falkland Islands*, by L. E. L. (1900), p. 514.

² Snow's *Two Years' Cruise off Tierra del Fuego* (1857), i. 166.

³ *British America*, *ut supra*, p. 516.

⁴ Darwin's *Voyage of the Beagle* (ed. 1901), p. 189.

⁵ Lucas's *Hist. Geog. of British Colonies* (1890), ii. 323.

⁶ Snow, *ut supra*, ii. 287-309.

⁷ *Journal of the Royal Geog. Soc.* (1864), xxxiv. p. clviii.

⁸ *British America*, *ut supra*, p. 518.

One of the most interesting features of the Falkland Islands agitation of 1770 is the light it throws upon the capacity and judgment of the Whig oligarchy, whose history is the history of English politics in the eighteenth century. The Rockingham group enjoys the reputation of having been the most liberal-minded faction of the day. No one would have ventured to doubt the adherence to Revolution principles of a party whose spokesman was Burke, and whose leader was an ideal English country gentleman. Still less dare one question the greatness of the great Chatham, who professed to see in the ministry's moderation nothing but 'supine neglect or wicked treachery.'¹ Yet the willingness of all these men to involve the country in a fruitless war in order to injure the opposing party had much of the sinister partisanship of Pulteney and Carteret, and foreshadowed their own resistance to every measure of the Government in the dark days of the American Revolution. The Whig noble's public spirit was rarely above suspicion, and his appeal to the country in 1770 on behalf of naval power and territorial expansion was certainly astute.

The episode on the other hand shows in a very favourable light the men whom George III.

¹ Phillimore's *Lyttelton* (1845), ii. 761.

was fast converting to a policy of mere compliance with his will. If they lacked independence and breadth of view, they seem nevertheless to have fully shared the sound administrative ability that marked the governing class in Hanoverian England. They proved themselves to be statesmen of no less sanity and strength of purpose than Whigs of the older school, and Lord North in particular justified Grenville's early prophecy that his 'great promise and high qualifications'¹ would make him a capable prime minister. By failing to soar above the contemporary standard of colonial policy, these men involved England in the misfortunes of the American war, but they were far from being the foolish and ignoble pedants of Whig legend.

Lastly, the whole story of the question of the Falkland Islands betokens that no issues but those of a concrete and material character could appeal to that generation of Englishmen. Until, under the influence of the younger Pitt, the country came to realise that the freedom of struggling nationalities was something to be no less ardently fought for than trade and empire, she never saw the idealist aspect of the wars she won. A later age discerns love of brothers over sea in the ardour with which she saved

¹ Albemarle's *Rockingham* (1852), i. 344.

her colonies from the French in the Seven Years' War, and solicitude for her United Empire loyalists in the noble heat with which she withstood the rebel arms in 1775. In actual fact her motives were far more practical and selfish, and the soundness of most of her intuitions was but a happy accident. We cannot therefore seek for any moral grandeur in the agitation of 1770 and 1771. The whole crisis was only a comedy, and the high-flown language of the actors was but the political jargon of the day. Yet it must be remembered that even now we have not reached the time when the claims of a man's fatherland predominate always over the interests of his party, and in judging politicians of the reign of George III. we have to bear in mind the far humbler moral code which then governed public conduct. We can fairly recognise in the opposition a shrewdness and a tenacity which have their uses, and in the ministerialists, who refused to be dazzled by the fame of Chatham and eloquence of Burke, the honesty and common sense which were the most shining qualities of eighteenth-century England, and which have done so much to win for the race its influence and empire.

CHAPTER V

THE RUSSIAN MENACE

A CRISIS OF 1791

ALTHOUGH eclipsed by the magnitude of contemporary events in France, the agitation provoked in England by Pitt's Russian armament of 1791 has never been neglected by historians. The theme fills considerable space in the sixth volume of Lecky's work on the eighteenth century, an important chapter in Lord Rosebery's *Life of Pitt*, and several closely packed pages in the *Cambridge Modern History*. It has furnished illustrations alike of the unreality of Parliamentary majorities in the days of George III. and of the influence of public opinion upon eighteenth-century government in England, of the insecurity of Pitt on the eve of the war with France, and of the opportunities wasted on his enemies. It led admittedly to a passing decline in British influence abroad, and to the alienation of Prussia, which bore bitter fruit in 1795. It has, however, other features of interest. It throws fresh light upon the national character, and confirms the inferences that impartial

judges will draw from those aspects of popular politics in 1739, 1753 and 1770, which we have examined above. Again the first test by which Englishmen tried ministerial policy was its effect upon their trade interests. Pitt's appeal to a less material patriotism was unheeded, while the religious cries which had served to defeat an alleged inroad of unorthodox competitors in 1753, proved no less effectual in supporting the cause of the Russia merchants in 1791. They protested in the latter year against a step which conduced to the strengthening of the heathen Turk. For the rest, the story of Pitt's policy in the spring of 1791 is memorable as displaying the first indication of British distrust of Russia, and as giving for the first time to national opinion a bias which became traditional.

The events which led to Pitt's sudden revelation of a Russian menace can be briefly told. On 15th April 1788 treaties were concluded between Great Britain and the United Provinces, and between the United Provinces and Prussia. On 13th June 1788 Harris, whom we have already seen at Madrid in 1770, negotiated a provisional treaty with Prussia at Loo, which was confirmed at Berlin on 13th August, and formed the basis of a triple alliance between Great Britain, Prussia and the United Pro-

vinces. The time was the heyday of Pitt's policy of peace, and he used his influence after the death of Joseph II. to detach Austria from Russia at Reichenbach in July 1790, to induce her to negotiate for peace with Turkey at Sistova and to reconcile Russia and Sweden by the Treaty of Warela on 15th August. With the active help of George III.¹ he insisted on British abstinence from intermeddling in French affairs. To give peace to eastern Europe by ending the war between Russia and Turkey was, however, his hardest task. Catherine II.'s famous tour in southern Russia in the first half of 1787 had closed with a Turkish ultimatum and with open hostilities in August. On 17th December 1788 Oczakow (Otchakov) had been taken by Potemkin with the loss of three generals and 6000 men, and it was the object of Anglo-Prussian diplomacy to restore peace to eastern Europe without allowing Russia to retain this place. Meanwhile the progress of the Russian arms moved faster than the machinery of peace-making. On 20th December 1790 Suwarrow stormed Ismail and slaughtered 38,000 of its inhabitants. Catherine II. was not a ruler likely to forego the spoils of victory, and certainly her claim to

¹ *P. V. Smith MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., xii. 9 [1891]), p. 368.*

retain Oczakow was neither unnatural nor immoderate.

Under these circumstances Pitt's cabinet decided on 21st March 1791 to throw the full weight of British influence upon the side of Prussia, which was bent on neutralising by negotiation, and if necessary by force, the triumphs which Catherine had won upon the field. Grenville the home secretary alone demurred. It was agreed in a minute presented to George III. on 25th March that a fleet of between 35 and 40 sail should be sent to the Baltic, and a squadron of 10 or 12 ships to the Black Sea in May, in order to support Frederick William II.'s military projects against the Russian army in Livonia.¹ On the night of Sunday 27th March a message left London for Berlin² with the news of Pitt's plan and with drafts of a joint representation to be submitted to the Russian court and to be answered within ten days. The minister relied on his great majority in Parliament, and on his influence in the country. On 28th March the proposed naval armament was reported to Parliament as being designed to effect the pacification of Europe, but a few words from Fox, spoken 'with more than usual solemnity,'³ fore-

¹ Leeds's *Political Memoranda* (ed. 1884), p. 151. ² *Ibid.* p. 152.

³ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xxix. 32.

shadowed fierce resistance. Pitt had already heard from Richmond, who as head of the ordnance office was a member of the cabinet, that he also was opposed to intervention without the co-operation of Holland and Sweden.¹ On 29th March Grenville, though himself a doubter, moved an address of thanks for the royal message to the House of Lords, and was met by determined Whig opposition. Fitzwilliam argued that the Government had not even attempted to explain the grounds of its interference in a conflict which did not concern British interests;² Porchester denounced Pitt's scheme as emanating from the mad ambition³ of creating an empire in the east; Carlisle styled Russia the natural ally of this country;⁴ Stormont recalled Chatham's partiality for the state that his son now intended to attack.⁵ The prospects of successful intervention were said to be far from bright. The capture of St. Petersburg would not mean the close of the war,⁶ while Lansdowne referred to the historic courage of the Russians, who had resisted assaults during Prince Ferdinand's German campaigns, 'as if they had been absolute stones and logs of wood.'⁷ Frederick the

¹ Stanhope's *Pitt* (1861), ii. 113.

² Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xxix. 34.

³ *Ibid.* xxix. 35.

⁴ *Ibid.* xxix. 36.

⁵ *Ibid.* xxix. 39.

⁶ *Ibid.* xxix. 43.

⁷ *Ibid.* xxix. 47.

Great had stated that such fighters were unconquerable,¹ and it was futile to be led away by the 'horrid ambition'² of eastern aggrandisement into the miseries of a great war with allies as exacting as the Prussians, and as impoverished as the Dutch.³ Leeds, the foreign secretary, was the only minister who essayed to reply⁴ to such criticisms with warmth and conviction, and the vote of 97 to 34 by which the motion was carried was no echo of the debate.

On the same day the House of Commons was no less restive. Pitt stated the royal message, and was met by violent onslaughts on the expediency of risking war. Russia offered no galleons nor ingots, such as in other struggles had been 'the usual incentives which called forth the exertions of British tars.'⁵ Fox said that English trade derived immense benefits from a good understanding with Russia. We exported £400,000 worth of goods every year to that country, and imported thence £2,500,000 worth, of which the bulk was carried in English bottoms.⁶ If considerations of utility were to be ignored, the sacrifice could only be justified by strong moral issues and not by the preservation of Oczakow, which though taken as early as 1788, had not been thought worthy of notice

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xxix. 50.

² *Ibid.* xxix. 43.

³ *Ibid.* xxix. 47. ⁴ *Ibid.* xxix. 52. ⁵ *Ibid.* xxix. 58. ⁶ *Ibid.* xxix. 68.

in the King's speeches of 1789 and 1790, and which was a far less important acquisition to Russia than the Crimea or Kherson.¹ Burke had already reached the parting of the ways which separated him from Fox and his anti-British clique, but he was still a Whig in his contempt for Turkey, and he held that an Asiatic and infidel power should be disregarded in gauging the balance of power. If the principles of 1688 were sacred, and if the British constitution embodied the wisdom of the race, Britons owed these boons to the religion that hallowed their influence on English life. It would therefore be sacrilegious to ally the nation with the 'destructive savages' who had condemned 'those charming countries which border upon the Danube, to devastation and pestilence.'² By 228 votes to 135 the Government won the day.

Pitt's supremacy, however, had not the security it was to acquire during the years in which he weathered the storm of French antagonism. On 30th March, Richmond warned Leeds³ that the country would desert the ministry if it persisted in its policy. Leeds answered that it was too late to give way. In the evening the cabinet met again. Richmond,

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xxix. 65.

² *Ibid.* xxix. 77.

³ Leeds's *Political Memoranda* (ed. 1884), p. 152.

Stafford, the lord privy seal, and Grenville pleaded for the abandonment of the idea of any intervention more positive than diplomacy.¹ Pitt, Leeds, Lord Chatham then first lord of the admiralty, and Thurlow the lord chancellor still favoured the scheme of energetic co-operation with Prussia. Leeds, who was prone to be 'carried away more by his imagination and sanguine hopes than by reason and reflection,'² was particularly zealous. On 31st March Pitt brought his cabinet the news of the defection of Grafton and his sons.³ Stafford, always weak and taciturn, 'assured us he had scarce closed his eyes all night from the agitation of his mind.'⁴ Thurlow wavered and 'seemed much agitated.' Camden, the lord president, said little. In the evening the cabinet met again, and Leeds, the one member besides Pitt whose heart was in the cause of withstanding Russia, realised that the others would give way to the peace party. He tells the story of Pitt's defeat vividly in the *Political Memoranda*, which he kept in spite of the growing practice of cabinets to encourage secrecy and abstinence from written records. 'I went up to the chimney, and stirring the fire, observed that as it was

¹ Leeds's *Political Memoranda* (ed. 1884), p. 153.

² *Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence* (ed. 1845), ii. 438.

³ Leeds's *Political Memoranda* (ed. 1884), p. 154.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 155.

probably the last time I should have to do the honours of that room, I thought it particularly incumbent upon me to have a good fire for my company.' Richmond and Stafford asked weakly, 'Good God, what d'ye mean?' Leeds said that he took it for granted that the Government's intimation of active help to Prussia was to be cancelled, 'in which case I should think myself obliged to make my bow.'¹ He and Chatham alone supported Pitt; Thurlow, who had previously appeared loyal, now 'either actually was or pretended to be asleep.'² Pitt at last yielded reluctantly to his colleagues' dread of entanglement in fruitless Continental warfare. At one in the morning on 1st April when the cabinet meeting broke up he had decided that it was better to sacrifice the immediate benefits of the Prussian alliance and of the increased stability of Turkey to the ultimate advantage of retaining office and excluding Fox from power. Orders were given at three in the morning on 1st April to stop the militant message then on its way to Berlin. In actual fact, however, they were issued too late. On 5th April Francis Jackson, the secretary of the English legation, communicated the original message to Frederick William, who prepared to put 88,000

¹ Leeds's *Political Memoranda* (ed. 1884), p. 156.

² *Ibid.* p. 158.

men into the field.¹ Two days later he learned that England refused to risk an appeal to arms, and had taken refuge in negotiation.

The Whigs did not suffer their triumph to pass without a storm of oratory. On 1st April the Lords were asked by Fitzwilliam to condemn the policy of rescuing any Turkish territory from Russia, and to protest against the waste of any single guinea in the cause of preserving Oczakow. Catherine II. and Tippu Sahib were both champions of struggling nationalities in the eyes of these academic debaters. On 12th April Grey moved eight resolutions in the Commons as to the inexpediency and folly of the armament against Russia. Lord Belgrave in reply pointed out the dangers of the unchecked aggrandisement of Russia. The fall of Constantinople would be only the prelude for that of Egypt, and 'where [Russian] victories would afterwards end God alone could tell.'² By 253 votes to 173, Pitt emerged victorious from the debate in spite of fresh declamations by Sheridan and Fox. On 15th April, William Grant, afterwards Master of the Rolls, as a defender of the ministry insisted on the excellence of the practice by which the executive was able to carry out delicate diplomacy, and

¹ Leeds's *Political Memoranda* (ed. 1884), p. 159.

² Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xxix. 180.

to make naval preparations without embarrassing references to the legislature for its consent at every turn in public policy.¹ Fox troubled Burke and his other more conservative allies of the moment by introducing into his attack an irrelevant appreciation of the revolutionary movement in France, 'the most stupendous and glorious edifice of liberty which had been erected on the foundation of human integrity in any time or country.'² The Government's majority on a division was 92. Again on 9th May 1791 the Whig peers assailed the forward policy that had been pursued in March, and protested against the taxation that it had involved in respect of salt, soap, candles, leather and beer, 'that innocent and wholesome beverage.'³ On this occasion they mustered but 29 in the division, and on 25th May only 114 members of the House of Commons were found to support a further resolution condemning Pitt's action. The last hope of Fox's party to gain political credit out of the country's failure to support Turkey flickered out on 2nd June, when in spite of Pitt's obdurate silence as to the inner history of the events leading to his suggested interference between the two combatants, and of Fox's renewed invective

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xxix. 237.

² *Ibid.* xxix. 249. ³ *Ibid.* xxix. 446.

against his 'calamitous and imbecile' policy,¹ the Government triumphed by 170 votes to 75.

These debates fill many pages in Cobbett's *Parliamentary History*, while their effect upon the cabinet is candidly disclosed in Leeds's *Memoranda*. Their influence upon international relations was great and immediate. The fall of Leeds meant the abandonment of all that was energetic in the Triple Alliance. Nagel, the Dutch minister, 'spoke of my resignation,' says Leeds, 'with tears in his eyes.'² The Prussian court was far more deeply mortified. Frederick William II. was forced to leave the Turks to their fate. William Augustus Fawkener, clerk to the Privy Council, was sent to Berlin, and thence to join Whitworth, the British minister plenipotentiary at St. Petersburg, where he arrived on 24th May. He tried to induce Catherine to release her hold upon Oczakow, 'as if our blustering would terrify a woman in whom fear of no sort seems to predominate.'³ On 9th July Repnin again beat the Turks at Matzin, and Fawkener had no means to influence 'the Semiramis of the north.'⁴ She obtained

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xxix. 703.

² Leeds's *Political Memoranda* (ed. 1884), p. 174.

³ Miss Berry's *Journal and Correspondence* (ed. 1865), i. 293.

⁴ *Ibid.* i. 292.

a bust of Fox from Woronzow, the Russian minister in London, and displayed it to Fawkener after she had placed it between busts of Cicero and Demosthenes, 'for his eloquence had saved two great nations from a war.'¹ She had no wish to prolong the conflict with Turkey, and agreed to an armistice at Galatz on 11th August 1791. Thus England's awakening to the Russian menace ended for the time, in Pitt's words, 'not very creditably, but better so than worse.'² On 9th January 1792 the Treaty of Jassy gave to Turkey the reprieve which Pitt desired for her, but at the cost of Oczakow and of the coast between the mouths of the Dniester and the Bug. England's suggestion that the Oczakow fortifications should be demolished was ignored. The king's speech on 31st January attributed the peace to the ministry's intervention, but the debate elicited from the opposition a reminder that the preliminaries were concluded within too short a time of the presentation of the English memorial at St. Petersburg to bear any relation to Pitt's pacific intercession.³ For two months longer the Whig orators continued their attacks on the Russian armament as

¹ Miss Berry's *Journal and Correspondence* (ed. 1865), i. 321; *Bland-Burges Letters* (ed. 1884), p. 150.

² George Rose's *Diaries and Correspondence* (ed. 1860), i. 111.

³ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xxix. 749.

having been impolitic and unjustifiable, unchristian and unsuccessful. Reproached by Grey and Fox and Sheridan in speeches of 'splendid eloquence,'¹ Pitt vindicated his policy as that of a trustee for posterity,² entitled for that reason to a higher tribute than having his bust placed by a foreign ruler 'between two of the greatest orators of Greece and Rome.'³ Catherine's compliment to her English champion had been double-edged.

So great is the significance of this episode in British foreign policy that the pamphlets of the two contending parties, and the reasoning by which they judged the first allegation in British history of a Russian menace, are well worthy of perusal. The cause advocated by Pitt was for the moment a cause that failed. He was driven to surrender to public opinion, and it is fortunate that his defeat was soon forgotten when he withstood the might of revolutionary France. Yet though thwarted for the moment, his policy towards Russia and Turkey was really the keystone of the later English attitude, and whether for good or ill, his conception as to the fitting part to be played by Britain in the Eastern question planted the seeds both of the Crimean War and of the imperialism which

¹ Cobbett's *Parl. Hist.*, xxix. 994.

² *Ibid.* xxix. 999.

³ *Ibid.* xxix. 998.

Beaconsfield personified at the Congress of Berlin. It is therefore of great interest to examine the motives which animated him and his followers, though his own ideas were too closely veiled to be stated with much confidence.

Pitt's distrust of Catherine dated far back. As early as 1781 she had rejected England's offer of Minorca,¹ and in 1786 she had refused to renew the commercial treaty of 20th June 1766, under which Great Britain had been on the footing of most favoured nation in Russian ports. She had told Harris that 'the greatest blessing that could befall this empire is a Turkish war,'² and she aimed avowedly at the conquest of Constantinople. Considerations as to British influence in the Mediterranean, and the possibility of Egypt in Russian hands becoming a highway to India, were apparently no less powerful motives to Pitt's action than his desire to retain Prussia's support of international peace, and to repay her for her loyalty during the recent friction with Spain upon the question of Nootka Sound. If the class interested in trade with Turkey was smaller and less influential than that connected by commerce with Russia, it was yet of some consideration,

¹ *Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence* (ed. 1845), i. 381.

² *Ibid.*

and its financial interests were bound up with Pitt's policy of saving 'the sick man' from strangulation. The satins and velvets of Brusa and Aleppo, the serges and camelots of Angora, the crapes and gauzes of Salonica, the printed muslins of Constantinople, and carpets of Smyrna found markets in England, and provided benefits for her ship-owners and merchants.¹ If these regions passed under the Russian yoke, they would find Russian outlets on their way to foreign consumers, and become subject to Russian navigation laws. Thomas Thornton, who had seen something of life in both Odessa and Constantinople, recorded in his work on Turkey, a few years later, views on the two belligerent peoples which had appealed strongly to Pitt. He showed that the realm of Catherine II. had no just grounds for its religious and humane claims to British sympathy. Its religion was in fact 'a leprous combination of ignorance, superstition and fraud'²—its humanity a myth. Moreover, the economic future of Russia promised to be far more formidable to English exporters than that of Turkey, which could never become self-sufficing either in production or as a carrier,³ and which was too weak ever to awaken fear or envy. Even

¹ Thornton's *Present State of Turkey* (1807), p. 23.

² *Ibid.* p. 83.

³ *Ibid.* p. 212.

its Black Sea navy was in hopeless confusion. In 1790 an English traveller saw an admiral playing chess on his quarter-deck with a common sailor;¹ so low was the state of discipline. The Turks were so incapable of business that they left the management of their customs to Jews, and that of their mint to Armenians.² Dauntless fighting men as they were, they were thought to be but 'babes in modern tactics.'³ Therefore, for trade reasons, statistics showing the greater volume of England's Russian trade were delusive in the opinion of the party who supported Pitt's scheme of intervention. Russian patriots themselves admitted their passionate eagerness for industrial development,⁴ and deemed their demand for goods from England to be but the prelude to economic independence. A population of 36 millions⁵ must in time become self-supporting. Pallas, a 'counsellor of state to the Czar' and a famous naturalist, has left us a picture of Russia in 1793, 'most submissively dedicated' in 1803 to Alexander I., in which he notices the growth of home manufactures of woollens and cloth, and the rise of a Russian

¹ Thornton's *Present State of Turkey* (1807), p. 215.

² *Ibid.* p. 385.

³ *Cowper Correspondence* (ed. 1904), iii. 161.

⁴ Masson, *Mémoires Secrets sur la Russie* (1800), ii. 57.

⁵ Tooke's *View of the Russian Empire* (1799), ii. 130.

hardware industry at the close of the eighteenth century, which should in time redeem Russia from her necessity for foreign goods.¹ She might even dispense one day with English coal.² Colonies of Germans, who came principally from Würtemberg, were planted on the banks of the Volga below Saratow to teach the natives agriculture and yarn-spinning,³ and how to live in cleanliness and comfort. Others formed a German quarter at Moscow,⁴ while Calvinists from the Palatinate and Mennonites from Moravia were also welcome.⁵ The number of Germans, Frenchmen and Hungarians on the banks of the Volga was estimated in 1784 at 32,000.⁶ They were then by no means prosperous, but the Government's generosity in providing a house, sixty acres and 150 roubles for every foreign settler in that district, proved the value that it attached to immigration.⁷

Among the pioneers of Russian industry none ranked higher than Samuel Bentham, brother of the great jurist, and distinguished as seaman, inventor and naval constructor. He designed carriages for use on either land or

¹ Pallas's *Travels* (Eng. tr. 1803), i. 10.

² *Ibid.* i. 6.

³ *Ibid.* i. 224.

⁴ *History of the Russian Fleet* (ed. Laughton, 1899), p. xi.

⁵ Pallas's *Travels* (Eng. tr. 1803), i. 63.

⁶ *Mémoire Extrait du Journal d'un Voyage fait en 1784* (éd. 1797), p. 84.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 85.

rivers, and engines for planing and forming mouldings, which were particularly appreciated in a land so rich in timber.¹ He supervised Potemkin's manufactory at Kritchew,² and examined the undeveloped mines of Siberia and the Urals. He strove to further popular education.³ With such competent advisers the Government willingly embarked on protection, and it was suggested that men engaged in manufactures should be freed from military service.⁴ French and Swiss pedagogues taught new ideas to the young nobility. Bounties stimulated the Armenian silk manufactures of Georgia and Astrakhan.⁵ In the south silk-spinning was attempted by Jews,⁶ and along the lower reaches of the Don and in the Crimea, the grape was cultivated successfully by French farmers and vine-dressers, and by Armenian settlers.⁷ The arms factory at Tula was designed to free Russia from dependence on the foreigner,⁸ and with the same hope, a prohibitory tariff closed what had been the best market for Allsopp's Burton beer.⁹ St. Peters-

¹ *Memoirs of Sir S. Benthham* (1856), p. 44.

² *Ibid.* p. 45.

³ *Ibid.* p. 48.

⁴ Pallas's *Travels*, i. 11.

⁵ *Ibid.* i. p. 222.

⁶ Forster's *Journey from Bengal to England* (1798), ii. 217.

⁷ Pallas's *Travels* (Eng. tr. 1803), ii. 231.

⁸ Szujew, *Beschreibung seiner Reise* (1789), pp. 45-8.

⁹ *The Food Value of Malt Liquors* (1906), p. 8.

burg was full of German tailors, shoemakers and artisans, and of English merchants and saddlers.¹ Russia's economic future was in fact so promising that Pitt believed that his political fears of Russian aggrandisement should not be dissipated by the essentially transient utility of the Russian trade. In April 1791, at the very height of the crisis, he was furnished with *Observations on the Nature of the Connection that has hitherto subsisted between Great Britain and Russia*,² the privately circulated work of Joseph Ewart, the British minister plenipotentiary at Berlin, and this treatise confirmed his belief. Ewart, who was a favourite at the Prussian court, and had married a Prussian countess, regretted the part played by England in facilitating by the gratuitous gift of officers, seamen and shipbuilders, the growth of the Russian navy, and the conquest of the Crimea in 1783. Catherine II. had refused to renew the commercial treaty of 1766 with Great Britain when it expired in 1786. After that year England was the least favoured nation at Russian ports.³ Though four-fifths of the whole produce of Russia was bought by British subjects, the cabal that guided Catherine per-

¹ Masson, *Mémoires Secrets sur la Russie* (1800), i. 110.

² Fortescue MSS. (*Hist. MSS. Comm.* [1894] *Rep.*, xiv. 5), ii. 44-50.

³ *Ibid.* p. 46.

suaded her to levy duties varying from 20 to 100 per cent. on the English goods they sent in return. Ewart foresaw clearly the day when all non-Russian manufactures would be shut out by a protective tariff, and he recognised that Catherine's lavish foundations of towns by ukase might in time be followed by the development of towns in serious actuality. Her dreams of establishing industries in southern Russia would be soon fulfilled if only something of the zeal of the Government could be imparted to the slow-moving minds of the people. At heart the organisers of the new Russia were far less friendly to this country than the Turks, and it was absurd to look for any attachment to free trade principles in the rising class of Russian mechanics, whom Catherine was drilling in self-government, and organising into craft guilds on the German model.

The people of Turkey were praised with more positive arguments in Captain Sutherland's *Account of a Tour up the Straits from Gibraltar to Constantinople*, which had been published in 1790, and had found subscribers if not readers in both Pitt and Richmond. The trade advantages of a good understanding with Turkey were brought out with great clearness by this capable officer. He pointed out that Russian

rule involved ultimately a closed door to British goods, while the Turks bought, and would buy for ever, articles sent out from England in a highly manufactured state. They sold in return such raw materials as silk and cotton, which were necessities here, and did not in any way compete with home products and commodities. Fruit and drugs again were carried hither in English bottoms and were often re-exported.¹ These arguments were confirmed in the account of trade at Constantinople by James Dallaway, the physician and chaplain of the British embassy. There was a great demand for English cloth and block tin, and also for watches. An English watch was the first luxury in which a Turk would indulge.²

Assuming then that the action which the Prussian court prayed Pitt to take involved no loss to British commerce, his school was not one to suffer allegations as to Russian piety and benevolence to stand in the way of public policy. Evidence was scanty in support of these sentimental Whig pleas. Nor were the Turks the monsters of Whig legend. Sutherland described them as strict 'in points of honour.'³ Abdul Hamid I., who died in 1789,

¹ Sutherland's *Tour* (1790), pp. 159, 183.

² Dallaway's *Constantinople* (1797), p. 76.

³ Sutherland's *Tour* (1790), p. 167.

was 'of a humane and virtuous character';¹ he possessed 'an engaging, benevolent countenance.'² It would have been better to help him against the Russian invaders, and England and Prussia should blush with shame if they allowed Catherine to retain all her conquests.³ 'As an Englishman,' Sutherland writes in language which posterity has sometimes echoed, 'policy obliges me to wish success to the Turks. As a philanthrope, I feel the utmost detestation of the ambitious combination entered into by the Emperor [Joseph II.] and Empress to extirpate the Turks, merely because nature has been bountiful to their soil, and because their country promised an easy conquest.'⁴ If Constantinople fell, Egypt would fall too.⁵ This distrust of Russian character marked Pitt's aims at an alliance with Poland. Its partition was dreaded by him and by Hailes, the English representative at Warsaw.⁶ They looked on Catherine as its chief enemy, and thought that the Poles might well purchase Prussian protection by yielding Thorn and Dantzic. In March 1791 Pitt could not perhaps explain his reasons adequately on this point; a few months later a partisan averred

¹ Sutherland's *Tour* (1790), p. 170.

² *Ibid.* p. 358.

³ *Ibid.* p. 334.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 333.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 172.

⁶ *Memorial on the Present State of Poland* (1791), pp. 25, 26.

that he might have carried through his scheme for intervention between Russia and Turkey in spite of the Whigs, 'had he been at liberty to divulge all he then knew of the danger hanging over the north, which subsequent events have unfolded to the world.'¹ Even Fox came to lament that 'it is over with poor Poland,'² and later history has proved how little Russia's pretensions of Christianity ought to modify England's choice of policy.

The party who followed Pitt in discerning a Russian menace in the progress of the arms of Potemkin and Suwarrow accepted willingly his version of the importance of Oczakow. The country was exhorted to believe that it was the key of Turkey, and that its fall presaged the early expulsion of the Turks from Europe. If judged by this contention alone, history would laugh at the war scare of 1791. A glance at the map will show that the possession of Kherson by the Russians gave them the command of the whole navigation of the Dnieper, and that their occupation of the land at the mouth of the Bug and of the fort of Kinburn distinctly lessened the importance of Oczakow. Ships could easily avoid it, if

¹ *Annual Register* (1791), p. 107 ; cf. Eton's *Survey of the Turkish Empire* (1798), p. 428.

² C. J. Fox's *Memorials and Correspondence* (ed. 1853), ii. 366.

necessary, by passing close to Kinburn. Indeed Kinsbergen, a Dutch admiral, had told Auckland, the British ambassador at the Hague, that Oczakow was of no military importance to any state,¹ and that even as a base for naval warfare on the Black Sea, Sebastopol, which Russia already held, was of more moment.² Auckland assured Pitt in February that the whole district was a waterless desert without the slightest strategic or political value,³ and prayed him to propose some form of compromise in view of Catherine's mood, and the impossibility of attacking Riga from the sea.⁴ The cabinet, however, wished to believe otherwise, and distrusted his advice. Accordingly Sir J. B. Burges, the under-secretary for foreign affairs, wrote strongly to him on 1st March, pointing out the commanding position Oczakow occupied on the Black Sea,⁵ and reproaching him for the 'miserable and absurd' error of helping to foster a rival maritime power.⁶ As Russia was exhausted by war, while Britain was strong in her ships and wealth, and had but lately 'given the law to France, Spain and Austria,' Burges

¹ *Auckland Journal and Correspondence* (ed. 1861), ii. 381.

² *Ibid.* ii. 382.

³ *Fortescue MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., xiv. 4 [1894])*, ii. 25.

⁴ *Ibid.* ii. 31.

⁵ *Bland-Burges Letters and Correspondence* (ed. 1885), p. 161.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 162.

claimed that intervention was bound to succeed. Six days afterwards Auckland was asked to discover for Pitt the answers to questions 'at the present moment so very material.'¹ Seven inquiries followed: Does Oczakow command the passage from the Liman to the Black Sea? Does it afford the Turks a position enabling them to obstruct a Russian fleet which might try to sail from Kherson to Sebastopol? Whence do the Russians derive the naval stores for their Black Sea fleet? Would the passage of such stores be impeded if Oczakow was restored to Turkey? Could Oczakow be so strengthened as to be secure against Russian attacks? If Russia retains Oczakow, will its possession enable her to disturb the channels of commerce between Poland and the Black Sea? Does the possession of Oczakow help the Russians to maintain her sovereignty over the Crimea? Auckland having again belittled the importance of Oczakow, Burges wrote to him another letter of expostulation on 21st March, in which he vindicated the Government from the charges of levity, and of preferring a false sense of dignity to the dictates of wisdom.² The correspondence proves Pitt's earnestness of purpose, and it was unfortunate that he did

¹ *Auckland Journal* (1861), ii. 382-3.

² *Bland-Burges Letters and Correspondence* (ed. 1885), p. 163.

not choose to open his heart, and offer his knowledge to his followers, who were quite willing to accept his high estimate of Oczakow with an enthusiasm that bordered on credulity. The Russians were in their eyes already approaching 'to the gates of Constantinople.'¹ England then possessed no trustworthy geographical account of Russia,² and thus it was easy to deem Oczakow 'superior to Kinburn as a naval station,'³ and the key of the Turkish empire. If, it was pointed out, the Baron de Tott laid down in his *Memoirs* that Oczakow was no less than two leagues from the fort of Kinburn, and therefore could hardly be the Gibraltar of the Dnieper Liman (the passage that led to the mouths of the Bug and Dnieper), and that it was ill-defended by fortifications,⁴ it was answered that the commercial and strategic uses of Oczakow might nevertheless be very great. Indeed, their views on this point were confirmed in 1792 by Pleschééf's *Survey of the Russian Empire*, which admitted that it was 'a town and fortress of considerable strength,'⁵ and by Mrs. Guthrie, who explored the region thoroughly in 1795, and came to the conclusion

¹ *Auckland Journal* (ed. 1861), ii. 385.

² Pleschééf's *Survey of the Russian Empire* (Eng. tr. 1792), p. ix.

³ *Annual Register* (1791), p. 99.

⁴ *Memoirs of Baron de Tott* (1785), ii. 63.

⁵ Pleschééf's *Survey of the Russian Empire* (Eng. tr. 1792), p. 307.

that it actually commanded the Dnieper Liman.¹ In any case, ignorance and partisanship gave enchantment to the good Tory's view of Oczakow, and brightened that obscure spot with gleams of beauty and greatness.

Pitt himself was less explicit. His speeches in Parliament were terse if not actually evasive. He felt bound to Prussia, and when once he had intimated his wish to check the Russian inroad, he recognised that defeat would involve a loss to British influence abroad. His supporters urged the necessity of upholding his cause for this reason alone. 'They cannot surely be friends to the national honour who would advise ministers to desert the cause they have openly avowed in the face of all Europe,'² runs a strong plea in his favour. England ought not to yield to 'the threats of an upstart power, whom Britain is known to have cherished into consequence.'³ It is an open question how far Pitt was moved by apprehensions of Russian expansion in Asia, and of a Russian invasion of India. He spoke and wrote too little and too discreetly to enable us to judge.⁴ Nor did he attempt like Beaconsfield to discriminate sharply between the legitimate and illegitimate bounds of Russian territorial

¹ Guthrie's *Tour through the Taurida* (1802), p. 29.

² *Gentleman's Magazine* (1791), lxi. 476.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Tomline's explanation of his reticence is unsatisfactory.—*Memoirs of Pitt* (1821), ii. 356.

aggrandisement. It is, however, clear that the fear of losing the possibility of carving out British markets, perhaps a British empire in Asia, was a real factor in popularising Pitt's foreign policy in 1791. The English were not alone in believing that the fall of Turkey was at hand, and that in the scramble for her possessions Constantinople was no more valuable a prize than Egypt. In 1778 Louis XVI. was pressed to anticipate Russia and England in that quarter by Tott, the inspector-general of French establishments in the Levant.¹ The far-reaching fancies of Catherine were therefore as much dreaded as if they had been practical plans. It was known that Potemkin, while simply aiming at a Mediterranean principality for himself, dreamed of the conquest of China by his countrymen. He was the Bismarck of his age, with large ideas, an iron will, and primitive manners. Tooke tells us that his usual breakfast consisted of 'the greater part of a smoke-dried goose from Hamburg,'² followed by ham, wine and Dantzic liqueurs. His mind was more agile than his body, and his ambition more splendid than his tastes. 'Ten thousand Russians,' he said, 'could march through China.'³

¹ *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* (1902), iii. 623.

² Tooke's *Life of Catherine II.* (1800), iii. 322.

³ *Ibid.* iii. 307; cf. Thornton's *Present State of Turkey* (1807), p. 81.

To Prince Nassau-Siegen who commanded the Baltic fleet was due the definite proposal of an attack upon the British in India by way of Bokhara and Cashmere. The idea was possibly conceived and certainly supported ardently by St. Genie or St. Ginier, a French adventurer who had travelled in the east, and who displayed a map upon which no march by Russian soldiery appeared impossible.¹ He urged Catherine to publish a manifesto on behalf of the great Mogul, and according to the historians Eton and Tooke, she was only dissuaded from attacking India by the caution of Potemkin, who was then on the verge of death. St. Genie was confident that the Bengalese would join the invaders,² and he reminded Catherine that an abortive attempt to open trade relations with them had actually been made in 1783.³ Those who looked upon the far east as a monopoly for British enterprise could not relish the exalted dreams which then found votaries at the Russian court, and they resented bitterly the pro-Russian tendencies of 'a certain set of men who put every obstacle in the way to embarrass the measures of the

¹ Tooke's *Life of Catherine II.* (1800), iii. 320-1; Eton's *Survey of the Turkish Empire* (1798), pp. 429, 500-1; Castéra, *Histoire de Catherine II.* (1800), iii. 100-1.

² Eton's *Survey* (ed. 1799), p. 511.

³ Chantreau, *Voyage fait en Russie* (1794), i. 216.

administration, and who have so far succeeded.’¹ If the Greek ambitions of Catherine were dangerous to English influence in the Mediterranean, the peril of India upon which the Empress was said to have been ‘firmly resolved’² was even more pressing, while there was little prospect of checking the eastward march of Russian arms across the Siberian steppes. The Russians already thought that ‘some day or other they may be masters of the islands of Japan also, as they conceive the force they could bring could not be withstood by such a people.’³ British opinion was not sufficiently well informed to recognise how effectually Russia’s chances of limitless expansion were prejudiced by her want of money and of science, and by her general habit of shrinking from initiative. Pitt’s party thus held that with Prussian assistance it would be well to prolong the life of the Turkish empire in Europe. There was no danger of any eruption in that empire against British territory, no fear of any exclusion of British imports. In Turkey the adjective English when applied to goods meant ‘excellent’;⁴ English shalloons and Staffordshire hardware were already appreciated, and

¹ *Cornwallis Correspondence* (ed. 1859), ii. 174.

² Eton’s *Survey of the Turkish Empire* (1798), p. 429.

³ *Ibid.* p. 504.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 485.

if only our traders made exertions, there would be a ready demand for Manchester stuffs, and for the wares of Birmingham and Sheffield.¹ The tradition of Chatham's day that Russia was a more fitting ally was but due to the passing alliance between the French and the Porte. It had no more lasting place in political science than the alleged eternal enmity of English and French. The state had a new opportunity to displace the embarrassed French monarchy as the dominating power in the councils of Constantinople.

This view of British policy was expounded with most precision in a tract called *A Comparative Estimate of the Advantages Great Britain would derive from an Alliance with the Ottoman in preference to the Russian Empire*. It justified Pitt's diplomacy by arguing that the balance of power would be better secured by retaining the Turkish power in Europe than by further Russian conquests, and urged that the mere profession of one form of Christianity did not necessarily elevate Russians above the level of Mohammedans, for the Koran was not immoral and the Turks were not intolerant to Christians.² If Christianity was essential to friend-

¹ Eton's *Survey of the Turkish Empire* (1798), p. 484.

² *Comparative Estimate* (1791), p. 10; cf. Dallaway's *Constantinople* (1797), p. 389.

ship, British alliances with Indian princes were but a mockery.¹ The writer perceived that the main objection to Pitt's armament was the fear of losing the Russian trade without any proportionate increase in that with Turkey, and to defeat that theory was his chief task.

Great Britain wanted more markets, for the American monopoly had been ended, French trade was precarious,² and tariffs were beginning to affect exports to the German states. If Turkish good-will was obtained, England might be rewarded with the cession of Cyprus or preferably of Crete, which would be useful to the East India Company.³ Turkey might buy our staple products besides those of the West Indies and Canadian furs, and if Crete was used as the depôt for such goods, a new Tyre or Alexandria might arise under the British flag 'in this voluptuous spot.'⁴ The Ottoman would be educated by the Englishman with 'the mild aid of science and of commerce.'⁵ The Turkey Company had wasted its opportunities, but a free trade would reap rich harvests.⁶ One quarter of the Cornish output of tin was already shipped annually to Turkey,⁷ and if merchants tried to sell muslins, shalloons,

¹ *Comparative Estimate* (1791), p. 11.

² *Ibid.* p. 3.

³ *Ibid.* p. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 7.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 13.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 19.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 24.

clocks, indigo and cutlery with greater zeal, the quantity of British exports would far exceed in value its current average of £295,000.¹ It was true that Russia bought our goods to the annual value of £400,000,² but whereas Turkey only sent to English ports raisins, figs, cotton wool and the madder that gave the dyers their 'Turkey red,' Russia sent goods to the value of £3,000,000.³ The balance of trade in the latter case was therefore ruinously against this country; its tendency meant 'national robbery, suicide and parricide.'⁴

These views no doubt represent the mercantile theory and a dead creed. They were, however, strengthened by commercial contentions which are economically sounder. The writer saw that Russia's willingness to open her doors to British goods was a passing expedient. Ploughs and looms are imports with a double significance, and the strong tendency to build up Russian manufactures upon the introduction of English machinery would in the end 'starve or banish to American wildernesses the British and Irish labourers and mechanics.'⁵ St. Petersburg was becoming full of factories and breweries, and the pathway of Russian Protection was an easy ascent to economic

¹ *Comparative Estimate* (1791), pp. 19, 25-33.

² *Ibid.* p. 38.

³ *Ibid.* p. 37.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 55.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 49.

independence. For Catherine the retention of Oczakow would mean nothing less than European sanction of her great plan of spoliation, another milestone towards the ascendancy of Russia.¹

Yet we know that public opinion on the whole² saw the Eastern question of 1791 in another light. If the future was with Pitt, the fortunes of the day were with Fox, and Britain was only saved from the dangers of a Whig Government by Pitt's surrender to the people's will.³ The conflict was decided by the general opinion as to the nation's trade interests, and in this it was akin to all the typical political controversies of eighteenth-century England. The average Briton looked calmly at the volume of trade with each of the two belligerent powers, and decided that Russian friendship was more useful than Turkish. Ultimate possibilities seemed of less weight than considerations which were practical and immediate, and with the same judgment that they had displayed during the American Revolution, the majority of Englishmen believed that policy should be based on the facts of the moment, not on the contingencies of the future.

¹ *Comparative Estimate* (1791), p. 60.

² Miss Berry's *Journal and Correspondence* (ed. 1865), i. 293; *Cornwallis Correspondence* (ed. 1859), ii. 109, 123.

³ See Pitt's own version in Stanhope's *Pitt* (1861), ii. 117.

In 1791 men knew that the country had benefited immensely from eight years of peace and retrenchment. It would be idle to risk her advantages for the sake of degenerate Turkey and of a desolate town, the name of which had been unknown until yesterday. Entanglements in endless eastern wars had proved the bane of Austria and Poland; England should cherish her immunity. It was her part to become rich and happy while Russians slaughtered Turks, and Frenchmen massacred each other, to be politically indifferent

‘Whether in giddy, flippant France
The king or people lead the dance;
Whether Potemkin trims the Turk,
Priestley and Paine belabour Burke.’¹

Moreover, there were material grounds for rejoicing in Russian progress. In spite of high duties,² English goods still found a market in Catherine’s dominions, while her army and navy were full of British officers.³ The number of English people employed in Russia should indeed have drawn the two nations together in sympathy. Had it not been for Orlov’s jealousy, it was said that John Elphinstone

¹ *Gentleman’s Magazine* (1791), lxi. ii.

² *Examination of a Pamphlet, etc., by a Citizen* (1791), p. 46.

³ *Ibid.* p. 47; *An Address to the People of England* (1791), p. 47; Tooke’s *View of the Russian Empire* (1799), ii. 472; Tooke’s *Life of Catherine II.* (1800), iii. 319; Sutherland’s *Tour* (1790), p. 172.

would have sailed through the Bosphorus in 1770, and planted the Russian eagle upon the minarets of Constantinople.¹ He, Greig, Trevenan and Dugdale were pioneers of Catherine's naval power, and did for Russia what Sheldon and Chapman did for Sweden. Bentham, whom we have already noticed as an industrial pathfinder, won the cross of the order of St. George by his gallantry in a sea-fight off Oczakow,² while the notorious Paul Jones found employment in the same service. Commodore Billings, who had acted as astronomer's assistant in Captain Cook's last voyage,³ was commissioned in 1785 to explore northern Siberia, and his second in command was named Hall. Catherine's court banker was a Scotsman called Sutherland, and her doctor an Englishman called Rogerson, who 'saw her Majesty every Sunday.'⁴ An Englishwoman, Maria Guthrie, became 'directress of the imperial convent for the education of the female nobility of Russia.'⁵ Another Briton called Semple was given the task of finding employment for the wretched foreigners, who had been persuaded

¹ Watkins's *Travels* (1790), p. 207; Charnock's *Biographia Navalis* (1798), vi. 360.

² *Memoirs of Sir S. Bentham* (1856), p. 47; cf. Romilly's *Memoirs* (ed. 1840), i. 417.

³ Sauer's *Billings's Expedition* (1802), p. ix.

⁴ *Daschkaw Memoirs* (ed. 1840), i. 273.

⁵ Mrs. Guthrie's *Tour through the Taurida* (1802), title-page.

to settle on the northern shore of the Black Sea long before that region offered any real prospect of a livelihood.¹

The extension of Russian sovereignty over the lands still misgoverned by the Porte might well mean the spread of civilisation over a benighted region, and the expansion of British markets. In spite of the prophets of 1775, the loss of the American colonies had not yet affected their demand for English goods, though 'we spilt our best blood and spent only to the last shilling in that vain contest.'² It would therefore be better not to predict ruin in the prospects of 1791, but to accept the inevitable, and see in Russia's appropriation of the Black Sea territories the opening of a new granary for our use instead of an invitation to war.³ The defeat of Turkey was in substance the weakening of France, and according to *A Short Seasonable Hint* addressed to the landholders and merchants of 1791, it would be madness to provoke an ally with a boundless future in order to preserve a state from which England had always stood dissociated in faith, diplomacy and religion.⁴ If the Turks were the true friends of ministerial

¹ *Mémoire extrait du Journal d'un Voyage fait en 1784* (ed. 1797), p. 16.

² *Short Seasonable Hint* (1791), p. 9.

³ *Ibid.* p. 10.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 38.

imagination, they would not buy French and German cloth instead of English.¹

The cause which Fox thought it expedient to support had far more pamphleteers to champion its tenets than that which Pitt espoused but would not explain. That peace was necessary for England, and Oczakow for Catherine II., was the burden of *An Address to the People of England*.² Russia could not be stayed from her conquests in south-eastern Europe by an English fleet in the Baltic.³ As another writer argued, the most our ships could do would be to fire our own factories at Riga or Revel, and Pitt ought not to cheat Britons of their lives and honour to sustain the Porte and its iniquities.⁴ Russia was an old ally, and furnished us with the bulk of our tar, hemp, iron and naval stores. If the country were to be deprived of these supplies there would be but sorry compensation in the suggested cessions of Crete or Cyprus.⁵ If we imported more from Russia than we exported thither, most of our imports were raw materials. The typical case of iron was for instance fashioned here into locks and keys, and reshipped to St. Petersburg

¹ Eton's *Survey of the Turkish Empire* (1798), p. 473.

² *An Address to the People of England* (1791), p. 9.

³ *Ibid.* p. 11.

⁴ *Examination of a Pamphlet, etc., by a Citizen* (1791), p. 78.

⁵ *An Address to the People of England* (1791), p. 11.

at 2000 per cent. profit.¹ Similarly Russian leather came to these shores, only to return to Russia in the form of boots; Russian grain was used to make English beer, and was sent back as such. Even manufactured articles from France passed to Russia through the hands of British middlemen.² Ships would be powerless against the forts of Cronstadt and Revel,³ and even were it otherwise, it would be wicked to repay by war the historic affection for Britain displayed by all classes of Russians since the days of Peter the Great.⁴ The many Englishmen who found employment in dealing in Russian leather, skins, furs, iron, copper, linen, linseed, caviar, sail-cloth, in the fish and oil of Archangel, the honey and wax of Pleskow, the tallow of Vologda, the oil of the Volga, the flax and hemp 'of the great Novgorod,' the sables of Siberia, and the pitch that was carried down the Dwina to Archangel, were enthusiastic in the same interest.⁵ The London merchants and stockbrokers were emphatically for non-interference. 'In the alley all is peace,'⁶ wrote Storer on 6th May 1791. During that year,

¹ *An Address to the People of England* (1791), p. 25.

² Masson, *Mémoires Secrets sur la Russie* (1800), ii. 78.

³ *An Address to the People of England* (1791), p. 35.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 43-5.

⁵ Beawes's *Lex Mercatoria* (ed. 1813), ii. 112, 299.

⁶ *Auckland Journal and Correspondence* (ed. 1861), ii. 388.

in spite of its diplomatic friction, no fewer than 525 British ships arrived at the port of St. Petersburg alone,¹ carrying woollens and silks, hardware and mercery, and bringing home the products of Russia. Trade had caused an English quarter to be established at St. Petersburg,² where Tooke the historian found employment as chaplain. Even the navy depended on Kazan for its best oak, on the Ukraine and Moscow for its hemp, on Novgorod and Russian Poland for its masts, and on Viborg for pitch and tar.³ Four-fifths of the ships that entered the last-named port hailed from England, exchanging wine, spices and salt, for timber, tar, pitch and tallow.⁴ The time-honoured preference for the North American source of such supplies had rested only on a sentiment which was dead. Indeed the Briton of the day put far more faith in his country's constitution than in his Anglo-Saxon blood, and had become so oblivious to the old principles of empire and nationality since the defection of the United States, that Russia was deemed to be quite as fitting a bourne of emigration as any colony over sea; Lady Craven wrote in 1786 that she

¹ Tooke's *View of the Russian Empire* (1799), iii. 634.

² Lady Craven's *Journey through the Crimea* (1789), p. 125; cf. Sauer's *Billings's Expedition* (1802), p. viii.

³ Coxe's *Travels in Poland, Russia, etc.* (1803), ii. 309.

⁴ Chantreau, *Voyage fait en Russie* (1794), i. 4.

hoped to see English settlements in the Crimea under the Russian flag.¹ While such views were current, it is easy to understand the strength of the forces against which Pitt had to contend.

Hardly less helpful to those who marshalled the pleas of the opposition was the prevailing dislike for the Prussian Government. Men recognised how deeply Hertzberg and the anti-Russian politicians of Berlin were involved in Pitt's adoption of his present policy. It was known that the Turkish troops were largely officered by Prussians,² and it was suspected that Prussia aimed only at her own aggrandisement. Almost all English politicians deplored her hostility to the freedom of Dantzic.³ They did not dream that Catherine II. and not Frederick William was to be the chief agent in effecting the destruction of the Polish state. 'John Bull,' wrote Major-general Grenville to Cornwallis on 4th May 1791, 'does not understand or approve of German politics and alliances.'⁴ One tract resented that Old England should have to humour Prussia and lend her navy to mere Teutons.⁵ The Prussian soldier himself was alleged to be no match for

¹ Lady Craven's *Journey through the Crimea* (1789), p. 188.

² *Fortescue MSS.* (*Hist. MSS. Comm.* [1894] *Rep.*, xiv. 5), ii. 91.

³ *Examination of a Pamphlet, etc., by a Citizen* (1791), p. 82.

⁴ *Cornwallis Correspondence* (ed. 1859), ii. 123.

⁵ *An Address to the People of England* (1791), p. 16.

the Muscovites, who fought 'for a country which they adore.'¹ The realm of Frederick the Great was really but a fictitious power² in the opinion of the Whigs, whose prescience was to be justified at Jena, and then mocked by all succeeding history. Certainly the Prussia of 1791 was no whit preferable to Russia on grounds either of love of peace or humanity, and the day was yet distant when Russian government was to become synonymous with cruelty and rapine. At the time of the first partition of Poland in 1774, many Jews who had lived there for many ages³ left the districts appropriated by Prussia in order to exchange the brutality of the German for the then milder tyranny of the Russian. Catherine promised them full rights of citizenship in 1786, and they were not excluded from Moscow until October 1790.

A third factor in English public opinion which was utilised in stirring up agitation against Pitt was religious. The evangelical movement had carried the nation far away from the indifference and erastianism of Walpole and Chesterfield. The close of the eighteenth century saw not only the revival of Sunday

¹ *An Address to the People of England* (1791), p. 40.

² Miss Berry's *Journal and Correspondence* (ed. 1865), i. 294.

³ Tooke's *Life of Catherine II.* (1800), ii. 275.

observance but the partial reassertion of theological ardour as an influence in moulding popular opinion. Doctrine came to be an invaluable asset to those who wanted a religious sanction and a justification by faith for their campaign against revolutionary France abroad and against Radical firebrands at home. It gave an added glow to the rhetorical conservatism of Burke, and a touch of priggishness to Pitt's orations on the war with France. It became in their hands a powerful instrument to hallow a ministry which claimed to defend causes of a sacred character, but in 1791 it was a Whig weapon, and religious enthusiasm then found strange and unfamiliar outlets in the propaganda of Fox and his friends. Enemies of the Turks pointed justly to the wretchedness of the Christian peoples subject to their sway, to their 'grievous and ignominious slavery.'¹ It was, they urged, shameful for such of Pitt's followers as hoped for the abolition of negro slavery to desire an alliance with a race who trafficked in Christian slaves, and who as recently as 1788 had swept 70,000 Christians from Temesvar to be sold in the markets of Constantinople.² It was true that the Russians had been cruel after storming Oczakow and Ismail, but they were better men than 'plague-

¹ *Short Seasonable Hint* (1791), p. 17.

² *Ibid.* p. 19.

stricken Turks and Algerine pirates,'¹ and their drift away from western Europe was a tendency to be encouraged not combated.² One writer protested against deserting old allies in order to join 'the enemies of the Christian name.'³ Another held that in supporting the Turks Pitt was 'daring the God of Heaven' for the sake of infidels whose ingratitude was assured.

'As full of port as we are full of pride,
On Christ we trample with gigantic stride,
For Turks we'll borrow till we've nought to pay,
Then Turks their love for Britons will display.'⁴

Every traveller knew of the cruelties of Turkish rule and of the corruption of Turkish justice. Prisoners of war were treated with horrible savagery and 'left for subsistence to the charity of the Christians and Jews.'⁵ In 1789 Thomas Watkins saw gangs of Russian and Austrian captives chained in couples and tormented beyond endurance; he related that Christian visitors to Constantinople were pelted by boys.⁶ Cowper, the typical non-partisan, was gladdened by the prospect of clearing Europe from the most execrable tyranny that had ever been exercised under heaven.⁷

¹ *Short Seasonable Hint* (1791), p. 20.

² *Ibid.* p. 37.

³ *An Address to the People of England* (1791), p. 13.

⁴ *Gentleman's Magazine* (1791), lxi. 470.

⁵ *Watkins's Travels* (1790), p. 209.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 208.

⁷ *Cowper Correspondence* (ed. 1904), iii. 161.

It was thus no hard task to argue that Russian national character was at all events higher and more congenial than Turkish. Fired by the memory of Peter the Great and the incentives of Voltaire, the court of St. Petersburg cherished Greek sympathies as well as Greek ambitions. The phrase, 'the way to Constantinople,' which greeted Catherine as she passed under an arch at Kherson in 1787, represented no mean aspiration. Her emissary Sottiri distributed Hellenic tracts in Epirus and Albania,¹ and claimed that Russia inherited the claims of both Athens and Byzantium. Catherine herself was addressed as 'the glory of the Greek faith,'² and her second grandson was christened Constantine in 1779, was given Greek nurses, and 'sucked in with his milk the Greek language, in which he afterwards was perfected by learned Greek teachers.' After the conquest of the Crimea, Tartar place-names were supplanted by Greek,³ and the Turkish hamlet of Adjebey developed into the great port of Odessa.⁴ Catherine and Potemkin always contemplated the emancipation of the Greeks, and the foundation of a Christian state of Dacia under

¹ Castéra, *Histoire de Catherine II.* (1800), iii. 81.

² *Ibid.* iii. 85.

³ Eton's *Survey of the Turkish Empire* (1798), p. 423.

⁴ Guthrie's *Tour through the Taurida* (1802), p. 23.

Russian auspices¹ in the territories known as Moldavia, Bessarabia and Wallachia. Nor were the Russians in these early days of their western education as 'gloomy and stupid' as the Turks. Eton, writing in 1796, even describes them as hilarious, and states in words which contrast tragically with those of later-day observers that 'the whole mass of the people appear to be more happy than any I have seen in three parts of the globe.'² He had nothing but sympathy for their 'vast and generous design' of liberating Greece and purging Europe of her pestilent enemy.³ In 1791, as at later dates, they had the good fortune to represent the cause of the Greek Church in eastern Europe, and they welcomed in their midst not only Christians from the Ottoman empire, but Serb refugees who had fled from Romish persecution in Hungary.⁴

To such arguments of commercial, political, and religious character the opposition joined the ever-present personalities of party warfare. One who chose the then suggestive pseudonym of A Citizen, ascribed the Russian armament to the disposition of 'an ambitious minister,

¹ Miss Berry's *Journal and Correspondence* (ed. 1865), i. 294; Waliszewski's *Romance of an Empress* (Eng. tr. 1896), p. 245; *Bland-Burges Letters* (ed. 1885), p. 147.

² Eton's *Survey of the Turkish Empire* (1798), p. 432.

³ *Ibid.* p. 397.

⁴ *Daschkaw Memoirs* (ed. 1840), i. 67.

who wishes to divert the eyes of the people from the examination of his operations.’¹ Another addressed Pitt with the words, ‘You shall have neither money for wars nor confidence for corrupt jobs.’² Others delighted to discover that he was wrong in his estimation of Oczakow. It seems clear that warships could travel from Kherson to the mouth of the Dniester at least four miles away from its guns and ‘within fifty fathoms of the point of Killburn’³ (Kinburn), where the Russians already mounted strong batteries. Moreover, the Whigs insisted that, even assuming that war was just and necessary (which they denied), Pitt’s measures could not possibly effect the ends at which he aimed. Prussia was an incapable ally. The British fleet could do little. It was afterwards learnt that 32 Russian ships of the line, 10 large frigates, and 240 well-equipped galleys were ready for action in March 1791 in the neighbourhood of Cronstadt,⁴ while both the Black Sea and the White Sea were guarded well. Riga was inaccessible,⁵ and Cronstadt impregnable;⁶ its road and harbour had been

¹ *Examination of a Pamphlet, etc., by a Citizen* (1791), p. 71.

² *Considerations on the Approach of War* (1791), p. 40.

³ *Eton’s Survey of the Turkish Empire* (1798), p. 96.

⁴ *Tooke’s View of the Russian Empire* (1799), ii. 500.

⁵ *Fortescue MSS. (Hist. MSS. [1894] Comm. Rep., xiv. 5)*, ii. 31.

⁶ *Ibid.* ii. 501.

carefully screened from inspection by any foreigners.¹ It is true that the 18,000 Russian seamen were untrained and ill-disciplined,² but on the other hand the British army and navy were in 1791 as undermanned as the exigencies of the party politics of that era invariably demanded. The navy had so shrunk that eight battalions of infantry were obliged to do the work of marines.³ Had the proposed expedition sailed to the Baltic, the ships would have been manned by soldiers. The Government wanted one thousand men to complete the establishment required for that restricted purpose in April, but notwithstanding the offer of bounties of £3 to every able-bodied seaman, £2 to every ordinary seaman, and £1 to every able-bodied landsman who enlisted,⁴ it was found impossible to raise that number without awaiting the return of two regiments on their way home from Jamaica.⁵ The nation was in fact paying by its insecurity for its fatuous belief that a standing army was unconstitutional and extravagant. Under such circumstances, and in view of Pitt's own acquiescence in the deterioration

¹ Bain's *Sailing Directions for the Baltic* (1796), p. 37.

² Coxe's *Travels in Poland, Russia, etc.* (1803), ii. 311; Chantreau, *Voyage fait en Russie* (1794), p. 191.

³ Fortescue's *British Army* (1902), iii. 519.

⁴ *Social England* (ed. 1904), v. 536.

⁵ Fortescue's *British Army* (1902), iii. 519.

of the army and navy, it was urged that his plans would be as disastrous as they were unprincipled.¹ England herself would never have tolerated in 1763 the attempts of neutral powers to rob her of the fruits of victory in the Seven Years' War, and there was no reason to expect Russia to act otherwise. These contentions were propagated in Parliament and in the press. They found perhaps most forcible and least exaggerated expression in a tract entitled *Serious Enquiries into the Motives and Consequences of our present Armament against Russia*, in which the old test of commercial utility was applied against the Government's scheme with triumphant coldness and calculation. The writer starts by investigating the causes of the war. The Turks were the aggressors;² Catherine herself aimed admittedly at but a modest measure of territorial expansion.³ Oczakow was 'not the avenue to Constantinople';⁴ on the contrary it was of far less value in that respect than Sebastopol,⁵ which was already Russian. If, however, it was of strategic use, it was of no concern to England if such good allies as the Russians threatened a people like the Turks, who had always been friends to

¹ *Short Seasonable Hint* (1791), p. 13.

² *Serious Enquiries* (1791), p. 1.

³ *Ibid.* p. 12.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 16.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 17.

our enemies the French, who were not Christians, and did not even buy British goods. Russia did not threaten any British interest; she was the hope of oppressed Greece, which looked to her for rescue from those who had 'reduced to the vilest subjection the descendants of the inhabitants of Athens and Byzantium.'¹ Prussia was only self-seeking, and if Frederick the Great had hidden his selfishness by his art, Hertzberg 'with a trembling hand cuts at random.'² He grudged Russia her conquests because she had saved Dantzic from absorption by Prussia in 1785.³ In addition to the great volume of trade recognised as passing between Great Britain and Russia, a vast amount of English goods were exported thither by smuggling.⁴ Of the 932 vessels which were laden at the port of St. Petersburg in 1790, 517 were British.⁵ We received from Russia not only flax and timber, but cordage for our sails, iron for our best anchors, oil for our soap and candles.⁶ Pitt had no right to assist Prussia towards her projected appropriation of Poland and Polish trade.⁷ His fleet, though powerless to do much harm, had no grounds to do any 'for a most impolitic and

¹ *Serious Enquiries* (1791), p. 15.

² *Ibid.* p. 32.

³ *Ibid.* p. 34.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 43.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 41.

⁶ *Ibid.* p. 40.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 33, 56.

unjust purpose.’¹ The argument is clinched by a schedule showing the details of Russian exports to Great Britain in 1790, which ranged through a variety of objects from iron and ropes, to 15,000 fox tails, 50 ermine skins, 70 weasel muffs, and 652 dozen smoked tongues.

Such dialectics resulted, as we have seen, in Pitt’s surrender, but the effects of that surrender were happily short-lived. For the moment Russia was alienated, and encouraged to be proud of her alienation. Robert Adair, who visited Catherine in June 1791 with letters of introduction from Fox, and who was described as ‘a clever young man about thirty, tall, thin and pale, with an appearance of considerable vivacity,’² was received with joy and applause; Fawkener was slighted.³ Even loyal followers of Pitt regretted in the coming years that he had not helped Russia to enter Constantinople, which success would have led to the salvation of Greece and possibly to the greater unity of Europe in her resistance to Napoleon. British antagonism made Catherine ‘most cordial and zealous’⁴ towards France in 1791. Her feelings, however, changed as the Revolution

¹ *Serious Enquiries* (1791), p. 59.

² *Bland-Burges Letters and Correspondence* (ed. 1885), p. 174.

³ Tooke’s *Life of Catherine II.* (1800), iii. 318; *Fortescue MSS.* (*Hist. MSS. Comm.* [1894], *Rep.*, xiv. 5.), ii. 100.

⁴ *Burke’s Correspondence* (ed. 1844), iii. 239.

developed. The bust of Fox was removed from its place of honour to join that of Voltaire in a lumber-room;¹ so that it may be admitted that the Napoleonic wars would probably have swept away the effects of any antagonism, however resolute, that Pitt might have displayed towards Catherine II. His plans of 1791 were forgotten as soon as Russia was caught in the vortex of the revolutionary era.

Pitt's attitude towards Prussia had perhaps more definite results. On 30th April 1791 Ewart had a long audience with Frederick William II., who told him how deeply he sympathised with Pitt personally, and that he recognised that his desertion was due to Grenville's insularity and to the prejudice of the country.² Yet as a public man Pitt ceased to be 'either consulted or trusted'³ at Berlin; the Prussians had been too bitterly disappointed. On 8th June 1791 Ewart discovered that the ambassadors in London of Austria, Russia, Denmark and Sweden had each reported to their respective governments that British foreign policy was to be considered a nullity in future.⁴ British influence shrank to insignificant pro-

¹ *Secret Memoirs of the Court of St. Petersburg* (Eng. tr. 1895), p. 69.

² *Fortescue MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. [1894], Rep., xiv. 5), ii. 61.*

³ *Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence* (ed. 1845), ii. 406.

⁴ *Fortescue MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm. [1894] Rep., xiv. 5), ii. 93.*

portions throughout Europe, and Harris wrote from Coblenz in October 1791 that 'everything I have seen since I have been on the continent makes me lament the weakness of our ministers giving way. We have lost a powerful friend and made a powerful enemy by it.'¹ Poland was partitioned in 1793 and extinguished in 1795, without any reference to the power which a few years earlier had been the arbiter of Christendom. Prussia deserted Pitt's first coalition in 1795. Pitt indeed had to pay dearly for his retention of office; it entailed the eclipse of his power in diplomacy, until the impending danger of French conquest restored to him a reputation in international politics which no British statesman has ever excelled.

Judged from the purely English point of view, his abandonment of his foreign policy in order to retain power was a blessing. It did not shake the loyalty of his party. It was but an incident in a great career. Leeds resigned his office on 22nd April 1791, nominally 'from a love of domestic life,'² really because he could not 'blow hot and cold,'³ and was too mortified to share in his chief's surrender; the other

¹ *Malmesbury Diaries and Correspondence* (ed. 1845), ii. 405.

² *Gentleman's Magazine* (1791), lxi. 484; his resignation was not generally known until 8th June. See *Buckingham Memoirs* (ed. 1853), ii. 190.

³ *Auckland Journal and Correspondence* (ed. 1861), ii. 388.

ministers clung to Pitt and their portfolios. Thus the Whigs remained excluded from authority. 'Were Mr. Fox a fresh man there would be little difficulty in getting into office,'¹ wrote one judicious thinker at the time, but the taint of his unpatriotic actions during the American War and of his coalition with North still affected Fox's position in the country, and the opportunity of his party was shattered by Pitt's acceptance of its demands in foreign policy. Grenville, who might have helped it to cast off the reins of Pitt, preferred to remain in the ministry, and to pass from the home to the foreign office in June 1791, rather than to be tied to a leader without principles. After the treaty of Sistova this typical Whig 'oligarch' wrote complacently: 'We shall now, I hope, for a very long period enjoy this blessing [of peace], and cultivate a situation of prosperity unexampled in our history.'² Though obviously unconscious of the impending storm, he felt by intuition that British welfare was dependent upon Pitt's retention of his place. It is of course hard to estimate what would have been the consequences of the Russian armament had Pitt's course been unimpeded. Probably he expected his demonstration of

¹ *Auckland Journal and Correspondence* (ed. 1861), ii. 389.

² *Buckingham Memoirs* (ed. 1853), ii. 196.

force to fall short of actual war, and trusted to the game of bluff. Such a game might have succeeded, for even in the events that happened, neutral writers by no means well inclined towards him attributed Catherine's abstinence from further conquests to his pressure,¹ while his own supporters believed it had caused her to undertake not to obstruct the free navigation of the Dniester,² and acclaimed a print of April 1791, which depicted him as Petruchio taming the Russian shrew.³ On the other hand Catherine was too clever a politician to yield to a lath painted to look like iron, and she recognised, as the French foreign minister, Montmorin,⁴ recognised, that England was then too prosperous in her trade and too anxious for her position in India to risk light-heartedly a war in Europe.

If, however, bluff should fail it is clear that Pitt would not have shrunk from carrying to its logical end his offensive alliance with Prussia and the Porte. On 24th May 1791 he wrote to Ewart that 'the risk and expense of the struggle, even if Russia had not submitted

¹ Ségur, *Histoire du Règne de F. Guillaume II.* (1800), i. 185.

² Rose's *Diaries and Correspondence* (ed. 1860), i. 110; Tomline's *Memoirs of Pitt* (1821), ii. 408; Eton's *Survey* (1798), p. 371.

³ *Social England* (ed. 1904), v. 509.

⁴ *Recueil des Instructions données aux amb. de France (Russie,* éd. Rambaud, 1890), ii. 505.

without a struggle, would not have been more than the object was worth.’¹ Assuredly his fleet might have won laurels in the Baltic, and the Prussian army of over 80,000 men might have played a more splendid part against the 54,000 Russian troops in Livonia than when called upon a few years later to resist Napoleon. We know that France would have given Russia no direct assistance beyond a few naval volunteers,² and that Pitt believed that Russia was already so exhausted as not to be able to endure a war of finance; Catherine’s paper currency was then at a discount of thirty-eight per cent.³ It is, perhaps, idle to speculate as to the fortunes of a struggle which never came, but the drain it must inevitably have caused upon British finances and upon the limited personnel of the British naval and military services would have crippled the country most dangerously on the eve of the greatest crisis in her history. A war of offence for the sake of distant and unpopular issues is a bad prelude to a war for existence, and England was no doubt wise in her decision to treat the war scare of 1791 as an episode rather than an event.

¹ Stanhope’s *Pitt* (1861), ii. 116; Tomline’s *Memoirs of Pitt* (1821), ii. 409.

² *Recueil des Instructions données aux amb. de France* (Russie, éd. Rambaud, 1890), ii. 503.

³ Chantreau, *Voyage fait en Russie* (1794), i. 154.

Yet even as an episode it is full of interest. It illustrates practically that felicific calculus which the Whigs adopted in politics long before they imported it into philosophy. The same utilitarianism that made for peace under Walpole and for war under the elder Pitt, that animated alike the old colonial system and the policy of *laissez-faire* that rose from its ruin, was the basis and the justification of the Whig resistance. Pitt's enemies, indeed, appealed no less warmly for help to those who purported to guide their steps in statesmanship by the dictates of Christianity or by love of freedom, but among the majority of their party such sources of inspiration were secondary if not fictitious. A few years later the same type of politician ranked among British enthusiasts for Napoleon. The moral pleas of the age were rarely distinguishable from clap-trap, and never soared above sentimentality. The Whigs in fact succeeded in 1791, because they perceived where lay the material advantages of the majority of the people. They believed that Catherine's impulsive welcome for every kind of industry, and her foundation of 245 new cities, represented only the dream of an egoist, not a serious menace to British trade; that Russia, with its ignorant people, its debased coinage, and its want of technical skill, would

not for a century to come be a serious rival to England in the East. If they under-estimated the danger to India, they saw at all events the immediate interests of their country. In view of our vast debt to eighteenth-century Britain, it is well to be grateful to the several successive generations who possessed this capacity for judgment.

We are, however, under no less an obligation to the larger wisdom of the younger Pitt. He had the rare gift of looking into the future, and he knew that the actions of a state cannot always be governed by simply calculating what line of conduct will lead ostensibly to the happiness of the greatest number. Ideal statesmanship takes account of other elements in every question—of justice, humanity, and the ultimate good of mankind. Pitt looked beyond the bounds of obvious and present facts, and foresaw the cloud that during the following century darkened the horizon of British India. If his means were not wholly happy in 1791, his ends at least have commended themselves to posterity. He sought to strengthen British influence in the East, to enforce peace throughout Europe, to lighten the heavy burden of safeguarding the north-western frontier of India, and to postpone for so long a period as might be possible the extension of Russian

sovereignty to the shores of the Mediterranean. Time has but served to endear these aims to the English people, and in 1878 they were re-asserted under singularly similar circumstances by as great a master of his craft. If Pitt's faith in Turkish virtue was a delusion, in all other aspects his policy was guided by motives which live still, and by its adoption he ranged himself also among the prophets.

CHAPTER VI

THE BERMUDA PROJECT OF GEORGE BERKELEY

GEORGE BERKELEY'S vision of Saint Paul's College in Bermuda is the only gleam of idealism that lightened English politics in the reign of George I. His personal distinction in metaphysics and theology has too often withdrawn his colonial aspirations from the historian's province, and made them mere material for philosophical biographers. In reality their reception by the country illustrates British political theory, for they reflected upon the prevailing attitude towards native races, while their repudiation by the state was a striking commentary upon its vaunted championship of the Protestant faith. Berkeley's failure shows further how late in the day came the discovery that an empire requires from its subjects a higher education than that of the merchant or the corsair. This part of his dream was not revived until in our own times it fascinated the more robust mind of Cecil Rhodes.

Berkeley came to London from Trinity

College, Dublin, in 1713 at the age of twenty-eight. He was already a notable man of letters and he found a hearty welcome among the leaders of his craft. He sat with Addison in a side box during the first performance of *Cato*, and notwithstanding his host's frequent refreshment with burgundy and champagne, he vouched for the sobriety of that 'great philosopher.'¹ He found Arbuthnot 'the first mathematician of the age, of uncommon virtue and probity,' and Pope 'a Papist, but a man of excellent wit and learning.'² From this famous circle he passed to comparative seclusion for seven years, spent mainly on the continent. On his return he was faced by the distress caused by the South Sea Bubble, and by what he perceived to be more lasting evils. Fresh from the placid life of Italy and highly sensitive by nature, his soul revolted against his environment. The steady rise of material prosperity had not yet softened the undisguised brutality of the nation, nor the cruelty of the penal code. Berkeley hated what he called the 'cozenage and stock-jobbing'³ of the day, and lamented that the country was no longer the home of 'a brave, sincere people of plain,

¹ *Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, vii. 1 (1879); *Egmont MSS.*, p. 238.

² *Ibid.* p. 239.

³ *Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain* (1721), p. 50.

uncorrupt manners.'¹ In May 1722 he conceived the idea of planting the seeds of a simpler and purer England in Bermuda.

Berkeley's churchmanship had hardly less influence upon his conduct than his optimism and benevolence. The natural outlet of British emigration was America, and as Berkeley deemed religion to be the best agency for the reform of character, he saw with dismay that the expansion of British dominions over sea had been unaccompanied by any extension of Anglican activities. By custom established in Charles I.'s reign² the Bishop of London had been accorded the rights of diocesan over the American plantations, and in spite of suggestions made by Laud and Clarendon, and of recommendations made in 1714 by a committee of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, no step had been taken to found a bishopric in any colony.³ That society's charter was specially aimed at preserving negroes and American Indians from 'atheism, infidelity, Popish superstition and idolatry,' and since its establishment in 1701 it had sent out two missionaries to the Iroquois, and assisted other

¹ *Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain* (1721), p. 52.

² *In re the Mayflower. Law Rep.* (1897), P. 208.

³ Wilberforce's *Protestant Episc. Church in America* (1856), p. 153.

Christian adventures among the heathen. In 1722 two of its agents were consecrated by nonjuring bishops to perform episcopal acts.¹ Efforts on a larger scale had been made by the New England Company, which was founded in 1662, and of which Robert Boyle was first governor. Through its munificence John Eliot had been enabled to publish his Indian Bible, and a number of converts had been gathered in the island of Martha's Vineyard. Yet the harvest of such work was as yet trifling, and it was almost entirely won by Puritans. Anglicanism not only failed to grapple with the red men, but also neglected white settlers. It possessed no church in Connecticut before 1724,² and both there and in Massachusetts its scanty followers were forced to contribute towards the upkeep of Congregationalist churches until 1727.³ Missionaries in North Carolina had behaved 'in a most horrid manner,'⁴ and harmed their own cause. There were practically no clergy at all in Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Connecticut and the Carolinas, and very few in Virginia and Maryland. Yale was destitute of Church of

¹ Wilberforce's *Protestant Episc. Church in America* (1856), p. 161.

² Lauer's *Church and State in New England* (1892), p. 74.

³ *Ibid.* p. 85.

⁴ Weeks's *Religious Development in North Carolina* (1892), p. 35.

England doctrinal literature until 1711. No provision was made to educate the aborigines, for New England trusted rather to physical influences for the conversion of hunters and forest-lovers into tillers of the field and Puritans, while other plantations were indifferent. The charter of Harvard had provided in 1650 for the education of Indian youth, but only one red man, Caleb Cheeschaumuck, took a degree there in the seventeenth century, and a building originally designed for twenty Indians, became a workshop for printers.¹

Spiritually the most neglected spot in the empire was Bermuda. In James II.'s reign its governor could find no one entitled to open a letter addressed by the Bishop of London to the first clergyman in the island; the only claimant was an old tailor who had once been a Roundhead field-preacher.² This was the site which Berkeley chose for the task of regenerating Greater Britain. Its selection was probably a mere impulse, though his own statements in his *Proposal* are marked by precise information. Shakespeare, Marvell and Waller had all touched 'the still-vex'd Bermoothes' with romance, and drawn illusory pictures of

¹ *New England Company Correspondence* (ed. 1896), p. xx.

² *Cal. State Papers; Colonial (America and W. Indies, 1685-8)*, ed. 1899, p. 136.

another 'Hesperian garden.' Berkeley was as sanguine as a poet. In March 1723 he wrote that for ten months past he had resolved to spend the rest of his days in Bermuda, and to provide education on that idyllic island for ten savages and ten white men. His humble means received two providential accessions on the eve of his agitation on behalf of a college. The Vanessa of Swift, Hester Vanhomrigh, 'a lady,' writes Berkeley, 'to whom I was a perfect stranger, having never in the whole course of my life exchanged one single word with her,'¹ by her will, dated 1st May, and proved 6th June 1723, left him half her estate. He thus became possessed of £4000, which sum was not wholly exhausted by the long and dreary litigation its bequest involved. John, Lord Perceval, was mainly responsible for the second and more important boon which Berkeley received. He urged him to be assiduous in attending the court with a view to winning an Irish deanery. Disappointed by a legal contest, which impeded his preferment to that of Dromore, he became Dean of Derry in May 1724 with a stipend of £1100 a year. To him the post was but a stepping-stone to the fulfilment of a more romantic hope, and he only welcomed it as a means of influence in launching his scheme

¹ *Egmont MSS. (ut supra)*, p. 241.

for cultivating the simple life in Bermuda. On 3rd September 1724 Swift wrote that Berkeley's heart 'will break if his deanery be not taken from him.'¹

Early in 1725 he published his definite *Proposal for the better Supplying of Churches in our foreign Plantations, and for Converting the savage Americans to Christianity by a College to be erected in the Summer Isles, otherwise called the Isles of Bermuda*.² His primary object was religious, and he chose for a motto, 'The harvest truly is great, but the labourers are few.' The heathen were to be converted, and were to come to the college while still under ten years old, and before bad habits had taken root; they were to learn religion, morality, eloquence, history, mathematics and physic. The English colonists themselves were, however, just as much within the scope of the undertaking. Their children were to be educated, and their clergy were to be Berkeley's own pupils instead of 'the very dregs and refuse' of the priesthood. Bermuda was a spot from which all the British settlements were easily accessible. It was blessed with good air and cheap food; it was the Montpelier of America. It abounded in beef, mutton, fowls, fruit and garden produce.

¹ Fraser's *Berkeley* (1871), p. 102.

² Berkeley's *Works* (ed. Fraser, 1871), iii. 214-30.

Above all, it had no chance of acquiring the extensive trade which had made other colonies luxurious and the mother-country ungodly and debased. Exports like the butter and onions shipped to the West Indies, the joiners' work and matting shipped to the mainland, and the palmetto leaf that made ladies' hats for the English market, would never make Bermuda rich. Berkeley thought the absence of commercial ambitions would harmonise with the primitive spirit of simplicity and common effort. He appealed cheerfully to the public for money. £10 a year would keep a young Indian student in board, lodging, clothes, books and education. An endowment of £200 was enough to keep a missionary for all time. Without diverting any energy from existing organisations for the conversion 'of infidels, Papists and dissenters' at home, he promised a rich harvest for the bounty of any Briton who wished to reap a reward 'in the blessed society of all those who, having turned many to righteousness, shine as the stars for ever and ever.'

This invitation to the sober-minded England of George I. was dressed in more fascinating garb in Berkeley's lines 'On the Prospect of planting Arts and Learning in America':—

‘ Then shall be sung another golden age,
 The rise of empire and of arts,
 The good and great inspiring epic rage
 The wisest heads and noblest hearts.

Not such as Europe breeds in her decay,
 Such as she bred when fresh and young,
 When heavenly flame did animate the clay,
 By future poets shall be sung.’

Berkeley threw into his propaganda the magic vitality that belongs to the disinterested enthusiast. His friends of the Scriblerus Club were transformed from cynics into zealots. In February 1724 Perceval offered him £200, and talked of himself visiting ‘your Eden.’¹ The sum of £5000 was sought from private individuals, and upon the announcement that no subscription need be actually paid before the fund was large enough to build a College and maintain a staff, Walpole promised £200.² The list of donors soon included six peers and the charitable Lady Betty Hastings. Gualtieri, a Venetian, introduced Berkeley to the king, who granted him a charter in June 1725. It directed that the government of St. Paul’s College should be vested in a president and nine fellows. Berkeley was to be the first president; three Dublin men, Thompson, Rogers and King, were to be the first fellows. The visitor was

¹ *Egmont MSS. (ut supra)*, p. 242.

² *Hist. MSS. Comm. Portland MSS.* (1901), vii. 417.

to be the Bishop of London; the chancellor, that secretary of state who for the time being should have America in his province. £10 a year was to cover the expenses of each Indian student. The four pioneers were to start in the spring of 1726, and to retain their British preferments for eighteen months. They were to be furnished with £60 each on embarking. Twenty-three persons offered to receive the contributions of the pious. By 28th December 1725 £3400 had been subscribed; £600 more was promised by the following 10th February.¹ Berkeley felt confident of obtaining £5000 from the public, but he wanted £25,000 for his scheme. Encouraged by his popularity, he looked to Parliament for the balance. In order to avoid drawing upon current revenue, it was suggested that £20,000 might be raised out of land at St. Christopher, ceded by the French in 1713, and estimated to be worth over £80,000.

On 11th May 1726 the charter was considered by the House of Commons, and the survey of the St. Christopher lands by the surveyor-general of the Leeward Islands was laid before it. Only two members voted against a resolution to present an address to George I., that out of the lands in question 'his majesty will

¹ *Egmont MSS. (ut supra)*, p. 242; the dates in this chapter are old style.

be graciously pleased to make such grant for the use of the president and fellows of the College of Saint Paul in Bermuda as his Majesty shall think proper.'¹ Berkeley was delighted, and awaited the payment of the promised sum with feverish impatience. He did not understand Walpole.

The money was never paid. Neither Walpole nor Townshend was likely to tolerate the use of public money for the furtherance of a private romance. In December 1726 George I. was reported to have ordered £20,000 to be paid to Berkeley, but in January 1727 the latter presented a despairing petition, in which he prayed the king to direct the passing of a warrant for providing his endowment.² In June George II. renewed his father's assent to making the payment a first charge upon the lands in St. Christopher, but Berkeley realised that more solid help was not then forthcoming. On 1st August 1728 he married 'an agreeable young lady'³ called Anne Forster, and she and her sister offered to go with him to America. Each lady possessed £1500.⁴ On 3rd September he took leave of his friends, and on the next day he left Greenwich for Rhode Island.

¹ *Journals of the House of Commons*, xx. 697.

² *Cal. Treasury Papers 1720-8* (ed. 1889), p. 437.

³ Boyer's *Pol. State of Great Britain* for Oct. 1728, xxxvi. 313.

⁴ *Egmont MSS. (ut supra)*, p. 242.

Neither Prior, his intimate agent, nor any of the proposed fellows accompanied him, but his companions were nevertheless worthy pathfinders for an educational utopia. They included 'several tradesmen and artists,'¹ two wealthy emigrants called James and Dalton, and 'an excellent musician'² named Depusch. The cargo was said to comprise no less than 20,000 books. Berkeley voyaged to Rhode Island at Perceval's suggestion, with the idea of buying with his own money pasture for supplying the college with fresh meat, and he prayed that God, who had moved him to lay the design, had also given him the spirit proper to prosecute it.³ He proposed to leave Rhode Island for Bermuda as soon as he received his Government grant. On 23rd January 1729 he came to land.

For over two years Berkeley lived in seclusion at Newport. He was long undaunted by the forgetfulness of the English ministry, and said that if his plan had been foolish it would never have captivated king and Parliament in 1725. Cultivating a small estate from which his college would in good time draw its supplies, he wrote *Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher*,

¹ Boyer, *ut supra*.

² *Annual Register* (1763), p. 4.

³ *Portland MSS. (ut supra)*, vii. 467.

a work which was esteemed 'an elegant and genteel defence of religion,'¹ and as such won a niche in the index of the Roman Church in 1742. His little company represented a civilising force among the 18,000 inhabitants of Rhode Island. Berkeley himself was a frequent preacher at 'Trinity Church, Newport, to which he gave an organ. John Smybert, an artist, whose painting of Berkeley now hangs in the gallery of the Massachusetts Historical Society,² became the pioneer of art interests in North America, and was the teacher of Copley. Meanwhile all enthusiasm for the Bermuda project in England had vanished, and the public became thankful that its zeal had not disturbed the unimaginative calculation of the Government. In April 1729 the secretary of the treasury required from the auditor of the receipt a copy of Berkeley's letters patent, but with no friendly intent.³ In May 1730 Walpole told Gibson, Bishop of London, a common friend, that though the promised money would certainly be paid when it suited public convenience, he thought it inexpedient for Berkeley to remain in America in reliance upon that expectation. In September 1731 he left New-

¹ *Annual Register* (1763), p. 3.

² Winsor's *Narrative Hist. of America* (1887), v. 140.

³ *Cal. Treasury Papers 1729-30* (ed. 1897), p. 56.

port for Boston. He arrived in London in February 1732, and published *Alciphron* in March.

Some of the care and indulgence that Berkeley had meant to lavish on Bermuda found an outlet in his parting benefactions to North America. Ninety-six acres and the house of Whitehall in Rhode Island passed to Yale, and that college received also at his hands 880 books, 'whereof 260 were folios,'¹ in 1731, and 1000 more in 1733. He gave Harvard a library. His other benefactions to Yale were applied to giving Latin and Greek scholarships. 'This has been some incitement to excel in classics,'² wrote Douglass in 1760, but it was a result remote indeed from the larger motive of his visit to America.

The fate of the funds that had been placed in the exchequer³ after the sale of the lands in St. Christopher, and that were to have restored the moral grandeur of the English-speaking world, was even more ironical. On 8th May 1733 the House of Commons was asked to help George II. to gratify the proposals of William Charles Henry Frizo, Prince of Orange. This prince was an ugly dwarf, but his marriage to the Princess Royal was expected

¹ Douglass's *Summary* (1760), ii. 187.

² *Ibid.*

³ Hervey's *Memoirs* (ed. 1848), i. 234.

not only to save her from being, as Hervey put it, 'an ancient maid,' but also to tend 'to the further security of the Protestant succession to the Crown of these realms, and to the Protestant interest in Europe.'¹ On 10th May a committee of the House advised that a dowry of £80,000 should be raised out of the St. Christopher funds,² and on 13th June the king's consent was given to an Act 'for enabling his Majesty out of the monies arisen by the sale of the lands' in question to pay £80,000 as a marriage portion for his daughter, and £10,000 to 'the trustees for establishing of the colony of Georgia.'³ This last provision was perhaps a concession to religious interests, as a royal warrant of 30th July 1733 directed that it should be appropriated 'towards defraying the charges of settling foreign or other Protestants'⁴ in Georgia. Berkeley acquiesced in the diversion of the fund to the furtherance of Oglethorpe's undertaking, while Walpole recognised that in dealing with the latter he was dealing with a statesman as well as a missionary. Neither colonial nor religious considerations of any sort, however, prompted the far heavier cash payment made to the Prince of Orange on 14th March

¹ *Journals of the House of Commons*, xxii. 142.

² *Ibid.* xxii. 145.

³ *Ibid.* xxii. 203.

⁴ *Cal. Treasury Papers 1731-4* (ed. 1898), p. 393.

1734,¹ when the royal wedding took place with 'extreme good taste,'² says Hervey, under the velvet hangings and gilt lustres and sconces of 'the little French chapel adjoining St. James's house.'³

By this time all the glamour that had once attached to Berkeley's cause had faded. Those who had actually paid their subscriptions to his fund in 1725 received them back with a sense of relief. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel received £200, which no one claimed.⁴ Men reflected that, after all, the Red Indian could never be civilised. Even Berkeley's friends came to look on his venture with contempt. In December 1731 we find the Bishop of Bangor appealing to Mrs. Clayton (afterwards Lady Sundon) to help Berkeley on his return to court, as if his failure had disgraced him. 'Forget Bermuda,' he writes, 'and he will shine among the clergy, and do honour to the Church by his virtue and learning.'⁵ It was thought a waggish thing, after he had been consecrated to the see of Cloyne in 1734, to use the phrase, 'when the Bishop of Cloyne sets out a second time for Bermuda'⁶

¹ *Cal. Treasury Papers 1731-4* (ed. 1898), p. 538.

² Hervey's *Memoirs* (ed. 1848), i. 311.

³ *Ibid.* i. 306.

⁴ Overton's *English Church* (1906), p. 318.

⁵ *Sundon Memoirs* (ed. 1848), ii. 165.

⁶ *Orrery Papers* (ed. 1903), i. 224.

as a synonym for never. Writers of his own century, however appreciative of his virtue, accused him of whimsical ignorance of human nature. It was pointed out that young students would never have abandoned the ample life of Harvard or Yale for the narrow discipline of a college placed upon a remote island.¹ His optimism as to the effects of education was compared with his naïve belief in tar water as a medical panacea. Even his more recent biographers have treated his crusade as a benevolent vagary. The modern tendency to link later-day movements with the memory of the departed great has associated Berkeley's name with several religious and educational ventures at Yale² and in Bermuda, but there is nothing in such posthumous honours to determine the utility of the project that filled nine years in Berkeley's active life, and that dazzled for a moment the intellect of England.

It is curious in some respects that its appeal to the country was so short-lived, for in the first place its champion was blessed with extraordinary popularity, and secondly, it reflected some typical aspects of the prevailing theory of empire. Few personalities have enjoyed more general favour among men of all

¹ Douglass's *Summary* (1760), i. 149.

² *Two Centuries of Christian Activity at Yale* (1901), pp. 102, 110.

parties. Steele had been his admirer and ally. Swift called him 'a very ingenious man and a great philosopher. . . . A man of worth in the world.'¹ Atterbury had written that 'so much learning, so much understanding, so much innocence and such humanity I did not think had been the portion of any but angels.'² Chesterfield described him as 'a very worthy, ingenious, and learned man.'³ Johnson styled him 'a profound scholar as well as a man of fine imagination.'⁴ Pope ascribed to him every virtue under Heaven.⁵ Warburton wrote that 'he is indeed a great man, and the only visionary I ever knew that was.'⁶

Certainly his conception of a retreat from the mad whirl of town life in the early eighteenth century was one of men's dearest affectations. The college with its inner circus of fellows' houses and gardens, its outer circus of other houses and gardens, and its cypress walk wherein the dead were to be laid to rest, was symbolic of the current trifling with the simple life. Bermuda was traditionally 'a retreat for men of philosophic disposition'⁷ with a popula-

¹ Williams's *English Letters* (ed. 1886), p. 138.

² *Sundon Memoirs* (ed. 1848), ii. 175.

³ Chesterfield's *Letters* (ed. 1845), i. 195.

⁴ Boswell's *Johnson* (ed. 1906), i. 397.

⁵ Hill's *Unpublished Letters* (ed. 1899), p. 195.

⁶ Warburton's *Letters to Hurd* (ed. 1809), p. 45.

⁷ Beawes's *Lex Mercatoria* (ed. 1813), ii. 109.

tion of poor persons 'gay in a rustic manner.'¹ Here then was a scene already apt for the conventional idyll of the poets, a stage already prepared for the European's return to nature. Berkeley's Bermudans were to combine in what he termed 'the retired, academic life,' the ethics of the ecclesiastic with the simplicity of the shepherd. His expression of a craving to escape from the haunts of fops and rakes, bullies and stock-jobbers, was one of the literary flourishes of the age. We find even Americans affecting to regret that they had ceased 'to copy after nature in their food, dress, and every pursuit' according to 'the temperate manner of the red people.'²

Berkeley was in closer touch with the imperialism of his day when he pleaded in his *Proposal* that its adoption might enable Great Britain to displace the Romish powers as the chief missionary and civilising agency in the New World. The political literature of the time is full of regret that the French in Canada far surpassed their British rivals in winning the adherence of the native race, most of whom remained periodically hostile to our colonists down to the end of the war with Pontiac in 1766. Judged purely as a secular experiment,

¹ Douglass's *Summary* (1760), p. 148.

² Adair's *American Indians* (1775), p. 432.

Berkeley's design was far more calculated to impress the Indian imagination than the Puritan method, which was based on the false assumption that the red men could be trained to become peaceful Christian ploughmen and farmers merely by the inculcation of abstract dogma. It would have relied rather on native missionaries, and exposed the shameless French system, which suggested that Christ had been crucified by Englishmen, and that the Virgin Mary was a French maiden.¹ Berkeley's express statement that the policy of France and Spain required to be emulated by the English was thus a deliberate incitement to his country's cherished ideals. We have seen already how the Protestant faith jostles British trade interest among the battle-cries of eighteenth-century politics. The palmetto hats from Bermuda were regarded as ideal imports, as they not only saved British money from drifting to Italy, but also enabled good Protestants to dispense with straw work made by nuns.² The average Englishman of the day might well have expected Berkeley's college to conduce to the extension of British power as well as to the greater glory of God. Such circumstances appear to have warranted a success far more lasting than his acquisition of a charter which was never exer-

¹ Douglass's *Summary* (1760), i. 169.

² *Ibid.* i. 148.

cised, and of a Parliamentary grant which was never paid.

His failure was primarily due to Walpole's personal antagonism. His plan might have appealed to an empire-builder or an Anglican enthusiast, to a moral reformer or a believer in education. Walpole was none of these. He had all the economist's distrust for nebulous ideals, and all the politician's absorption in his country's immediate needs. He had no sympathy for colonial wants, for clerical dreamers, who wanted to purify England and convert the heathen. He knew that Berkeley's ardour was only distasteful to the Whig bishops who thronged his own ante-rooms, and he approved the wise custom that had freed public monies from the burden of sectarian propaganda. The cultivated group patronised by Queen Caroline despised Berkeley as a dreamer while it hailed him as a philosopher. To Walpole a philosopher fell into the same category as a dreamer ; both were mad, and Berkeley was roundly accused by the minister's partisans of being both insane and disloyal.¹

A second cause for the overthrow of his scheme was his mistaken reliance upon the treasury for support. So great was the early

¹ *Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, ix. 3 ; *Stopford Sackville MSS.* (1884), p. 3 ; *Sundon Memoirs* (ed. 1848), ii. 177.

popularity of his movement that he ought to have wanted from the Government nothing more than patronage and facilities. The Anglican laity, who had promised liberal help before Berkeley applied to Parliament for £20,000, became inert when that sum was promised. Even the small sum of £20, directed by George II. to be paid as his bounty to one Joseph Horton, a prospective minister in Bermuda in 1728, was only obtained after two pressing letters had been written by the Bishop of London to the lords of the treasury.¹ A cause so hopelessly dependent on the goodwill of a political party hardly deserved to triumph.

In any event it is clear that Berkeley's utopia was probably bound to fail in securing a real foothold on public opinion, because on one vital point he was out of touch with the social medium of his age. His insistence on abstaining from all industrial development in Bermuda, and on studiously retaining the existing narrow limits of its material prosperity, was fatally at variance with the colonial theory of the day. Indeed the history of the English in Bermuda had been that of a long endeavour to make the islands economically useful. Sir George Summers in the *Sea Venture* had been wrecked

¹ *Cal. Treasury Papers 1720-8* (ed. 1889), p. 542.

on the coast in 1609, and in 1615 the Summer Islands Company had been formed as an offshoot of the Virginia Company to exploit the country as a commercial asset. Its first effort was the cultivation of tobacco, but the results were never remunerative.¹ Attempts to produce sugar and good vines were abandoned as early as 1620.² Then silk-worms were imported, while French vine-growers were tempted from Languedoc, and Germans were brought over to work saw-mills.³ Still the islands did not flourish, and they were further vexed by religious strife. In Charles II.'s reign their oranges found a market in England,⁴ and after 1678 their inhabitants gathered salt in Turk's Island with some profit in spite of chronic molestation by Spaniards. In 1684 the Crown displaced the Company in governing the group and cancelled its charter, but the record of Bermuda's economic struggles became no brighter. In 1693 Richier, the governor, deplored 'the increasing sterility of the soil and the epidemic idleness of the inhabitants.'⁵ The tobacco crop declined steadily. Pineapples were cultivated,⁶ but did not survive the winds

¹ *Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, viii. 2; *Manchester MSS.* (1881), p. 35.

² *Ibid.* p. 36.

³ *Ibid.* p. 37.

⁴ *Ibid. Rep.*, xiii. 2; *Portland MSS.* (1893), ii. 276.

⁵ *Cal. State Papers; Colonial (Am. and W. I., 1693-6)*, ed. 1903, p. 14.

⁶ *Ibid.* (1689-92), ed. 1901, p. 444.

to which they became exposed by the thinning of timber.¹ Whaling expeditions were only undertaken spasmodically. The England of George II. was not a nation to witness calmly as a climax to so much labour and experiment a mere surrender to poverty. As early as 1696 the uses of Bermuda as a naval station were appreciated by the council of trade and the plantations,² and the brigs and sloops built by the islanders of cedar wood, with keel-pieces and beams of oak, and masts of white pine from New England, were reputed 'the best sailers in the world.'³ The Bermudans themselves were famous for their dexterity as fishermen,⁴ and their prodigious skill as divers.⁵ A generation of empire-builders in Britain naturally preferred to seek in the development of such aptitudes some reward for the toil of their ancestors, than to exult in Berkeley's dream of delivering Bermuda from the temptations of wealth.

It is suggestive to turn from the story of Berkeley drawing architectural designs for the erection of a new city of Bermuda, and devising complicated plans for employing the people

¹ Douglass's *Summary* (1760), i. 150.

² *Cal. State Papers ; Colonial (Am. and W. I., 1696-7)*, ed. 1904, pp. 96, 247, 361.

³ *Ibid.* (1693-6), ed. 1903, p. 340.

⁴ Bruce's *Memoirs* (ed. 1783), p. 510.

⁵ Douglass's *Summary* (1760), i. 148.

it was to attract in frugal occupations and peaceful learning, to look instead at more typical reflections of English opinion. Berkeley was addressing the people who had speculated in the South Sea Bubble and who crushed the Ostend Company, who made an idol of trade interests and a hero of Walpole. They had still to learn from Chatham and his greater son most of the doctrines that were to ennoble their crude desire for the expansion of England into a cause, that made not only for their own advancement, but also for the happiness and freedom of manhood. Defoe was writing his *Plan of the English Commerce* while Berkeley was in Rhode Island. It is a sagacious handbook. After surveying the splendid sweep of British trade, it dealt with the Red Indians as useful customers, who would barter valuable peltry for caps and stockings, tools and fire-arms. 'I say nothing of christianising the savages,' Defoe adds, as it is 'remote from our practice.'¹ This is absolutely true, for the English Government has always shrunk wisely from acting as a proselytising agency. The whole of such an outlook as Defoe's upon national policy is essentially prudent. It is for the state to safeguard the interests of the flag and the trader; missionary effort is for the indi-

¹ *Plan of the English Commerce* (1728), p. 341.

vidual. Those who worked in the eighteenth century in the cause of Greater Britain erred often in their excessive suspicion of change and in their obdurate materialism, but they were never foolish.

Nevertheless, although Berkeley's plan was thus a clear defiance to some of the soundest traditions of imperial policy, and also in a measure to the spirit of his age, England would have profited by its adoption. Judged even by the utilitarian standard of that century, its rejection was a national blunder. The Bermuda College would have filled a real gap in the colonial system. It would have added immensely to the stability of the empire, and to the strength of conservative principles in America.

Two reasons why the United Empire loyalists of 1775 found it impossible to organise resistance to the firebrands of the Revolution were the weakness of the Church of England in the colonies, and the wide cleavage that existed between British and American education and thought. Writers like Boucher and Chandler proved how valiantly the few enthusiasts among American Anglicans could do battle for the mother-country. Samuel Seabury, the Westchester 'Farmer,' deservedly fills a space in the American memorial window at Stratford-

on-Avon, for his tracts are the ablest pleas for racial unity among the dialectics of the revolutionary period. Yet his own consecration as Bishop of Connecticut came all too late, and at the hands of the Church in Scotland, and amid a nation of democrats and dissenters his faith in Anglican influence was inevitably a broken hope. The work of all these men would have been far more effectual had the Church done more in the past to make itself a living force in colonial life. It is clear that the important centre of training which Berkeley contemplated would have radiated the current Anglican conceptions of religion and loyalty from Bermuda to the remotest settlements. It would have been a channel for the diffusion of the contemporary British love of old institutions and established order among a people, whose surroundings led naturally to far different sources of inspiration. Had Berkeley's College become a real seed-plot of American culture, it would have materially weakened several of the forces in colonial society that conduced most to discontent, and might even have postponed the Revolution. The far-reaching effects of clerical control over education were evident in eighteenth-century England where Whig influence over the Church only intensified its indifference to political progress.

It is singular that most of Berkeley's critics failed to recognise how greatly his scheme might have modified the current of American thought had it blossomed in Bermuda. Joseph Stock, a divine, who edited Berkeley's works in 1784, struck a true note when he regretted that the nation had neglected to avail itself of a weapon that was so powerful a means of emphasising unity.¹

It does not of course follow that because the College would have thus been useful to the political interests of Great Britain, its success would have necessarily added to the happiness of the world. Judgment on this point must vary according to the creed and politics of the individual. In any case, although the empire could only have been strengthened by any agency which assimilated the thought and religion of England and her colonies, its greater need was the recognition of the fiscal independence of each of its component parts, and no purely educational project could touch this vital point of difference. The chief value of Berkeley's design was therefore not so much its possible utility to the perpetuation of the old colonial system, as its attempt to moralise the effects of British rule. Until late in the eighteenth century, absorption in the profits

¹ Stock's *Berkeley* (1784), i. xvii.

of trade together with the practice of slavery tended to obscure the more humane aspects of England's mission. Walpole's generation was peculiarly lacking in the ideals, which in later times have made the empire synonymous with the sway of justice and liberty. Berkeley's appeal to his countrymen for the more generous treatment of subject races represents one of the earliest endeavours to make the creation of the British empire an object more radiant than the mere opening of new markets.

In this respect it is important to observe that he was far from relying on the mere inculcation of Christian doctrine among the Red Indians. Englishmen were then far too hopeful as to the magic influence of sermons; even so experienced a traveller as James Adair thought that the red men might have been led by gentler treatment to a willing belief in 'the plain and easy principles of Christianity.'¹ History on the other hand bore eloquent testimony to the shallowness of apparent conversions. The New England Company had tried every method of persuasion without real success. Cotton Mather had reported in 1705 'how melodiously Jonathan George (an Indian) set the time for the psalms . . . and how dexterously the young lads of twelve years old could turn to the proofs of the

¹ Adair's *American Indians* (1775), p. 462.

sermon.’¹ Eliot, ‘the nursing father’² of American missions, had put his faith less in ritual and more in simple Bible teaching. Experience Mayhew in 1713 had relied on the visible results of prayer, and had naïvely directed the attention of the savages to the material welfare of converts, who now ‘kept cows and oxen and sheep, and went in good apparel after the manner of the English.’³ Yet all these workers were confronted by the counter argument that if Christianity were true, the English would never persist in despoiling and debasing the native race. The Red Indians could not appreciate the subtle theology of the quarrelsome Puritan sectaries, and said they ‘found religion too hard for them.’⁴ Their habitually grave attention to preachers betokened not incipient conversion but sheer bewilderment.⁵

Now Berkeley aimed indeed to supplant the Anglican missionaries of his day, who were notoriously ‘ignorant and wicked clergymen,’ ‘the dregs and offscourings of our colonies,’⁶ by highly trained enthusiasts, and by natives who had been enlisted as children in the same

¹ *New England Company Correspondence* (ed. 1896), p. 85.

² *Ibid.* p. 65.

³ *Ibid.* p. 102.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 120.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 85 ; cf. Schoolcraft's *Indian Tribes* (1853), iv. 342.

⁶ Adair's *American Indians* (1775), pp. 413-4.

cause. His idea, however, was far wider than that of the religious zealot. He clearly sought not only to forward a theological purpose, but also to achieve the high secular object of humanising the English attitude towards subject peoples. Throughout the century the Red Indians, while hailing the advent of English goods and firearms, prayed to be delivered from the preachers, who only taught them to drink and fight.¹ Berkeley would have made all the pioneers of British territorial expansion in North America, both clergy and laymen, more conscious of the white man's duty, and less hungry for the red man's land. Whether or no his college could have accomplished so splendid a result, the end at least was noble.

A survey of British imperial feeling during the early Hanoverian period would therefore be inadequate if it failed to note Berkeley's attempt to give it an ethical breadth, which it only acquired long afterwards. Politically it might have served to consolidate the empire, and to inoculate the Red Indian tribes against both the influence of the French in 1756, and of the rebel recruiters at Stockbridge in 1775. Morally its success might have been still more momentous and far more indisputably good.

Moreover, there can be no doubt that the

¹ Long's *Voyages* (1791), p. 32.

Bermudas themselves would have had more glowing annals had they received the boon that Berkeley wished to give. Down to the date of his propaganda, religion had been only a pretext in those islands for the persecution of Quakers, and for high poll taxes upon Jews. One governor in William III.'s reign had described their inhabitants as incorrigibly lazy and perverse;¹ another as 'base and niggardly.'² The college, accompanied as it was to have been by an influx of all that was purest in English society, would surely have redeemed the people from their worthlessness. The Bermudas would then have been no hotbed of sedition in 1775, nor could its fishermen have gone down in the history of the American Revolution as the 'disloyal people' of Rodney's official reports.³ Berkeley's austerity must have been mitigated in practice, for no English community would have really exorcised commercialism, and therefore it is reasonable to conjecture that the economic evolution of the islands would not have suffered by their educational rise. The subsequent history of their industrial prosperity is very humble, and to-day their only importance is as a naval station. The only exports are

¹ *Cal. State Papers ; Colonial (Am. and W. I., 1689-92)*, ed. 1901, p. 444.

² *Ibid.* (1693-6), ed. 1903, p. 227.

³ *Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, ix. 3; *Stopford Sackville MSS.* (1884) p. 112.

onions, tomatoes, potatoes, flowers, garden produce and freestone. All Berkeley's diatribes against luxury and lucre could not have endowed Bermuda with a more sterile record of economic achievement.

The abandonment of his college is upon these grounds to be regretted. It is true that the English people showed in their action a wise distrust of the interference of theological designs in the policy of the empire, and a suspicion, by no means unfounded, for the visions of an abstract philosopher. England did not then love metaphysicians. Yet on the other hand, in this special case, the pleadings of the theologian and metaphysician were directed with unusual perspicacity towards the real interests of the state. Berkeley's ideal was the elevation of imperialism to the higher plane, which it reached in fact all too late. History, however, is seldom kind to the man who fails, and in the long and gallant list of British empire-builders, the name of this gentle and gifted thinker has been crowded out.

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